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Summary 
Previous attempts to completely eliminate task-switch costs by improving advance 
preparation (e.g., Schneider, 2016, 2017) and by extensive practicing task rules (e.g., Zhao, 
Wang & Maes, 2018) had limited success; most researchers reported significant “residual” 
switch costs in typical task-switching paradigms, suggesting incomplete preparation of 
tasks. In most task-switching studies it was ignored that participants may have different 
switching abilities and/or strategies. It has been shown, however, that some participants 
perform better than others, showing only small switch costs for specific target-response 
mappings (Lindsen & De Jong, 2010), or reduced switch costs after extended practice of 
task rules (Stoet & Snyder, 2007). Other researchers have claimed that a few select 
participants showed superior performance in multi-tasking as well as other cognitive and 
perceptual tasks (Haaf & Rouder, 2017, 2018; Ramon et al., 2016; Robertson, Noyes, 
Dowsett, Jenkins & Burton, 2016; Strayer & Watson, 2012). It is therefore possible that in 
task-switching a few participants may also perform considerably better than others, 
showing minimal or no errors and no switch costs across different conditions. The present 
thesis aimed to study individual differences in task switching by monitoring group-average 
as well as individual performance under different conditions.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of different task-switching paradigms and accounts 
to explain task-switch costs and residual switch costs. In particular, I discuss studies that 
considered individual differences in various tasks and experimental paradigms.  
In order to detect superior performance in task switching and to study individual 
differences, I conducted an experiment and two follow-up studies that are documented in 
Chapter 2. I employed Generalised Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs; Bolker et al., 
2009) on single-trial RTs in order to investigate whether individual participants exhibit 
comparable switching effects and whether best performers vary across different conditions, 
paradigms, and experiments. Seven psychological scales and a Raven intelligence test were 
also employed in order to better understand possible factors that may be related to 
differences in performance in task switching. The results of Chapter 2 suggest that there 
are considerable individual differences in task switching and that smaller individual switch 
costs may be due to more efficient preparation during cue-stimulus intervals. Furthermore, 
I suggest that efficient task preparation may be linked to better executive control, general 
intelligence, higher motivation, and lower levels of impulsivity.  
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Since efficient preparation after task-cueing plays an important role in reducing or 
even eliminating switch costs, Chapter 3 sought to facilitate faster cue-based preparation, 
thereby reducing switch costs in typical participants. Previous research has suggested that 
task-switch costs are smaller for “transparent” compared to “non-transparent” or standard 
cues (e.g., Logan & Schneider, 2006; Schneider, 2016). In three experiments I compared 
“non-priming” cues with carefully designed “priming” cues that indicate the upcoming 
target feature and response mappings. I found that participants who used priming cues 
showed smaller and non-significant switch costs in their response times, independent of the 
interval between cue and target stimulus. These participants also showed more 
homogenous task-switching performance. In a related EEG study that investigated the 
temporal dynamics of preparation I provide evidence that priming cues elicited 
significantly larger cue-locked positivity in switch trials compared to repeat trials at 
electrode Pz, in different cue-stimulus intervals. Similar to previous results on transparent 
cues, this suggests that preparation can be facilitated (e.g., Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). 
Gender-related individual differences in task switching are investigated in Chapter 
4.  Previous reports on gender differences have been controversial (e.g., Polunina, Bryun, 
Sydniaeva & Golukhova, 2018; Stoet, O’Connor, Conner & Laws, 2013). In Chapter 4 I 
studied whether gender differences are present in the preparation phase of task-switching 
by manipulating the cue-stimulus interval. The results of the experiment in Chapter 4 
suggest that females may have a slight advantage in task switching for longer preparation 
intervals. While individual switch costs varied considerably for female and male 
participants, females showed smaller congruency effects in trials with task repetition. I 
suggest that female participants were faster than males in task preparation. In addition, 
some females seemed to employ a different strategy in repeat trials. For example, they may 
have performed different tasks by recalling cue-stimulus-response associations without 
applying the task rules. 
In Chapter 5, I summarise possible reasons that may lead to superior switching 
performance and discuss other factors that may account for different switching 
performance across individuals. Limitations and future directions of research are also 
outlined. I suggest that individual differences should be considered and reported in order to 
improve model and hypothesis testing and to make results more replicable. Finally, I 
discuss whether superior switching abilities can be related to other tasks and situations. 
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CHAPTER 1 Literature Review 
1.1 Overview of Chapter 1 
In daily life, switching between two or multiple tasks rapidly is not easy and is 
usually accompanied by deteriorated performance, compared to completing one task after 
another. With the interest in understanding how people switch between tasks, a number of 
laboratory-based task-switching paradigms were developed in the past decades.  
Most task-switching paradigms involve two tasks or more. In the past task-
switching experiments, participants were required to judge (a) whether a given digit is 
greater or smaller than 5, or (b) whether the digit is odd or even (e.g., Koch, 2003; Sudevan 
& Taylor, 1987), or (c) whether the letter member is vowel or consonant (e.g., Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002); judge (a) whether a target stimulus is on 
the upper or lower quadrants, or (b) whether the target is on the left or right quadrants (e.g., 
Meiran, 1996; Meiran, Chorev & Sapir, 2000); use “Stroop” stimuli and switch between 
(a) naming the ink colour of a printed word and (b) reading the word (e.g., Allport, Styles 
& Hsieh, 1994; Regev & Meiran, 2014). Task switching is either predictable (Koch, 2003; 
Monsell, Sumner & Waters, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or unpredictable (Meiran, 
1996; Meiran et al., 2000), or even being decided by participants themselves (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004, 2005; Arrington, Weaver & Pauker, 2010; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014). In 
the Section 1.2 of this chapter, I first summarise key task-switching paradigms that were 
widely used in the past decades. I discuss their advantages and limitations while 
highlighting the related individual differences. 
No matter what paradigms and experimental procedures are being employed, 
longer response times and higher error rates are typically reported when switching between 
tasks compared to repeating the same task. Significant differences suggest task-switch 
costs (for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch, Poljac, Müller & Kiesel, 2018; 
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Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). However, it has been shown that 
individual differences in task-switching performance occur and that switch costs vary 
across individuals (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2010; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Stoet & 
Snyder, 2007; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2016). Two major accounts have been proposed to 
explain the commonly observed task-switch costs and individual differences: the 
interference account (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Mueller, Swainson & Jackson, 2007; Rubin 
& Koch, 2006; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003), and alternatively, the preparation 
account (e.g., Altmann, 2004a, 2004b; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; De Jong, 2000; 
Fintor, Stephan & Koch, 2018; Koch & Allport, 2006; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Monsell 
& Mizon, 2006; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schneider, 
2016, 2017; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck & Demanet, 2007). In Section 1.3 I 
critically discuss these two accounts. In addition, since switch costs are defined as 
impaired performance, i.e. increased RTs and ERs in task switching, researchers have tried 
to reduce or eliminate switch costs by improving task preparation (e.g., Nieuwenhuis & 
Monsell, 2002; Schneider, 2016, 2017) and by extensive practice of task rules (e.g., Stoet 
& Snyder, 2007; Strobach, Liepelt, Schubert and Kiesel, 2012; Zhao et al., 2018). 
However, most researchers reported significant “residual” switch costs in typical task-
switching paradigms (e.g., Meiran et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Schneider, 2016, 2017; Zhao et al., 2018; but see Fintor et al., 2018, and 
Verbruggen et al., 2007). Their efforts of reducing switch costs are also summarised in 
Section 1.3.  
Researchers have argued that residual switch costs cannot be eliminated because 
task preparation is unlikely to be completed before target stimulus onset (e.g., Hydock & 
Sohn, 2011; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 
2001; Weidler & Abrams, 2013), does not occur in some of the switch trials (De Jong, 
2000), and is completed only for specific stimulus-response pairs (Lien, Ruthruff, 
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Remington, & Johnston, 2005). However, recent studies have also provided evidence for 
individual differences in task-switching (Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 
2007; Stoet et al., 2013), multitasking (Medeiros-Ward, Watson & Strayer, 2014; Strayer 
& Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010) and in other cognitive tasks (Haaf & Rouder, 
2017, 2018), perceptual tasks (Robertson, et al., 2016; Russell, Duchaine & Nakayama, 
2009) and memory tasks (Mallow, Bernarding, Luchtmann, Bethmann & Brechmann, 
2015; Ramon et al., 2016). These studies suggested that there were a few select 
participants with superior performances in complex tasks that require high level of 
attentional and cognitive control. These exceptional participants may have superior 
executive control, better trait-like abilities, employ more efficient strategies and/or are 
more highly motivated. It is therefore possible that in task-switching experiments a few 
participants may also perform considerably better than others, showing minimal or no 
errors and no switch costs across different conditions. In Section 1.4 I critically discuss 
previous results considering individual differences under different tasks and conditions. 
Their approaches to reveal individual differences and to identify select individuals with 
superior performances are also highlighted. In Section 1.5 I state the general objective of 
the present thesis - to study individual differences in task switching by monitoring group-
average and individual performance under different conditions. Generalised Linear Mixed-
effects Models provide a powerful statistical tool to investigate this (GLMMs; Bolker et 
al., 2009).  
 
1.2 Task-switching paradigms 
The ability to switch between tasks has been investigated in both experimental and 
individual differences research using a variety of task-switching paradigms. In previous 
task-switching studies it has been suggested that different paradigms can measure a unique 
13 
 
switching ability along different dimensions of cognitive control. In this section I will 
summarise some of the pioneering work on task switching. I will also discuss the three 
main paradigms that have been used in past task-switching studies and highlight individual 
differences in performance.  
 
1.2.1 List paradigm  
The paper-and-pencil administered list paradigm of Jersild (1927) is typically cited 
as the first behavioural investigation into task-switching. Jersild (1927) had participants 
working through lists of items. Participants performed lists of the same task repeatedly or 
alternated between two different tasks in other lists. For example, Jersild (1927) asked 
participants to add 6 to each number in List 1 and subtract 3 from each number in List 2. 
Participants were also asked to work through two more lists - List 3 and 4, where responses 
alternate between adding and subtracting. The lists that consisted of only one type of task 
were called “pure lists” or “single-task lists” (List 1 and List 2 in Figure 1.1), and the lists 
that required alternately adding and subtracting were called “shift lists” or “mixed-task 
lists” (List 3 and List 4 in Figure 1). Jersild, using a stopwatch, compared the overall time 
for completing tasks in the single-task lists with the time in the mixed-task lists, and found 
a difference in completion time: Participants took longer time to complete the mixed-task 
lists than the single-task lists, indicating a shift loss of about 30 ms when mixed-task lists 
were performed first and of about 32 ms when mixed-task lists were performed after the 
single-task lists.  
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Figure 1.1. An add-6/subtract-3 example of Jersild (1927) list paradigm. Note that in the 
real experiment there were no white and black background in each trial, so that participants 
alternated between addition and subtraction tasks without explicit task cueing. The 
numbers here are examples, for illustrative purpose only.  
 
According to Jersild (1927), an explanation for the shift loss was that when 
performing in the single-task lists participants only need to establish a set of task rule that 
is relevant to the currently performed list of tasks (e.g., a list of addition task), whereas 
when performing in the mixed-task lists participants need to alternate between different 
task goals and task representations leading to a loss in efficiency. For example, when 
switching from adding to subtracting, the adding rule, i.e., adding 6 to the number needs to 
be inhibited while the relevant subtracting rule, i.e., subtracting 3 from the number needs to 
be activated and applied to the current number-target.  
However, later studies interpreted the performance differences between single-task 
and mixed-task list as increased working memory load for maintaining two different sets of 
tasks and keeping track of the sequence of tasks in mixed-task lists compared to attending 
to only one task in single-task lists (Philipp, Kalinich, Koch & Schubotz, 2008; Rogers & 
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Monsell, 1995). In order to compare the performance between repeat and switch trials to be 
appropriate, both types of trials must be performed under the same cognitive loads or 
demands. There was evidence that performance in task repetitions of mixed-task blocks 
was impaired (i.e., longer response times and higher error rates) compared to task 
repetitions of single-task blocks, reflecting different task conflicts and cognitive control 
processes between single-task and mixed-task blocks (Philipp et al., 2008; Rubin & 
Meiran, 2005). There were no task-repeat trials in Jersild’s mixed-task lists. Therefore, 
Jersild’s list paradigm was criticised as not measuring the pure task-switching process. 
Because of this issue, this experimental paradigm of task switching is seldom used 
nowadays.  
 
 1.2.2 Alternating-run paradigm 
To overcome the problem of Jersild’s list paradigm, Rogers and Monsell (1995) 
developed the alternating-run paradigm. In their study, task-repetitions were included in 
mixed-task blocks, allowing the study of both task-repeat and task-switch trials under 
equal working memory load. Similar to Jersild (1927), the task sequences were predictable.  
In Rogers and Monsell (1995), a pair of a letter and a digit was presented in each 
trial. Participants switched between categorising a letter as a vowel or consonant and 
categorising a digit as odd or even in the letter-digit pair. To help participants to keep track 
of the task sequence, the letter-digit pair was presented on a 2*2 grid, moving clockwise 
(Figure 1.2A). Participants were told to perform the letter task and to respond to the letter 
only when the letter-digit pair was shown in one of the top two cells, and to perform the 
digit task and to respond to the digit only when the pair was shown in one of the bottom 
two cells. As a consequence, this paradigm requires participants to switch to another task 
in every second trial (e.g., letter-digit-digit-letter-letter-digit-digit; the bolded words are 
16 
 
task-switch trials and the unbolded words with underlines are task-repeat trials). 
Participants were asked to press the “left” key on the keyboard for even digits and 
consonants, and the “right” key for odd digits and vowels (Figure 1.2B). Compared to 
performance in task-repetition trials, participants had longer response times and higher 
error rates in task-switch trials. This switch-repeat difference was replicated in other 
studies, even though the upcoming task was simple and predictable, the preparation time 
was more than a second, and there was an external cue that helps participants to retrieve 
the relevant task set (Koch, 2003, 2005, 2008; Monsell, Sumner & Waters, 2003; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995).  
A. 
 
B.  
 
Figure 1.2. Alternating-run paradigm, adapted from Rogers and Monsell (1995, Figure1). 
A. Task-repeat and task-switch trials. The letter-digit pair moves clockwise resulting in an 
AABBAA task order. B. task-response mappings. 
17 
 
Variants of alternating-run paradigm were developed, such as varying the number 
of task repetitions in order to study recovery time from a recent task switch (Monsell et al., 
2003); providing external task cues in order to study whether advance preparation can be 
facilitated (Koch, 2003); requiring implicit learning of the task sequence in order to study 
whether implicit learning and endogenous memory of the task sequence can improve task 
switching (Gotler, Meiran & Tzelgov, 2003; Heuer, Schmidtke & Kleinsorge, 2001; Koch, 
2005, 2008). Although the variety of paradigms, an advantage of the alternating-run 
paradigm is that task-repeat and task-switch trials occur in the same block, allowing to 
study task switching in a block of trials with equal cognitive demands and conflicts. 
There are limitations for alternating-run paradigms. According to Altmann (2007), 
alternating-run switch costs consist of not only costs of switching tasks but also costs 
specific to the first trial of each run due to functional setting up of task representations. 
These costs cannot be separated in the alternating-run procedure. In addition, since the 
upcoming task is predictable in the alternating-run paradigms, participants may keep track 
of the task sequence in memory in order to fast access tasks. Participants may have started 
preparing for an upcoming switch even when they are currently performing in a task-repeat 
trial (i.e., AA BB AA B, the bolded letters are task-repeat trials, in which a switch 
preparation may start). This may cause additional interference in the current task 
processing. According to Meiran and colleagues (1996, 2000), when task switch is 
unpredictable participants were unlikely to prepare the task switch while performing in a 
task-repeat trial, which facilitates the beneficial effect of task repetitions (but see Poljac, 
Koch & Bekkering, 2009).  
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1.2.3 Task-cueing paradigm 
In order to overcome the limitations of the alternating-run procedure, task-cueing 
paradigms or explicit cueing paradigms were developed (Meiran, 1996, 2014; Meiran et 
al., 2000; Sudevan & Taylor, 1987). Task presentation in the task-cueing paradigms can be 
randomly, in contrast to the fixed sequence of task order in alternating-run paradigms. 
Participants know which task to perform in the upcoming trial based on a task cue 
preceding or accompanying the target stimulus. For a classic example, Meiran (1996) and 
colleagues (Meiran et al., 2000) asked participants to perform task switching on a 2 * 2 
grid, in which the target could appear in one of the four cells without a fixed sequence. In 
each trial, there were two subtended arrowheads served as a task cue before the target 
stimulus was presented. The arrowheads that were positioned vertically signalled an 
up/down task, and that were positioned horizontally signalled a left/right task (Figure 
1.3A). Participants can prepare the relevant task between the onset of the cue and target 
stimulus, and press the corresponding key to make a response as soon as the target stimulus 
is presented (Figure 1.3B). Consistent with alternating-run paradigms, researchers found 
that performance in task-switch trials was impaired (i.e., longer response times and higher 
error rates) compared to task-repeat trials, indicating significant switch costs (Altmann, 
2004a, 2004b; Meiran, 1996, 2014; Meiran et al., 2000; Schneider, 2016, 2017).  
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A. 
 
B. 
 
Figure 1.3. Task-cueing paradigm, adapted from Merian et al. (2000, Figure 1). A. 
Example trials of the up/down task and left/right task. B. Task-response mappings were 
counterbalanced between experimental sessions. Each trial starts with a task cue indicating 
the upcoming task. Following the cue-stimulus interval (CSI), participants need to respond 
to the target stimulus based on the relevant task rule. As the examples shown in the figure, 
if the arrows point up and down, an up/down task needs to be performed in the current 
trial. In the example, participant need to press the down key (“3” or “1” depending on the 
experimental session) because the target stimulus appears in the bottom left cell. In another 
example, a right key (“3” or “9” depending on the experimental session) needs to be 
pressed because this is a left/right task and the target stimulus appears in the top right cell. 
Note that the target stimulus can appear in any of the four quadrants in each upcoming 
trial.  
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In addition to the unpredictable task sequences, there is another important 
advantage of the task-cueing paradigms. It allows to study cognitive control processing 
over two critical intervals: (a) the interval between the response in trial n-1 and the cue in 
trial n; (b) the interval between the onset of the task cue and target stimulus in a trial. This 
would separate interference decay process (interval a) from task preparation process 
(interval b) in task switching. I will detail studies on these two control processes in Section 
1.4. In short, the cognitive preparatory process of goal updating and rule activation can be 
involved in interval b whereas the interference from the previous task set and response 
mappings may dissipate gradually in interval a (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010).  
Past results showed individual differences in task-switching following a task cue 
because participants engaged differently in the cue-based preparation (e.g., Lavric, Mizon 
& Monsell, 2008; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; for a review see Karayanidis et al., 2010). For 
example, few participants prepared more efficiently in every trial and therefore showed 
reduced RT switch costs when with a cue-stimulus interval of over a second. Other 
participants engaged in the cue-based preparation only in a proportion of trials (e.g., 
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010). Trials with effective preparation were found to be associated 
with faster responses, and more efficient brain activities (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2010).  
Task-cueing paradigm has limitations. Providing a task cue in each trial yields costs 
of restarting a task (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2002). Studies showed that performance was 
impaired in cued trials compared to trials without a cue. Evidence can be found in task-
switching paradigms with intermittent instructional cues, a cue indicates whether repeating 
the previous task or switching to a different task (Altmann & Gray, 2002; Gopher, Armony 
& Greenshpan, 2000; Poljac et al., 2009). This impaired performance in trials with a cue 
was explained as the disturbed rhythm of a sequential task execution (Gopher et al., 2000) 
and the processes related to cue-based task activation and interference control that arises 
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from a recent activated competing task when in the blocks where tasks are mixed (Poljac et 
al., 2009). However, the restart costs can be reduced by task predictability (Koch, 2005, 
2008; Poljac et al., 2009). 
In addition, task-switching performance using experimental manipulated task-
cueing or a prespecified task sequence may overlook the ability to self-initiate a task. In 
task-cueing paradigms it is unlikely to study self-selected actions (i.e., an initialised goal-
directed process that is related to self-control of attention and voluntary task selection, 
etc.), which however is more critical in daily life. This is appropriately investigated in 
voluntary task-switching paradigms.  
 
1.2.4 Voluntary task-switching paradigm 
Voluntary task switching involves active selection by the participants of which task 
they decide to perform in the upcoming trial while eliminating tight environmental controls 
such as explicit task-cueing, limited task sequence and preparation time (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004, 2005; Arrington et al., 2010; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; Liefooghe, 
Demanet & Vandierendonck, 2009; Mayr & Bell, 2006; Yeung, 2010).  
Generally, voluntary task-switching experiments involve two or more simple 
categorization tasks. A well-known example of the voluntary task-switching is from 
Arrington and Logan (2004). In their study, participants voluntarily determined the 
upcoming task, performing either parity or magnitude judgement on a single digit. 
Specifically, responses made with the left hand using the d and f keys would indicate 
“lower than 5” and “higher than 5”, respectively, in the magnitude judgement task, while 
responses made with the right hand using the j and k keys would indicate “even” and 
“odd”, respectively, in the parity task. Participants received instructions that each task must 
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be performed about equally often and that the sequence of selected tasks is random. 
However, although participants were free to select which task to perform, performance 
significantly deteriorated in task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials (e.g., 
Arrington & Logan, 2004).  
An obvious advantage of voluntary tasks-switching paradigm is that this paradigm 
enables participants to voluntarily engage in an upcoming task, in addition to standard task 
performance measures of response times and error rates. This paradigm enables 
endogenous executive control that is indispensable for making a task choice and producing 
a correct response.  
A critical limitation of this paradigm is that task-switching behaviours may exhibit 
consistent biases away from true randomness, even though participants are asked to 
produce a random sequence of trials. When free to choose which task to perform in a given 
trial, participants tend to repeat tasks more than switching to a different task, resulting in 
repetition bias. Repetition bias can be caused by different experimental manipulations. For 
examples, previous research has shown that the tendency to repeat a same task 
(perseveration) was larger when participants had short time between the response in the 
previous trial and the onset of the target stimulus in the current trial (e.g., Arrington & 
Logan, 2004, 2005; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; Liefooghe et al., 2009). In addition, 
participants were less likely to make voluntary task switching when there was an exact 
stimulus repetition (Arrington et al., 2010; Mayr & Bell, 2006), and even when there was a 
repetition of the stimulus features that were unattended in previous trial (Yeung, 2010).  
However, a recent individual differences study on voluntary task switching and 
traits provided evidence that when participants in the condition where they were required 
to select the shape and location tasks at random and equally often, participants who had on 
average larger RT and ER switch costs were less likely to switch between tasks; they 
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tended to select the harder task (shape task) more often (Umemoto & Holroyd, 2016). 
Moreover, in this study participants who scored higher in persistence had greater 
compliance with task instructions associated with reduced task bias and on average 
reduced RT and ER switch costs. However, the more persistent participants showed on 
average longer response times and higher error rates. Umemoto and Holroyd (2016) 
concluded that individuals high in persistence were more concerned with the higher-level 
aspects of the meta-task (i.e., concerned with switching between tasks) than about 
performance on the tasks themselves. According to the results of an fMRI study by 
Kurniawan et al. (2010), Umemoto and Holroyd (2016) suggested that persistent 
individuals may have more activated anterior cingulate cortex with better cognitive control 
over task selection.  
 
1.3 Task-switching – Main empirical findings and theoretical interpretations  
In the task-switching research, task-switching abilities are studied from many 
perspectives and using three main paradigms: predictable task-switching paradigm, task-
cueing paradigm, and voluntary task-switching paradigm. Based on the specific research 
purposes, the studies usually focus on different cognitive aspects and the data that are 
discussed reveal different task-switching processes. Nevertheless, whatever their focuses 
are and whatever paradigms being employed, it is often a consistent and important finding 
that responses are slower and error rates are higher in task-switch trials than in task-repeat 
trials, resulting in task-switch costs (e.g., Arrington & Logan; 2004, 2005; Jersild, 1927; 
Meiran, 1996, 2014; Meiran et al., 2000; Monsell et al., 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Schneider, 2016, 2017; for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). In previous research using typical task-switching paradigms, 
task-switch costs are considerable, even though (a) the tasks are simple; (b) the task 
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sequence is predictable; and (c) the to-be-performed task is entirely chosen by participants 
rather than decided by experimenters. 
For examples, in an alternating-run paradigm by Rogers and Monsell (1995), on 
average participants responded approximately 200 ms slower and made approximately 4% 
more errors when switching between tasks, even though the task order was entirely 
predictable. Similarly, according to Meiran (1996), although participants were instructed 
by an explicit task cue at the beginning of each trial, responses were approximately 100 ms 
slower and error rates were approximately 2% higher in task switch trials. Using a 
voluntary task-switching paradigm, Arrington and Logan (2004) reported that although 
participants voluntarily decided which task to perform in an upcoming trial, the response 
time switch costs were significant, which is approximately 310 ms. However, there are 
results that indicated individual differences in task-switching performance and that switch 
costs varied across individuals (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2010; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; 
Stoet & Snyder, 2007; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2016). Two major accounts have been 
proposed to explain the commonly observed task-switch costs and individual differences in 
performance: the interference account, and alternatively, the preparation account.  
 
1.3.1 Interference account 
The interference account assumes that task-switch costs are due to persisting 
activation of previously activated task-set or proactive interference, stimulus-based 
interference that cannot be resolved in advance, and response-based interference when 
executing a response (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Koch & Allport, 2006; Mueller et al., 2007; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubin & Koch, 2006; Waszak et al., 2003; Yeung & Monsell, 
2003; for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). 
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Proactive interference 
Allport et al. (1994) published a seminal paper and attributed the task-switch costs 
to persisting interference from the previous trial with a different task. In Allport et al. 
Experiment 5 (1994), participants were asked to perform in several lists of Stroop word 
task, in which participants switched between colour naming and word reading (Stroop, 
1935). There were pairs of trials and the second trial of a pair can be a task switch or task 
repetition. Since participants received task instructions indicating whether a task switch 
was required in the second trial of a pair, they could prepare the relevant task during the 
interval between the response to the first stimulus of a pair and onset of the second 
stimulus in the pair (RSI). However, Allport et al. (1994) found that increasing RSI from 
20 ms to 1,100 ms did not significantly reduce task-switch costs, suggesting proactive 
interference that persists and cannot fully dissipate over the RSI (see also Meiran et al., 
2000).  
Proactive task-set interference is an involuntary after-effect of previous control 
states. Evidence that supports this comes from the observation of task-switch costs which 
are often asymmetrical when switching between two tasks differing in difficulty. For 
example, Allport and colleagues (1994) observed large switch costs when switching from 
the colour-naming to word-reading task, but no switch cost when switching from the word-
reading to colour-naming task. In this study, participants typically performed better in the 
word-reading task compared to the colour-naming task, which means that word reading is 
more automatic and therefore dominant or easier whereas colour naming is less automatic 
and therefore nondominant or more difficult. When performing in task-switch trials, 
previous task set must be inhibited in order to perform the task in a given trial. Switching 
to the nondominant colour-naming task would require a strong inhibition of the dominant 
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word-reading task in the previous trial. However, when the dominant word-reading task 
becomes relevant again, participants must apply more cognitive resources and take longer 
time to recover from the strong inhibition. Therefore, the larger switch costs when 
switching to the word-reading can be accounted by different levels of task-set inhibition, 
with stronger inhibition of the easier task (see also Meuter & Allport, 1999). An alternative 
and simpler explanation was provided by Schneider and Anderson (2010) that suggested 
that the asymmetrical switch costs arises from sequential difficulty effects. Since 
performance was impaired after a difficult trial, response times were longer when 
switching to an easy task and when repeating a difficult task leading to asymmetrical 
switch costs (see their Figure 1). 
The asymmetrical switch costs were replicated in many studies (Meuter & Allport, 
1999; Schneider & Anderson, 2010; Yeung & Monsell, 2003; for reviews see Kiesel et al., 
2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). However, Yeung and Monsell (2003, Experiment 1) 
observed larger switch costs when switching to the more difficult colour-naming task, 
reversed asymmetrical switch costs, if delaying the onset of the word for 160 ms or 320 ms 
after the onset of the colour attribute. In addition, Yeung and Monsell (2003, Experiment 
3) also found reversed asymmetrical switch costs when both tasks differed in response 
category (i.e., using abstract meaning of responses, such as speaking “left”, “right”, “up”, 
and “down”, rather than saying “one”, “two”, “three”, and “four” to respond to colours of 
four digits “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”) and/or response modality (vocal, manual). Researchers 
concluded that reducing the interference between tasks led to decreased or even reversed 
asymmetrical switch costs.  
More recently, there are studies suggesting individual differences in asymmetrical 
switch costs, which may be related to different interference control. Umemoto and Holroyd 
(2016) reported smaller asymmetrical switch costs in high persistent individuals. They 
proposed that higher persistence may be associated with larger activation in the brain area 
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that facilitates cognitive adaptations to conflicts. Other researchers found that video game 
players had reduced asymmetrical switch costs in a flanker task-switching paradigm 
possibly because more efficient strategy to control interference and/or improved executive 
functioning due to more experience with action video games (Cain, Landau & Shimamura, 
2012). 
 
Stimulus-based interference 
In addition to proactive interference, there was stimulus-based interference in task 
switching. Allport et al. (1994) studied task-switching performance using both Stroop 
colour-word stimuli in which the word meaning was always incompatible with the ink 
colour (e.g., RED displayed in yellow) and neutral stimuli in which colour-words were 
printed in black or a string of five Xs was presented in one of five colours (e.g., either RED 
displayed in black, or XXXXX displayed in yellow). They found much smaller switch 
costs in neutral stimuli that afford only one task (37 ms) compared with Stroop stimuli that 
affords two tasks (150 ms). Allport et al. (1994) concluded that switch costs were in part 
from stimulus-triggered interference that cannot be resolved in advance. 
Allport et al (1994) interference account of switch costs was supported by other 
studies (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Andreadis & Quinlan, 2010; Koch et al., 2003; 
Theeuwes, Atchley & Kramer, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; for reviews, see Kiesel et 
al., 2010; Koch, et al., 2018; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Studies suggested that 
performance in task switching, switch costs particularly, is affected by whether or not the 
target stimulus was designed to afford only one task or different tasks. Stimulus was 
univalent or neutral if it only appears in one task whereas stimulus was bivalent if it serves 
as a target in two tasks. Compared with univalent stimuli, studies found larger switch costs 
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for bivalent stimuli because bivalent stimuli have features for both tasks and may increase 
response conflicts in some trials.  
Indeed, bivalent stimuli are not only associated with features of both tasks, but also 
afford a response of the competing task. Bivalent stimuli are considered as “congruent” if 
they are related to the same response in the two tasks, and as “incongruent” if they are 
related to different/conflicting responses in the two tasks (e.g., Meiran, 2000; Rubin & 
Koch, 2006; Schneider 2015). For example, in Rubin and Koch (2006), participants were 
asked to decide whether the target square appears in the upper or lower cells of a 2*2 grid 
in an up-down task and whether it is in the left or right cells in a left-right task. Some 
participants were required to press the key T to indicate upper and left locations, and 
pressed key M to indicate lower and right locations. Therefore, if a target appears in the 
upper left cell or lower right cell, then participants press T and M, respectively, regardless 
of the left-right task or up-down task. This is the congruent condition. In contrast, for 
example, if the target appears in the upper right cell, then participants need to first recall 
the current task goal and then respond according to the appropriate task rules. This is the 
incongruent condition. Rubin and Koch (2006) found that participants on average 
responded more slowly in incongruent condition (500 ms) compared to congruent 
condition (455 ms). The performance difference between incongruent and congruent trials, 
500 ms - 455 ms = 45 ms, is known as the response-congruency effect or congruency 
effect. According to Schneider (2015), congruency effects can be the result of either rule-
based feature categorisation and conflicting feature-response selection or retrieval of 
conflicting target-response associations. The latter hypothesis was supported in a recent 
study by Li, Li, Liu, Lages and Stoet (2019a). This study suggested that conflicting target-
response associations may play a more prominent role in producing congruency effects 
when in experiments where target stimuli were repeated.  
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The congruency effect is a robust finding in task-switching research when using 
bivalent targets (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde & Hoffmann, 2006; Kiesel, Wendt & Peters, 2007; Li 
et al., 2019a; Merian, 1996; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schneider, 
2015; for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). 
However, researchers have reported that some participants had better interference control 
with reduced congruency effects (e.g., Haff & Rouder, 2017, 2018). In addition, recent 
research suggested that congruency effects can be halved in conditions that require 
participants to respond to target stimulus by target-response associations rather than by 
applying task rules (Li et al., 2019a). In previous studies it has been argued that 
congruency effects cannot be reduced by increasing preparation times (e.g., Merian, 1996, 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995), however other researchers found that by increasing the switch 
probability from 25% to 50% or 75%, longer preparation times reduced RT congruency 
effects (Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Another important finding was obtained by Kiesel et al. 
(2006), who observed that the congruency effects can be modulated by trial-to-trial 
congruency. They found that incongruent targets reduced congruency effects in the next 
trial with a task repetition, suggesting conflict adjustment according to the source of 
conflict.  
The congruency effect is more prominent in task-switch trials compared to task-
repeat trials and is related to switch costs (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Bugg & Braver, 2016; 
Kiesel et al., 2007; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubin & Koch, 2006; for reviews see Kiesel 
et al., 2010; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). In a task-switch trial with incongruent target 
stimulus, both target feature and the feature-response mapping that are related to the task in 
the previous trial need to be more inhibited in the present trial with a different task. That is, 
there is higher proactive interference in task-switch trials which requires more attentional 
control, especially in trials with incongruent target stimulus with features associating with 
conflicting responses. In contrast, proactive interference is smaller in task-repeat trials, 
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while the task-irrelevant feature may still capture attention and activate competing 
responses.  
Taken together, there is stimulus-based interference in task switching and task-
switch costs arise in part because of stimulus-based interference. Task-switching 
performance is impaired, if the target stimulus affords features of both tasks, and further 
deteriorated if the target features are associated with conflicting responses in the two tasks. 
In the following I will discuss task-switch costs that arise from response-triggered 
interference. 
 
Response-based interference 
Apart from the proactive interference and stimulus-based interference, there is 
evidence for response-based interference in task-switching. In previous task-switching 
studies, participants typically showed larger switch costs when two tasks are mapped to the 
same response set than when each task is associated with a unique set of responses (Brass 
et al., 2003; Meiran, 2005; Meiran et al., 2000; Yeung & Monsell, 2003; but see Astle, 
Jackson & Swainson, 2008; Mayr, 2001). For example, Meiran et al. (2000) required 
participants to press one key to indicate either up or left, on the basis of the task required, 
while a different key for down or right. This is the bivalent-response condition. In contrast, 
in the univalent-response condition participants were asked to press four different keys to 
indicate four different target locations. Meiran et al. (2000) found larger and significant 
switch costs in the bivalent-response condition compared to univalent-response condition. 
Researchers suggested that when two tasks shared the same response set the previously 
used task-response mapping persists and causes response interference in task-switch trials, 
resulting in large switch costs. The increased task-switch costs with bivalent responses can 
be explained by the need of inhibiting the competing responses.  
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Another response-based interference comes from response repetitions. Studies have 
shown that repeating the same response over two consecutive trials can lead to 
performance benefits for task repetitions but performance costs for task switches (Altmann, 
2011; Mayr & Bryck, 2005; Meiran, 2005; Roger & Monsell, 1995; for reviews see Kiesel 
et al., 2010; Koch, 2018; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). This is because when the 
previously familiar task-stimulus-response association is not applicable to the current 
target stimulus with a different task, an alternative association needs to be established, 
which turns into a cost (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Mayr & Bryck, 2005). Altmann (2011) 
suggested an episodic retrieval model arguing that response repetition costs in task 
switching is less robust as previously thought. In this retrieval model, retrieval of not only 
response but also stimulus, task, and task cue can affect performance. This is because any 
repeated feature between trials serves as a retrieval cue and other features in the retrieval 
trace facilitate or interfere with performance in the current trial depending on whether they 
match or mismatch, respectively, the current processing context (see also Hommel, Proctor 
& Vu, 2004).  
In summary, proactive interference, stimulus-based interference, response-based 
interference and interference due to any mismatching of features between trials can lead to 
impaired performance in task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials. Participants 
show worse performance in switch trials and significant switch costs because in task-
switch trials they need to overcome the interference from the previously activated task set, 
the interference from the irrelevant target feature and response mappings. Therefore, the 
commonly observed switch costs represent the time needed to overcome these sources of 
interference.  
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1.3.2 Preparation account 
Switch-specific or general task preparation 
The preparation account is another account which assumes that task-switch costs 
reflect the additional time of task-set reconfiguration when a task switch is required in an 
upcoming trial (De Jong, 2000; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Other studies 
indicated that the preparation process is not necessarily specific to switch-trials. Instead, 
increasing preparation time can benefit both task repetitions and task switches (Altmann, 
2004a, 2004b; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; Koch, 2001, 2005, 2008; Koch & Allport, 
2006). In addition, ERP studies on task switching have provided evidence supporting both 
switch-specific and general preparation processes (e.g., Karayanidis, Provost, Brown, 
Paton & Heathcote, 2011). Specifically, Karayanidis and colleagues extracted event-related 
potential (ERP) waveforms time-locked to cue onset. It was found that an early central-
parietal positivity emerging at around 250-400 ms after cue onset was linked to faster RTs 
for switch but not for repeat trials, consistent with a switch-specific preparation process. A 
later pre-target negativity at around 500–600 ms was correlated with reduced RTs for both 
switch and repeat trials, consistent with the idea of a general preparation process 
(Karayanidis et al., 2011; see also Mansfield, Karayanidis & Cohen, 2012; Steinhauser, 
Maier & Ernst, 2017; for reviews see Karayanidis et al., 2010; Karayanidis & Jamadar, 
2014, Jamadar, Thienel & Karayanidis, 2015). Accordingly, these results suggest that there 
is a switch-related task reconfiguration process that can be distinct from a general 
preparation. In addition, task preparation may involve multiple subprocesses. 
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Sub-processes of task preparation 
Task preparation following cueing involves distinct subprocesses. Studies using 
electroencephalogram (EEG) measures have found at least two cue-related preparatory 
subprocesses: an earlier process that is associated with task-goal updating and a later 
process that is related to task-rule activation (Jamadar, Michie & Karayanidis, 2010a, 
Jamadar, Hughes, Fulham, Michie & Karayanidis, 2010b; Karayanidis et al., 2009, 2011; 
Lavric et al., 2008; Nicholson, Karayanidis, Poboka, Heathcote & Michie, 2005; 
Nicholson, Karayanidis, Davies & Michie, 2006; Travers & West, 2008; for a review see 
Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). Researchers identified that different time courses and 
neural-correlated information underlies different task preparation processes.  
For example, Nicholson et al. (2006) compared difference waveform for switch-to 
with switch-away cues in long cue-stimulus intervals of 1000 ms. Switch-to cues 
specifically signalled the upcoming task, while switch-away cues signalled not repeating 
the same task as in the previous trial without specifying which task to perform in the 
upcoming trial. Nicholson et al., (2006) reported that response time switch costs were 
significantly smaller in switch-to trials compared to switch-away trials. They also observed 
that both cue types elicited an early cue-locked positivity at about 100 ms post-cue that 
was larger in switch trials than in repeat trials at central-parietal sites, indicating 
differential switch positivity, or switch positivity for short. The switch positivity was 
smaller and lasted shorter in switch-away cues, compared to switch-to waveforms over 
approximately 400-450 ms and 700-750 ms within the CSI. Nicholson and colleagues 
suggested that the early positivity was affected by the need to inhibit a previously relevant 
task-set and the need to activate a new task goal while the later positivity may reflect 
selection and activation of the relevant task rules (see also Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; 
Karayanidis et al., 2009). The previous ERP results clearly identified different sub-
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processes of task preparation and suggested that switch costs are caused by incomplete 
preparation in switch trials 
Previous behavioural, ERP and fMRI studies have identified variability in advance 
preparation across trials and participants (e.g., De Jong, 2000; Jamadar et al., 2010a; 
Jamadar et al., 2010b; Lavric et al., 2008; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; for a review see 
Karayanidis et al., 2010). For example, by establishing cumulative response time 
distributions, De Jong and colleague (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010) found that 
RT distributions differed between switch and repeat trials, between trials with long and 
short preparation intervals, and varied across participants. Some participants had large 
overlaps for RT distributions between repeat and switch trials with long preparation 
interval, suggesting better preparation. Similarly, Lavric et al. (2008) indicated little or no 
switch costs in fast response trials (i.e., efficient preparation), whereas slow trials showed a 
large switch cost (i.e., less or no preparation). They also partitioned the ERP data into fast 
and slow RT trials. Their results showed a reliable switch-related posterior positivity in the 
prepared or fast trials, but not in the unprepared or slow trials. Furthermore, in an fMRI 
study by Jamadar (2010b), individual variability in preparation and RT switch costs was 
associated with activations in premotor cortex that subserves goal-related response 
planning and generation. 
 
1.3.3 Residual switch costs 
In previous task-switching research, it was established that switching between tasks 
slows responses and increases error rates (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010). In order to make the 
performance to be efficiency in task-switch trials as in task-repeat trials, several studies 
had tried to reduce switch costs by increasing preparation times.  
35 
 
Evidence shows that prolonging the time interval before target stimulus onset 
reduces task-switch costs because participants have longer time to prepare the task, 
suggesting a preparation effect (for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). For example, in an alternating-runs paradigm, a between-
block increase of response-stimulus interval from 150 ms to over half a second 
substantially reduced switch costs (e.g., Monsell et al. 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
Similarly, using task-cueing paradigms researchers found that a within-subject increase of 
cue-stimulus interval leads to reduced switch costs (Altmann, 2004a, 2004b; Koch, 2001, 
2005; Koch & Allport, 2006; Meiran, 1996, 2014; Meiran et al., 2000). Studies on 
voluntary task switching also indicated large preparation effect on switch costs when more 
time was available before selecting a task (Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; Demanet & 
Liefooghe, 2014; Liefooghe et al., 2009).  
However, even with long preparation intervals most researchers found significant 
residual switch costs in typical task-switching paradigms (e.g., Altmann, 2004a, 2004b; 
Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; Demanet & Liefooghe, 2014; Koch, 2001, 2005; Koch & 
Allport, 2006; Liefooghe et al., 2009; Meiran, 1996; Meiran et al., 2000; Monsell et al. 
2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; but see Verbruggen et al., 2007; Fintor et al., 2018). For 
example, Meiran et al. (2000) demonstrated that switch costs cannot be reduced further 
when the cue-stimulus interval reached 500 ms, resulting in a residual switch cost of 60 
ms. Similarly, Monsell (2003) showed that the reduction in switch costs reached an 
asymptote after a response-stimulus interval of about 600 ms, resulting in substantial 
residual switch costs of 120 ms that cannot be reduced further beyond 600 ms. Task-
switching models were proposed in order to explain these residual switch costs and are 
discussed in the following. 
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Compound-retrieval account 
Researchers proposed compound-retrieval account and argued that task switching 
reflects additional cue processing (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2010; 
Schneider & Logan, 2005, 2007). In other words, task-switch costs are not completely 
produced by the "endogenous" control operation triggered by task rules. At least a portion 
of the task-switching costs comes from a compound retrieval process. Researchers 
suggested that participants can form cue-target compounds and retrieve the correct 
response for each compound directly from memory (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & 
Schneider, 2010; Schneider & Logan, 2005, 2007). Since the cue also switches when task 
switching, task-switching costs may be due to an additional cue-encoding process or cue-
switching costs that contributes to the observed task-switching cost.   
For example, Logan and Bundesen (2003) employed two-to-one cue-task mappings 
and found large response time difference between cue-repeat trials and cue-switch but task 
repeat trials, whereas little difference between cue-switch task-switch trials and cue-switch 
but task repeat trials. They argued that task-switch costs are caused by switching cues. 
However, other studies suggested a number of conditions under which task switching is 
larger than cue switching (see a review in Jost, De Baene, Koch & Brass., 2013), such as 
the probability of task switching (e.g., Monsell & Mizon, 2006) and the type of cue (e.g., 
Logan & Schneider, 2006). The performance differences between task-switch and task-
repeat trials are from more complex cognitive processes, such as establishing different task 
representations in working memory, rather than perceptual processing of the cue itself 
(Altmann, 2006; Grange & Houghton, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 
2006). 
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Two-stage account of task reconfiguration 
Other researchers have proposed two separate stages of task reconfiguration in task 
switching (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001): an 
early goal reconfiguration stage that can be triggered as soon as participants are cued 
about the task, and a second rule activation stage that only starts when the target stimulus 
is presented. Residual switch costs reflect the second rule-activation stage where 
participants wait for the target stimulus onset before they can activate a specific task rule. 
This account has been supported by more recent studies (e.g., Hydock & Sohn, 2011; 
Weidler & Abrams, 2013). However, the assumption that residual switch costs arise from 
the postponed completion of reconfiguration has been challenged by De Jong’s (2000) 
failure-to-engage account. 
 
Failure-to-engage (FTE) account  
According to De Jong’s (2000) FTE account on task-set preparation, participants 
either prepare for the upcoming task or fail to do so. In trials in which active preparation 
occurs, the residual switch costs disappear because advance preparation is complete before 
the target stimulus is presented. In other trials, however, advance preparation is incomplete 
when the target stimulus is presented, and this may occur even after extended preparation 
intervals. Residual switch costs are therefore a consequence of participants who 
occasionally fail to engage in the preparation process. As De Jong (2000) pointed out, 
response time distribution of task-switch trials should reflect a mixture of prepared and 
unprepared processing states (see also Lindsen and De Jong, 2010; Nieuwenhuis & 
Monsell, 2002; Poboka, Karayanidis, & Heathcote, 2014). This implies that performance in 
fully prepared task-switch trials should be similar to performance in task-repeat trials. In 
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line with this, Poboka et al. (2014), for example, reported that switch and repeat trials had 
very similar RT distributions in conditions with long cue-target intervals. 
 
Partial-mapping preparation (PMP) account 
Lien and colleagues (Lien et al., 2005) proposed a PMP account and argued that 
task preparation is partial. There were three different stimulus-response pairs in their study: 
left, middle and right, in the order of English reading. They found non-significant switch 
costs for the left (first) stimulus-response pair, but significant costs for the middle and right 
stimulus-response pairs. They suggested that advance preparation for a task switch was 
much more effective for the first, or high-priority stimulus-response pair, and therefore 
concluded that full preparation is typically limited to a few specific stimulus-response pairs 
because of the limited capacity of working memory and focused attention (see also 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Residual switch costs therefore reflect the unprepared S-R pairs.  
However, Lindsen and De Jong (2010) mimicked Lien et al. experimental 
procedures and failed to show any significant differences in the residual switch costs 
across three S-R pairs. Instead, Lindsen and De Jong found sizable and similar residual 
switch costs for all three S–R pairs. Their mixture-model analysis showed that the overlap 
between cumulative distribution for repeat and switch trials is similar for all three pairs of 
S-R mappings, and independent of preparation intervals. This pattern of results was 
observed in most participants. Therefore, the central tenet of the FTE account, suggesting 
that advance preparation probabilistically fails or succeeds, was supported. Residual switch 
costs reflect occasional failure of preparation. Then, an important question is how to 
motivate participants to engage in the task preparation and possibly eliminate residual 
switch costs.  
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1.3.4 Reducing residual switch costs by improved preparation 
Some researchers have tried to eliminate residual switch costs by improving task 
preparation. For example, Nieuwenhuis and Monsell (2002) used visual feedback and 
payoffs after each block in order to reduce response times. In addition, they used blocks of 
only 16 trials in order to minimize fatigue and to sustain advance preparation throughout 
each block. Nonetheless, they still found substantial residual switch costs, the difference in 
mean RTs between switch and repeat trials, of +69 ms. 
Another method to reduce residual switch costs was deployed by Verbruggen et al 
(2007). They were able to improve participants’ task preparation by reducing the cue 
presentation time. Residual switch costs were smaller and non-significant when the cue 
was removed after a brief presentation of 96 ms rather than remaining present throughout 
each trial (see their Experiments 2, 3, and 4). Verbruggen et al. (2007) concluded that by 
using only a briefly presented cue participants were more likely to process the cue and 
therefore complete preparation for an upcoming task switch within cue-stimulus intervals 
(CSIs) of more than one second (see also Experiment 3 in Proctor, Koch, Vu & 
Yamaguchi, 2008). However, Schneider (2016, Experiment 5) was unable to replicate the 
results of Verbruggen et al. (2007) and instead found large and significant residual switch 
costs when the cue was followed by a mask, similar to a condition where the cue was 
visible for the entire CSI and remained present after target onset. These contrasting 
findings suggest that residual switch costs are not just modulated by cue availability during 
CSIs.  
Moreover, Meiran and Chorev (2005), and Schneider (2017) tried to modulate 
residual switch costs by increasing participants’ phasic alertness — a form of attention that 
is described by rapid and brief changes in sensitivity to external stimulation (Posner, 1978, 
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2008; Posner & Boies, 1971). Researchers inserted an alerting stimulus shortly before cue 
or target stimulus onset in some trials and compared them to trials with no such alert. 
Meiran and Chorev (2005) found reduced RT and small switch costs in alert trials 
associated with long alerting intervals. Similarly, Schneider (2017) also observed shorter 
RTs in trials with alert compared to trials without alert, suggesting that general task 
performance can be improved by increased phasic alertness. However, Schneider (2017) 
found no evidence that phasic alertness reduced residual switch costs. 
More recently, Fintor et al. (2018) studied whether cue-target compatible modality 
can improve task preparation and reduce residual switch costs. In their study, a visual cue 
informed that responding only to the visual target stimulus, and the auditory cue informed 
that responding only to the auditory target stimulus. Participants were asked to indicate 
either the location of a visual or an auditory stimulus, based on the type of cue presented 
prior to the target stimulus. In their Experiment 1, researchers found eliminated residual 
switch costs for RT (3 ms) but not for ER (2.3%) when in cue-target compatible trials with 
a long cue-stimulus interval of 1,000 ms. They explained that when the cue modality was 
identical to the target-stimulus modality, cue-based preparation might have been facilitated 
within long CSIs. Fintor et al. (2018) suggested that task preparation can benefit from cue-
target modality compatibility. Although their results seem to be less comparable with 
previous studies using typical task-switching paradigms with visual cues and target stimuli, 
the study by Fintor et al. (2018) did support the FTE account (De Jong, 2000) 
demonstrating that task preparation can be completed before target onset.  
 
1.3.5 Reducing residual switch costs by practice 
Research on task-switching has looked into practice effects and residual switch 
costs. For example, Rogers and Monsell (1995, Experiment 1) asked participants to 
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perform in an alternating-run paradigm on two consecutive days, with each day consisting 
of 4 blocks of 48 trials each. They found that reduced residual switch costs on the second 
day (186 ms) compared to the first day (263 ms). In addition, Meiran et al. (2000, 
Experiment 1) had participants perform in a task-cueing paradigm consisting of two one-
hour sessions, with 480 trials in each session. The results revealed reduced residual switch 
costs in Session 2 (53 ms) compared to Session 1 (97 ms). Similarly, Koch (2001, 
Experiment 1) also showed significant reduction in residual switch costs after 5 blocks of 
72 trials, with a switch cost of 284 ms in the first block and of 143 ms in the fifth block. 
Note that in all these studies residual switch costs remained sizable and did not disappear 
after moderate practice with hundreds of trials.  
Other studies investigated the effect of more extended practice on residual switch 
costs. For examples, Kray and Lindenberger (2000) observed significant residual switch 
costs of over 100 ms after a practice of 8 sessions with a total of 6,144 trials. Berryhill and 
Hughes (2009) observed that following 5-month training of various task-switching 
paradigms participants still showed modest switch costs of about 20 ms. Similarly, Stoet 
and Snyder (2007) asked participants to perform at least over 23,000 trials in a 
colour/orientation task-switching paradigm. They found that all four participants showed 
significant residual switch costs in RT, ranging from 21 ms to 113 ms. They concluded that 
extensive practice does not eliminate human residual switch costs. This is because the 
evolutionary advantages of human cognitive control that enable human beings to maintain 
focused attention on one particular task for an extended period of time. Strobach et al. 
(2012) further confirmed reduced but significant residual switch costs (10 ms) after a 
practice of more than 7,000-trials on task switching. Strobach and colleagues found that 
practice did not eliminate residual switch costs even when each target stimulus was 
mapped onto a unique response. A very recent study by Zhao and coworkers (2018) 
provided more evidence that participants showed residual switch costs even after 
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performing the task-switching tasks on each of 21 successive weekdays. Accordingly, 
evidence suggests that residual switch costs cannot be eliminated by extensive practice of 
task rules.  
 
1.4 Individual differences 
It appears that residual switch costs are a robust phenomenon in typical task-
switching paradigms despite various attempts that tried to eliminate them (e.g., Schneider, 
2016, 2017). However, most researchers ignored individual differences in task switching 
performance. There is growing evidence that some participants learn to switch between 
tasks better than others, showing faster task switching and fewer errors (Lindsen & De 
Jong, 2010; Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007; Stoet et al., 2013). For example, Stoet and Snyder 
(2007) asked four participants to practice task switching for more than 20,000 trials. They 
observed individual differences in switch costs after extensive practice. Stoet and Snyder 
(2007) found that switch costs were roughly constant for Participant 1, decreased for 
Participant 2 and showed small increases for Participants 3 and 4. Their results suggest that 
participants were differently engaged over the course of task-switching learning. Similarly, 
Lindsen and De Jong (2010) found that 12 out 18 participants showed high degree of 
overlap between the switch and repeat cumulative distribution of the response time for 
their first stimulus-response pair (i.e., the leftmost or high-priority pair of the three 
horizontally aligned stimulus-response pairs, initially assumed by Lien et al. 2005), 
corresponding to the smaller switch costs for this pair. Among the 12 participants there 
were 7 participants showing a large overlap between switch and repeat RT distributions for 
all stimulus-response pairs. These 7 participants showed relatively faster response and 
smaller RT switch costs, however their error rates were similar to other participants. 
Researchers suggested that this subgroup of participants may have been better prepared for 
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every upcoming trial (Lindsen & De Jong, 2010). Individual variability in task preparation 
can also be found in previous ERP and fMRI task-switching studies (e.g., Karayanidis et 
al., 2010).  
In addition, using other related cognitive, perceptual and memory tasks, researchers 
have identified large individual differences with some even providing evidence that not 
every participant showed performance decrements in the more complex condition (e.g., 
Haaf & Rouder, 2017, 2018; Mallow et al., 2015; Russell et al., 2009; Strayer & Watson, 
2012). For example, Haaf and Rouder (2018) re-analysed the data from a Stroop location 
task (Pratte, Rouder, Morey & Feng, 2010) in order to investigate whether every 
participant identified the word location more slowly when, for example, a word RIGHT 
was presented to the left side of the screen (incongruent trials) compared to the right side 
of the screen (congruent trials), showing a positive Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). Haaf and 
Rouder (2018) observed that the average Stroop effect was 11.90 ms with individuals’ 
effects ranging from -19 ms to +68 ms. They also developed a generalised spike-and-slab 
model that captures individual differences in Stroop effects and estimates posterior spike 
and slab probabilities of individuals’ effect. The model consists of a spike referencing the 
point mass at zero and two slabs referencing the positive and negative distributions. 
According to this model, individuals’ posterior probability of being in the slab varies 
considerably, ranging from 0.20 to 0.99. They concluded that some participants showed a 
true positive Stroop effect, whereas others show a true negative effect, whilst others show 
no effect at all (see Figure 5C in Haaf & Rouder, 2018). 
For another example, Watson and Strayer (2010, 2012) reported “super-taskers” 
(2.5% of the sample) who demonstrated high levels of cognitive competence in a dual 
driving/memory task. These super-taskers showed no performance decrements with respect 
to performing single- and dual-task situations. They suggested an individual-difference 
variable accounts for the effect - executive attention. A related study by Medeiros-Ward et 
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al. (2014) investigated the brain activity of super-taskers with matched controls. Medeiros-
Ward and colleagues measured brain activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) while participants performed a demanding dual N-back task with visual and 
auditory stimuli presented simultaneously. Researchers found that super-taskers had 
reduced activity in posterior frontopolar prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices, 
suggesting more efficient recruitment of neural correlates of attentional control and better 
executive control functioning.  
Examples of superior performance were also provided by Russell and colleagues 
(2009). They tested four people who claimed to have exceptional face recognition ability. 
They found that all four face “super-recognisers” performed better than control participants 
in two different face recognition tests: A Before They Were Famous (BTWF) test required 
participants to name famous individuals or provide a uniquely identifying description, 
based on a photo taken before each individual became famous; and an adapted version of 
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) that required 
learning to recognise six unfamiliar faces. In both tests, super-recognisers performed at 
ceiling, showing higher scores than any of the control participants. In a follow-up 
Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT; Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007) 
participants were required to sort a set of six images with frontal views of faces by 
similarity to a target face. The super-recognisers made fewer errors than a new set of 
control participants when the face image was upright. However, they did not perform 
better when the face image was turned upside down (inverted). Russell and colleagues 
(2009) provide evidence for the existence of people with exceptional recognition ability for 
upright faces and on-average ability when in the more difficult condition. That is, when 
super-recognisers were required to recognise an inverted face they showed significant 
inversion decrements similar to the control participants. More recently, the research by 
Robertson et al. (2016) suggested that there were police ‘super-recognisers’ who 
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performed well above normal levels on tests of unfamiliar and familiar face matching, 
independent of the image quality (degraded, high quality). These studies suggest that there 
are large individual variations in perceptual discrimination ability. 
In addition to the existence of super-taskers and super-recognisers, there are also 
“superior memorisers”, who can recall long lists of numbers, sequences of images, or other 
data such as face-name associations over a short time (e.g., World Memory Championships 
in http://www.world-memory-statistics.com/home.php). Mallow et al. (2015) asked 11 
super-memorisers who were successful in the World Memory Championships and 11 
control participants to view 40 digits and memorise as many items as possible within 60s 
duration. Researchers found that super-memorisers were able to recall on average 35.4 of 
the 40 digits, while the control participants recalled on average only 10.8 digits. The super-
memorisers recalled significantly more digits and spent significantly less time on digit 
recalling than the controls. Mallow and colleagues (2015) further demonstrated that 
compared to controls, super-memorisers showed on average more activations in the left 
superior parietal cortex and temporal gyrus during digit-encoding and -learning, and on 
average more activations in left anterior superior temporal gyrus and right motor cortex 
during digit recalling. An fMRI study by Ramon et al. (2016) gave similar behavioural 
results that super-memorisers reached higher scores in face-name association learning. 
Moreover, they were characterised by a lower variability in terms of learning time and 
recall performance, suggesting superior memory abilities and processing skills. However, 
they did not find a reliable association between hippocampal volume and exceptional 
memory skills for face-name associations. In addition, some control participants in the 
study by Ramon et al. (2016) were also able to achieve relatively high scores - especially 
the control participants who took more time during learning phases. This highlights 
motivational components that may play a important role when measuring memory skills. 
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Overall, by considering individual differences researchers found that there were 
exceptional individuals who outperformed others in the complex conditions. Previous 
studies used various approaches to study individual differences with different purposes 
(e.g., Haaf & Rouder, 2017, 2018; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Robertson et al., 2016; 
Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010, 2012). For example, the study by 
Russell and colleagues (2009) showed individual accuracy (number of correct or number 
of errors) in different face recognition tasks using dot plots. Their results indicated that few 
participants performed consistently above average in different tasks. Later, Lindsen and De 
Jong (2010, Experiment 1) used an individual-difference approach to identify the 
probability of advance preparation for three stimulus-response pairs. They compared the 
cumulative distributions for repeat and switch trials in all three stimulus-response pairs 
across 18 individual participants. Using yet another approach, Watson and Strayer (2010) 
monitored individual performance with the aim of identifying supertaskers with superior 
ability in multitasking. They focussed on participants who reached the top 25% of all 
single-task scores and showed no mean performance decline from single-task to dual-task 
condition. As a result, only 5 out of 200 participants met both criteria. Their Monte Carlo 
simulations based on 100,000 participants indicated that the frequency of supertaskers was 
significantly greater than chance. More recently, in order to identify whether some people 
have and other people do not have Stroop effects Haaf and Rouder (2018) plotted the 
observed individual effects from lowest to highest in rank order. Haaf and Rouder found 
that the Stroop effect normally distributed. Moreover, with the usage of a spike-and-slab 
model they identified individual posterior probability of having a true Stroop effect above 
or below zero.  
In the task-switching paradigms, previous research has suggested varying 
preparation across participants, with more efficient preparation indicating better task-
switching performance and smaller switch costs (e.g., Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; 
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Karayanidis et al., 2010). Similar to Haff and Rouder (2018) methods to study individual 
differences, in the present thesis I tried to find out whether RTs and switching costs are 
randomly distributed across participants, by plotting individual-specific intercepts and 
random effects based on GLMM model estimations. In addition, similar to the method 
employed by Watson and Strayer (2010), in Chapter 1 I developed strict selection criteria, 
aiming to identify participants with exceptional task-switching ability. Based on previous 
results on exceptional performance and various cognitive, perceptual and memory tasks, it 
seems reasonable to predict that a few participants may show minimal errors and no costs 
of task switching. If they exist, I wanted to study whether they have characteristics that set 
them apart in different task-switching paradigms and conditions. Another critical issue is 
whether individual differences in task switching may be related to certain underlying traits 
or other factors such as executive control, motivation, and strategies. Previous studies have 
suggested a number of factors that can affect cognitive performances (e.g., Benedek, Jauk, 
Sommer, Arendasy & Neubauer, 2014; Nadler, 2013; Pessoa, 2009).  
In task-switching paradigms, although it has been widely reported that residual 
switch costs cannot be entirely eliminated with strong incentives for task engagement (e.g., 
Schneider, 2017) and with extended practice of task rules (e.g., Zhao et al., 2018), we 
cannot completely rule out the possibility that participants may have different executive 
control functioning that processes and regulates goal-directed thoughts and behaviours (for 
a review, see Diamond, 2013). It is possible that participants with highly efficient 
executive functioning would perform task switching more quickly and more accurately. 
Using a number of cognitive measures, researchers found that some participants had higher 
level of sustained attention, vigilance to the task-relevant information, and greater 
efficiency in working and long-term memory retrieval, suggesting better executive 
functioning (Miyake et al., 2000; Zeidan et al., 2010). 
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Researchers have argued that executive control functioning is strongly linked to 
several trait-related factors such as general intelligence and personality characteristics. For 
example, it has been suggested that general intelligence influenced the efficacy of 
executive controls, with higher intelligence scores were associated with better ability of 
information updating (Benedek et al., 2014; see also Friedman et al, 2006). Moreover, 
Murdock, Oddi and Bridgett (2013) reported that higher openness scores (i.e., a 
psychological characteristic of being open-minded to new experience; Gosling, Rentfrow 
& Swann, 2003) were significantly associated with better cognitive flexibility and 
information updating in working memory, whereas higher neuroticism scores (i.e., being 
anxious, moody and easily upset; Gosling et al., 2003) were significantly associated with 
poorer information updating.  
In addition, Pessoa (2009) hypothesised that motivation impacts executive controls. 
In his proposed model, motivation fine-tunes executive functions that facilitate working 
memory updating. Increasing motivation in participants would also lead to improved 
efficiency in orientation and reorientation of attention in order to meet current behavioural 
demands and opportunities. Consistent with Pessoa (2009), Nadler (2013) suggested that 
motivation benefits cognitive flexibility and improves performance in categorisation 
learning. Studies on task switching have shown decreased response times and error rates 
when motivating participants using rewards, performance feedback and other experimental 
manipulations (e.g., Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; Schneider, 2016, 2017). Previous 
results on working memory tasks have revealed that incentive motivation can modulate 
cognitive performance through top‐down signals with amplified activity over prefrontal 
and visual association regions (Krawczyk & D' Esposito, 2011). However, in the absence 
of external rewards, there is evidence that people who are intrinsically motivated - that is, 
who think a task is useful, interesting and important, and perceive themselves as skillful 
and competent - are more likely to engage in the task and use effective problem-solving 
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strategies (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Struthers, Perry & Menec, 2000; Wulf & Lewthwaite, 
2016). It is possible that in task-switching experiments some participants are more 
interested in the tasks and therefore are more motivated and willing to engage in the 
switching process.  
The question is whether all individuals show switch costs or not, simply because 
some participants may have better executive abilities, are more highly motivated, and/or 
have other traits that may be related to more efficient switching. This is similar to the 
general question posed by Haaf and Rouder (2017, 2018): Does everyone show the same 
effect in a cognitive task? More specifically, in a typical task-switching experiment, do 
individual participants have the same overall performance and show the same switch costs? 
Individual differences in task-switching may be obscured when reporting only averaged 
group performances across tasks, conditions and paradigms. It is necessary to investigate 
not only average performance of a group of participants but also to document individual 
variability whenever possible. 
 
1.5 Aims of the thesis 
In this thesis I investigated how participants, and how males and females differ in 
their task-switching performance. To achieve this, I employed Generalised Linear Mixed-
effects Models (GLMMs; Bolker et al., 2009) on single-trial RTs to study individual 
differences in task switching, in addition to conventional ANOVAs on response times 
(RTs) and error rates (ERs) averaged across trials. I also aimed to find out the origins of 
individual differences in task switching. Therefore, I explored a number of possible 
factors, such as general intelligence, motivation, and personal traits, that may have an 
effect on individual variability in task switching. It was of particular interest whether there 
are superior task-switchers among typical participants, who perform in task switching 
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without showing switch costs in task-switch trials, and what characteristics sets them 
apart? According to previous results, efficient task preparation and reduced interference 
may be the key (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2018; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). If so, 
task-switching performance may be improved by specifically designed cues, however, 
individual differences in different cue types were also highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 2 Identifying Individual differences in Task-switching and 
Explaining the Differences Using Multiple Psychological Scales and 
Cognitive Measures 
2.1 Introduction 
 Previous task-switching research has found that although participants are 
instructed and encouraged to prepare faster, performance is typically impaired with longer 
response times and higher error rates in task-switch trials than in task-repeat trials, even 
after training. Task-switch costs can be reduced by using a number of experimental 
manipulations but residual switch costs remain significant (e.g., Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 
2002; Schneider, 2016, 2017). Researchers typically assume that participants are fully 
engaged and motivated but previous results suggest that participants are unable to prepare 
for the task set in each upcoming trial (failure-to-engage; De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De 
Jong, 2010) and pay more attention to task-set changes in some trials than in others (partial 
preparation; Lien et al., 2005).  
In order to motivate participants to fast prepare the task set in each upcoming trial I 
used a novel procedure that encourages participants to engage in every single trial for an 
extended period. In Experiment 1A, participants were asked to finish the experiment early 
by making no error in a block of 200 consecutive trials with two randomly intermixed 
tasks. I suggest that this “zero-error policy” would motivate participants to fully 
concentrate on the task and reduce "failure-to-engage". However, it is still possible that not 
every participant fully engaged in the demanding experiment. I employed an Intrinsic 
Motivation Inventory (IMI; Deci & Ryan, 2011) to assess participants’ subjective 
experience as well as intrinsic motivation for the task-switching experiment. According to 
previous results in motivation and performance on learning and cognitive tasks (e.g., Deci 
& Ryan, 2008; Krawczyk & D' Esposito, 2011; Nadler, 2013; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 
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2002; Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2016), participants with higher scores in motivation scales may 
have improved performance in the task-switching experiment. 
In addition, according to previous task-switching results on individual differences 
(e.g., Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007) and individual differences in 
other related tasks (e.g., Watson & Strayer, 2010), participants may have different 
executive control and trait-like switching abilities. I employed a Web-based Executive 
Control Function scale (Webexec; Buchanan et al., 2010) to capture participants’ overall 
experience of executive problems. As reported by Buchanan et al. (2010), there is a strong 
negative relationship between Webexec scores and the performance on cognitive tasks 
(mean r = -.35): Participants who reported more executive problems (or higher scores on 
Webexec) showed less well performance in the cognitive tasks, such as lower accuracy in a 
reverse digit-span task and less items recalled in a semantic frequency task.  
Five other psychological traits including self-reported perfectionism, impulsivity, 
cognitive flexibility, trait self-control and personality were measured using Short Almost 
Perfect Scale (SAPS; Rice, Richardson & Tueller, 2013), Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale 
version 11 (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; 
Martin & Rubin, 1995), Trait self-control scale (TSC; Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 
2004), and Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, et al., 2003), respectively. A 
study by Richardson, Rice and Devine (2014) suggested that individuals who had higher 
scores in SAPS tended to be more critical to their performance in a stressful context. Other 
researchers found that perfectionists were less capable of self-regulating their anxiety after 
making an error in cognitive tasks (e.g., Perrone-McGovern et al., 2017). Using BIS-11 
and several measures of executive control researchers concluded that higher impulsiveness 
was related to troubles in deleting no-longer-relevant information from working memory 
(Whitney, Jameson, & Hinson, 2004), difficulty associated with solving cognitive conflicts 
and inhibiting incorrect responses (Enticott, Ogloff & Bradshaw, 2006; Leshem, 2015). 
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Çelikkaleli (2014) employed CFS and showed a positive relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and effective problem-solving skills. A meta-analysis of 102 studies (de Ridder, 
Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok & Baumeister, 2011) indicated that higher scores on 
TSC related to better control and inhibition of undesired behaviours. Similarly, personality 
traits assessed by TIPI were also found to be related to different cognitive characteristics 
(Gosling et al., 2003; Murdock et al., 2013). Accordingly, since successful performance in 
task switching requires sustained attention while fast goal updating before flexible 
switching, it is possible that all of those psychological factors play a role in the individual 
differences in task-switching performance.  
I also studied general intelligence using a Raven’s advanced intelligence test 
(Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). According to Ravan et al. (1998), this test was ideal for 
identifying people with superior reasoning ability and the ability to solve complex 
problem. Deary and colleagues (2012) reported that some people can be better than others 
in the general intellectual abilities, largely due to genetic variances. Evidence has shown 
that intelligence closely links with critical executive control functioning and cognitive 
behaviours (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al, 2006). In a task-switching experiment, I 
predicted that good-performing participants may have higher levels of intelligence. 
In summary, the present chapter sought to investigate how participants differ in 
their task-switching performance using different tasks, conditions and paradigms, with 
particular focus on individual task-switching costs in one experiment and two follow-up 
studies. In addition, I employed seven different psychological scales and a Raven’s 
intelligence test in order to investigate factors that may be related to the different task 
switching.  
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2.2 Experiment 1A 
Experiment 1A aimed to study individual differences in task-switching using a 
highly-demanding procedure. In contrast to conventional task-switching experiments with 
a fixed number of experimental trials, I asked participants to keep trying until they 
completed 200 consecutive trials in a mixed-task block without committing a single 
mistake. Alternatively, testing continued until the experimental session exceeded 90 
minutes. I asked participants to keep practicing the tasks for up to 90 minutes as previous 
results showed improved switching performance after extended training (e.g., Stoet & 
Snyder; 2007; Zhao et al., 2018).  
I assumed that asking participants to complete the experiment by making no error 
in 200 trials would heighten participants alertness and motivation over each consecutive 
trial. In addition, this method provides a series of RT measurements that are not 
confounded by intermittent errors (Regev & Meiran, 2014; Van der Borght, Braem, 
Stevens & Notebaert, 2016). 
According to previous research on individual differences in cognitive (Haff & 
Rouder, 2017, 2018; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Stoet & 
Snyder, 2003, 2007; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010), perception 
(Robertson et al., 2016; Russell et al., 2009) and memory tasks (Mallow et al., 2015; 
Ramon et al., 2016), I anticipated that participants would perform differently in the task-
switching experiment. I expected that a few highly-engaged participants may reach 100% 
accuracy in their best-performing block and show no apparent RT switch costs. Other 
participants may perform more poorly, making frequent errors in the mixed-task block, 
showing significant switch costs, or both. 
In addition to task-switch costs, Experiment 1A also studied congruency effects by 
comparing congruent trials with incongruent trials. I predicted that congruency effects 
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would be smaller in the best-performing block where participants achieved maximum of 
correct responses because Bugg and Braver. (2016) found reduced congruency effects 
when better control of attention across trials. 
In order to study whether individual differences in task switching can be related to 
the differences in personality and other psychological characteristics, I assessed 
participants’ personality as well as other psychological factors including intrinsic 
motivation, impulsivity, trait self-control, executive function problems, cognitive 
flexibility, and perfectionism. Based on previous studies on cognitive performance and 
psychological traits, I predicted that few highly performing task-switchers would show 
higher scores in intrinsic motivation, trait self-control, cognitive flexibility, but lower 
scores in impulsivity, executive function problems and perfectionism.  
 
2.2.1 Experiment 1A Method 
Participants 
I recruited a total of 62 students from the University of Glasgow and Caledonian 
University. I tried to establish a reasonably large sample that would represent typical task-
switching participants including both highly engaged participants and participants with 
relatively lower motivation. All participants received a small reward for taking part and 
were entered into a prize draw to win a £5, £10, or £20. Two participants had to be 
excluded because they quit the experiment before completing the study. I also excluded 
two poorly performing participants because they only achieved a maximum of three trials 
in their mixed blocks. The 14 male and 44 female students in the remaining sample of 58 
participants were between 20 and 34 years old (M = 25.0 years, SD=3.1). All participants 
passed a colour-blindness test (Ishihara, 1983), and they were naive with respect to the 
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task-switching paradigm and experimental purposes. The study was carried out in 
accordance with the recommendations of the BPS Code of Ethics and Glasgow University 
College of Science and Engineering Ethics Committee. All participants gave written 
consent to take part. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet and dimly-lit laboratory. Participants 
were seated in front of a computer screen at a viewing distance of approximately 57 cm. 
The experiment was programmed using PsyToolkit software (an open access software 
toolbox for programming psychological experiments based on Linux operating systems; 
Stoet, 2010, 2017) and run on a PC with a 24-inch screen. In order to improve response 
time measurement, a Black Box toolkit (BBTK) response pad was used to record button-
press responses with millisecond precision. Two of the four white buttons on the response 
pad were used to record responses. All data were analysed in R version 3.4.2 (R Core 
Team, 2017). 
Stimuli and Tasks 
Colour-shape task-switching task  
I employed a pre-cued colour/shape task-switching paradigm. Both cues and 
stimuli were displayed on a black background. The task cues were displayed at the centre 
of the screen. The cues were white isosceles triangles with side length of 35 mm and base 
length of or 42 mm. A triangle pointing upwards indicated a colour task and a triangle 
pointing downwards indicated a shape task. I used four different rectangles as target 
stimuli: a vertically elongated (high) red or green bar, a horizontally elongated (wide) red 
or green bar. The size of the stimuli varied randomly across trials, with the shorter side 
ranging between 6.6 to 33 mm and the elongated side ranging between 46 to 73 mm. The 
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RGB colour of the stimuli also varied randomly across trials (red, green, and blue channels 
could range between 0 and 255, as is standard in many computer applications). For the red 
stimuli, the red channel value ranged between 200 and 255 whereas the green channel 
value equalled blue channel value varying between 0 and 100. For the green stimuli, the 
green channel value ranged between 200 and 255 whereas the red channel value equalled 
blue channel value varying between 0 and 100. The purpose of the variation in colour and 
size of the target stimuli was to encourage participants to use general task rules when 
making responses rather than recalling specific cue-stimulus-response associations from a 
“lookup table” (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007; Dreisbach, Goschke & Haider, 2007; Forrest, 
Monsell & McLaren, 2014). Participants used the same pair of response keys for both tasks 
resulting in congruent and incongruent trials (Figure 2.1). In congruent trials, both task-
relevant and task-irrelevant target features lead to the same (correct) response in both tasks. 
In incongruent trials the distracting target features, if erroneously attended to, would result 
in a different and therefore incorrect response (cf., Kiesel et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 2.1. Illustration of the task rules in the colour/shape task-switching paradigm of 
Experiment 1A. The colour task cue was a white triangle pointing upward, and the shape 
task cue was a white triangle pointing downward. The target stimuli were four rectangular 
bars (colour = red, green; shape = high, wide). LEFT and RIGHT corresponds to pressing 
the left and right button on the response pad, respectively. 
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Psychological scales 
Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI). Personality was assessed by using a Ten-
Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling et al., 2003). The scale contains 10 items to 
assess 5 personality dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability and openness to experience. Participants rated themselves in a 7-Likert scale from 
1 (disagree strongly) to 7(agree strongly). Half of the items were reverse coded. TIPI is an 
ideal self-rating scale because of the concise description of each personality characteristics 
and reliable psychometric properties (mean test-retest reliability = .72). 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI). The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; Deci 
& Ryan, 2011) was used to assess participants’ subjective experience as well as intrinsic 
motivation when performing in the colour-shape task-switching experiment. The IMI 
consists of 22 items in four subscales: interest/enjoyment (7 items; α=.94), perceived 
competence (5 items; α=.88), perceived choice (5 items; α=.90), and pressure/tension (5 
items; α=.86). The interest/enjoyment subscale measures participants’ self-reported 
intrinsic motivation in the task-switching task (e.g., I found the task very interesting); 
perceived competence subscale involves questions concerning the self-assessed 
competence towards the task they have just experienced (e.g., I felt pretty skilled at this 
task); the perceived choice subscale includes questions about whether they participate in 
the task on their own initiative (e.g., I felt like I was doing what I wanted to do while I was 
working on the task); the pressure/tension subscale reflects the negative emotion to the task 
(e.g., I felt pressured while doing the task), which are considered as a negative predictor of 
intrinsic motivation. The items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all true) to 
7 (very true), with the total scores ranging between 22 and 154. Ratings were reversed in 
valence if absence of these aspects of intrinsic motivation indicated above (e.g., I didn't 
really have a choice about doing the task). A higher overall score indicates greater intrinsic 
motivation in the colour-shape task-switching experiment. 
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Web-based Executive Control Function (Webexec). The web-based executive 
control function (Webexec; Buchanan et al., 2010) is an online self-report questionnaire 
which was designed for capturing participants’ overall experience of executive problems. 
Webexec has 6 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .785) assessing problematic thoughts and 
behaviours (e.g., Do you have difficulty carrying out more than one task at a time?). 
Participants respond on a 4-Likert scale (from 1 = no problems experienced through 4 = a 
great many problems experienced), with the scores ranging between 6 and 24. A higher 
score indicates more executive problems.  
Short Almost Perfect Scale (SAPS). The Short almost perfect scale (SAPS; Rice et 
al., 2013) was employed to measure perfectionism. SAPS consists of two subscales: 
Standards (4 items for assessing the standards people set for themselves; e.g., I have high 
expectations for myself.) and Discrepancy (4 items for measuring negative self-evaluation 
of performance or perfectionistic self-criticism; e.g., I am hardly ever satisfied with my 
performance). Participants rated each item on a 7-Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree), with the total score ranging between 8 and 56. A higher score refers to 
more self-defeating thoughts and behaviours. Rice et al. (2013) reported good internal 
consistency coefficients for the Standards subscale (α = .87) and Discrepancy subscale (α 
= .84).   
Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale version 11 (BIS-11). The Barratt’s Impulsiveness 
Scale version 11 (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) is a 30-item self-report questionnaire, which 
is developed to measure different sub-traits of impulsiveness: Non-planning impulsiveness 
(10 items; e.g., I say things without thinking), Attentional impulsiveness (10 items; e.g., I 
do not pay attention.) and Motor impulsiveness (10 items; e.g., I make-up my mind 
quickly.). Each answer is rated on a 4-point ordinal scale, from 1 (Rarely/Never) through 4 
(Almost Always/Always), indicating the ways people act and think in different situations. A 
60 
 
review on BIS-11 by Stanford et al. (2009) demonstrated reliable internal consistency 
(Cronbach's alpha = .59 to .74) and test-retest reliability (r = .61 to .72).  
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS). Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin & 
Rubin, 1995) was employed to measure one’s ability to switch cognitive sets to adapt to 
environmental change. The CFS is a 12-item 6-point Likert scale. Participants point out a 
number from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree) that best shows their agreement 
with each statement (e.g., In any given situation, I am able to act appropriately). Martin 
and Rubin (1995) reported high reliability of the scale (test-retest r = .83).  
Trait self-control scale (TSC; Brief version). To assess individual differences on 
trait self-control or self-regulation, I used a trait self-control scale developed by Tangney et 
al. (2004). The scale is a 13-item 5-point Likert scale (1 “not at all” to 5 “very much”). 
Nine of the items in the scale are reversely scored in order to avoid response bias (e.g., I 
have trouble concentrating). Tangney et al. (2004) reported a high internal consistency 
coefficient of .85 and a test-retest reliability of .87. 
Procedures 
The task-switching experiment lasted up to 90 minutes. Before testing, each 
participant received verbal and written instructions that introduced the task rules for the 
colour and shape task and how they were cued (Figure 2.1).  
Each trial started with the presentation of a task cue signalling the relevant task that 
had to be performed (Figure 2.2). The cue was shown for 250 ms before it was covered by 
a mask for 250 ms followed by a blank screen for 150 ms. Altogether the cue-stimulus 
interval (CSI) lasted 650 ms. The mask could help participants to focus on the cue and to 
initiate task preparation before the target stimulus was presented. The procedure with cue 
masking was similar to Verbruggen et al. (2007) and Schneider (2016). Immediately after 
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the CSI, a target stimulus appeared and remained on screen until the participant gave a 
response or until the maximal RT of 1,500 ms was exceeded. A correct response would 
trigger the next trial after an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 500 ms. If participants failed to 
respond within 1,500 ms, the message “Too slow” appeared for 2,000 ms. If participants 
pressed the wrong key, an error warning was displayed for 2,000 ms. At the end of each 
block or after an incorrect response, each participant received individual feedback 
indicating their mean RTs and the number of consecutive correct trials. 
Participants were asked to fully engage in the experiment with the incentive to 
finish early if they made no error in 200 consecutive trials of the mixed-task block. Once a 
participant gave the wrong response or did not respond in time (counted as incorrect) in the 
mixed-task block, the attempt of reaching zero errors was aborted and the participant 
would receive practice trials in the colour and the shape task for additional task-rule 
practice. The experiment lasted until a participant performed 200 consecutive trials in the 
mixed-task block without mistakes. In case a participant did not manage to reach zero 
errors, the experiment was terminated after 90 minutes, after which participants completed 
7 online psychological scales: TIPI, IMI, Webexec, SAPS, BIS-11, CFS, and TSC. The 
total procedure of questionnaires lasted about 20 minutes.  
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Figure 2.2. Experiment 1A. Schematic timeline of a trial in the colour/shape task-
switching block. 
 
2.2.2 Experiment 1A Results 
Task-switching task 
I examined individual differences in task switching using a novel procedure that 
encouraged participants to make zero mistakes. I first conducted conventional ANOVAs 
on response times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) averaged across conditions from all mixed 
blocks. In addition, I employed Generalised Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs; 
Bolker et al., 2009) using the gamma link-function in order to study individual differences 
in RTs from the mixed-task block with the maximum number of responses (MAX block). 
Each individual can have a different number of trials in their MAX block. GLMMs can 
take into account imbalanced data and typically provide better model fits than conventional 
ANOVAs. In order to guard against model overfitting, I employed information criteria AIC 
(Akaike information criterion; Akaike, 1973) as well as BIC (Bayesian information 
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criterion; Schwarz, 1978) that penalise more complex models. The fixed effects of a 
GLMM reflect group-level performance whereas random effects reveal individual 
variability in RTs. I predicted that participants may vary in their task-switching 
performance, particularly in the MAX blocks, since participants may be differently 
motivated and may have different characteristics. 
 
Mean RTs and ERs from All Mixed Blocks 
The first trial of each block was discarded from the analyses because it cannot be 
classified as a switch or a repeat trial. Error trials were also excluded from the RT analysis. 
Since participants had to start a new block whenever they made an error, it was not 
necessary to exclude trials after an error. Mean RTs and ERs for each participant (see 
Figure 2.3) were entered into separate three-way ANOVAs with repeated measurements on 
factor Task (colour, shape), Trial transition (repeat, switch) and Congruency (congruent, 
incongruent). 
For mean RTs, I observed three statistically significant main effects. There was a 
significant main effect of Task, F(1, 57) = 22.30, p < .001, η2p= .28. Participants responded 
on average more slowly in the shape task (577 ms) than in the colour task (553 ms). In 
addition, there was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 57) = 30.69, p < .001, η2p 
= .35, with slower mean responses for incongruent trials (581 ms) compared to congruent 
trials (550 ms). 
More importantly and in line with previous findings, I found a statistically 
significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 57) = 76.53, p < .001, η2p = .57. Responses 
were slower in trials with task-switching (591 ms) compared to trials with task repetition 
(540 ms), indicating an average RT switch cost of +51 ms. The switch cost was larger in 
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the incongruent trials (SC = switch - repeat = +61 ms, p < .001) than in the congruent trials 
(SC = +41 ms, p = .015), indicating a statistically significant interaction between Trial 
transition and Congruency, F(1, 57) = 5.99, p = .018, η2p = .10. No other interaction effects 
were statistically significant. 
For ERs, I found a significant main effect of Congruency, suggesting more errors in 
incongruent trials (8.08%) than in congruent trials (2.62%), F(1, 57) = 43.63, p < .001, η2p 
= .43. As in the RT analysis, I found a statistically significant main effect of Trial 
transition, suggesting more errors in switch trials (6.26%) than in repeat trials (4.44%), 
F(1, 57) = 13.08, p < .001, η2p = .19, indicating a significant ER switch cost of +1.82%. 
The ER switch costs were larger in the incongruent condition (SC = +3.52%, p < .001) 
than in the congruent condition (SC = +0.13%, p = .904), F(1, 57) = 10.37, p = .002, η2p 
= .15. No other effects reached statistical significance.  
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Figure 2.3. Responses of Experiment 1A averaged across all mixed blocks. Mean RTs (top 
panels) and ERs (bottom panels) for Task (colour, shape), Trial transition (repeat, switch) 
and Congruency (congruent, incongruent). Violin plots with superimposed boxplots show 
averaged data of N = 58 participants. Each violin plot represents the estimated distribution 
of mean data in the corresponding condition. Bold horizontal bars and boxes denote 
medians and interquartile ranges, respectively. Black dots represent outliers whereas red 
diamonds and error bars denote means and standard errors, respectively. 
Note: ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = non-significant 
 
The results of the ANOVAs indicate that significant RT and ER switch costs 
occurred, even though participants were asked to make no errors. It is likely that most 
participants only fully engaged in the mixed block where they achieved their maximum 
number of consecutive correct responses and may show no switch costs. Therefore, I 
considered only performance in the MAX blocks in the following analysis. I tried to 
identify how participants differed in their best-performing block (i.e., the MAX block): 
Did some participants perform better than others, e.g., by not making a single error in their 
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MAX block? Did individuals who were fully engaged and highly motivated in their MAX 
block also have zero switch costs? 
 
MAX Blocks 
Participants had different numbers of correct trials in their MAX block (Figure 
2.4A). Only a few valid observations were available for poorly performing participants but 
up to 200 observations for some exceptional participants, leading to imbalanced numbers 
of observations across conditions (M = 109 trials, ranging between 5 to 200 trials). 
Similarly, the individual analyses of RT switch costs showed that individual switch costs 
ranged between -75 ms to +251ms, with an average switch cost of +35 ms in the MAX 
block (Figure 2.4B). 
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A. 
 
B. 
 
Figure 2.4. Experiment 1A. Individual variation in task switching. A. Individual switch 
cost (SC from MAX blocks, and from all mixed blocks, in ms). B. MAX trials (maximum 
number of consecutive trials correct). Triangles and corresponding numbers reflect 
participants who did not make any mistakes in MAX trials. Among them, red triangles and 
the corresponding red numbers in the two plots denote the 9 best-performing participants. 
Please note that the zero-error performers who labeled with grey triangles in panel B 
showed significant switch costs. Participant 7 had zero mistakes and showed significantly 
negative switch costs (switch - repeat = -47 ms, p = .011). Therefore, Participants 7 was 
not considered as a typical best-performer (be accurate and fast in task-switch trials similar 
as in task-repeat trials). Other participants (labeled with grey squares) made frequent errors 
in their MAX block. 
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Best-performing participants in MAX blocks  
I found that after an average practice of 1,233 trials (ranging from 540 to 1,956) 
before the MAX block, a total of 16 participants from the sample were able to finish the 
experiment early by completing 200 consecutive trials in the MAX block without making a 
single error. Among the 16 participants, I identified 9 best-performing participants or best 
performers who learned to switch between tasks without error after relatively few trials 
(mean number of trials before MAX = 1,102 trials, ranging from 540 to 1,656 trials). Each 
of these 9 participants had no significant RT differences between task-switch and task-
repeat trials (mean switch cost of +5 ms). For comparison, the remaining 7 participants, 
who also made no errors in the MAX block, responded more slowly in task-switch than in 
task-repeat trials (mean switch cost of +42 ms). Note that among these 7 participants, a 
two-sample t-test showed that Participant 7 performed significantly faster in task-switch 
trials compared to task-repeat trials showing a negative switch cost of -48 ms (p = .011, 
Cohen’s d = .37). This participant was different from the best-performing performers who 
showed the same accuracy and speed in task-switch as in task-repeat trials. 
In order to study whether the 9 best-performing participants varied in RTs over the 
course of their MAX block, I split the 200 trials from their MAX blocks into the first and 
second 100 (c.f. De Jong, 2000). The corresponding averaged RT data were then submitted 
to a four-way repeated-measure ANOVA with factor Trial transition (task-repeat, task-
switch), Congruency (congruent, incongruent), Task (colour, shape) and Block half (first, 
second). The results showed non-significant main effects of Trial transition (F < 1) and 
Congruency (F = 3.67, p = .092). Best performers showed non-significant switch costs (+5 
ms) and congruency effects (+13 ms). Importantly, the results indicated non-significant 
effects involving Block half, suggesting that the 9 best-performing participants showed 
non-significant change in RTs between the first and the second half of the MAX blocks. 
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The switch costs were +7 ms in the first half and +4 ms in the second half. The congruency 
effects were +8 ms in the first half and +18 ms in the second half. 
 
 RT analyses and individual differences in MAX blocks 
 In order to study RTs and individual task-switching performance in MAX blocks, I 
employed Generalised Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs). Although participants had 
different numbers of responses in their MAX block, hierarchical models can accommodate 
imbalanced RT data and provide estimates of group-level fixed effects as well as 
individual random effects (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008). The latter can capture 
individual differences in task-switching performance. 
I modelled the skewed RT data from the MAX blocks using the lme4 package in R 
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). I tested models with full factorial design (fixed 
effects for Task, Congruency and Trial Transition, and their interactions) and identified the 
most parsimonious model that converged (GLMM 1A.2 in Table 2.1). The model had by-
subject random effects for mean RT (intercepts), Trial transition (slopes) and Task 
(slopes).  
  
70 
 
Table 2.1 
Experiment 1A GLMM comparisons based on 58 participants’ RT data in the MAX block 
(the best model is in bold; GLMM 1A.2). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma 
(link = “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM1
A.1 
RT ~Task + 
Trial.transition + 
Congruency +(1 | 
subject) 
6 79191 79231 -39589 79179   
GLMM
1A.2 
RT ~Task * 
Trial.transition 
*Congruency 
+(1+Task+ 
Trial.transition | 
subject) 
15 79115 79216 -39543 79085 93.77 < .001 
*** 
GLMM1
A.3 
RT ~Task * 
Trial.transition * 
Congruency 
+(1+Task* 
Congruency || subject) 
26 79174 79349 -39561 79122 0.00 1.00 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
In order to report p-values for fixed effects, I used the asymptotic Wald test where 
each “t value” is computed as a ratio between estimated and standard error. In the 
following I report these t -values and the corresponding p -values without degrees of 
freedom (Bates et al., 2015). The fixed effects of the GLMM in Experiment 1A suggest 
that responses were 24 ms slower in the shape task (598 ms) compared to the colour task 
(574 ms), t = 6.52, p < .001; 28 ms slower in switch trials (600 ms) compared to repeat 
trials (572 ms), t = 5.85, p < .001; and 18 ms slower in the incongruent condition (595 ms) 
compared to the congruent condition (577 ms), t = 6.18, p < .001. The two-way interaction 
between Task and Trial transition was statistically significant (t = -2.75, p = .006), 
suggesting larger switch costs when switching to the colour task (+34 ms) than switching 
to the shape task (+23 ms). There also was a statistically significant three-way interaction 
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between Task, Trial transition and Congruency (t = 2.69, p = .007), suggesting that switch 
costs were larger in the colour-congruent condition (+37 ms), compared to the colour-
incongruent condition (+30 ms), the shape-incongruent condition (+25 ms) and the shape-
congruent condition (+20 ms).  
 
Figure 2.5. Experiment 1A. Illustration of by-subject random effects for RTs. Subject 
numbers on the left identify individual participants. Dotplots in the three top panels show 
random intercepts and random slopes of the best performers (no errors and no significant 
switch costs), and the dotplots in the three bottom panels illustrate the random effects of 
the other participants/subjects. Dotplots in the left column illustrate individual deviations 
(dots) and 95% confidence interval (horizontal error bars) from the estimated mean RT of 
the N = 58 participants. The dotplots in the middle and right column show individual 
deviations from the fixed effect of Trial transition and Task (random slopes). The solid 
vertical lines centred on zero in the left, middle and right panels correspond to the 
estimated mean RT (Intercept = grand mean RT of 586 ms), mean switch cost (Trial 
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transition; switch - repeat = +28 ms), and mean task difference (Task; shape - colour = 24 
ms), respectively. The dashed vertical line in the middle and right plot indicate zero switch 
cost and zero task difference, respectively. Please note the differently scaled x-axes (in ms) 
in the left and right panels.  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates that participants varied considerably in their mean RTs 
(Intercepts) from the overall average. Participant 49, for example, was on average 203 ms 
faster and Participant 55 was 327 ms slower than the grand average RT in the sample (586 
ms). The 9 best-performing participants also showed a considerable spread in their mean 
RTs. For example, Participant 46 responded significantly faster and Participant 19 
responded significantly slower than the total average. 
The individual differences in RT switch costs (Trial transition), however, were less 
pronounced and appeared to be independent of individual RTs (Pearson’s r = -.07). I found 
clear deviations from the group-average switch costs of +28 ms in only 3 out of 58 
participants: Participant 7 (-47 ms), Participant 2 (+34 ms), and Participant 17 (+48 ms). 
Not surprisingly, the 9 best-performing participants (Figure 2.5; top middle panel) showed 
smaller switch costs deviating only marginally from the mean switch cost (solid vertical 
line) and none of them deviated significantly from zero switch costs (dashed vertical line). 
In comparison, 12 out of 49 other participants (Participant 2, 11, 12, 17, 24, 28, 30, 37, 40, 
43, 50, and 57) showed switch costs that were significantly larger than zero. 
Similarly, the individual differences in RT task-difference showed a random pattern 
and appeared to be independent of individual RTs (Pearson’s r = .02) as well as individual 
switch costs (Pearson’s r = -.02). None of the best-performing participants showed a 
significant difference between colour and shape tasks and only five of the other 
participants (Participant 9, 16, 29, 31, 40) showed a significant difference between colour 
and shape tasks. 
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Task-switching performance and psychological scales 
Spearman’s correlations (2-tailed) were conducted between task-switching 
performance and psychological traits in N = 58 participants. The task-switching 
performance was indicated by variables including mean RT and RT task-switch costs from 
all mixed blocks and from the MAX block. In addition, the number of trials in the MAX 
block was studied (MAX No.). Error rates from all mixed blocks were also included. 
Significant correlations at the significance level of .05 are presented in Table 2.2.  
I found that the mean RT from all mixed block (ALL_Mean RT) was negatively 
related to the overall score of intrinsic motivation (IMI_overall), and particularly the score 
of feeling interested (IMI_Interest) and competent (IMI_Perceived_competence) in the 
task. In addition, the mean RT from the MAX block (MAX_Mean RT) was only 
negatively related to the motivation subscale of feeling interested (IMI_Interest).  
The switch costs from all mixed blocks (ALL_SC) were positively related to 
executive function problems (WebECF), the overall perfectionism scores (SASP_Overall), 
and the score of feeling disappointed to themselves in the task (SAPS_Discrepancy). 
However, the costs from all mixed blocks were negatively related to the score of being 
emotionally stable (TIPI_Emotionably_Stable), the overall score of being intrinsically 
motivated (IMI_overall), and the score of feeling competent in task switching 
(IMI_Perceived_competence).  
With respect to the switch costs from MAX block (MAX_SC), the costs were 
positively related to the score of attentional impulsivity (BIS_Attentional) and executive 
function problems (WebECF). However, the switch costs were negatively related to the 
score of being emotionally stable (TIPI_Emotionably_Stable), the score of trait self-control 
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(TSC) and the score of feeling that they were actively participating in the task-switching 
experiment (IMI_Perceived_choice).  
Error rates (ALL_ER) were positively related to executive control problems 
(WebECF), the overall score of impulsivity (BIS_Overall), and the score of the subscale 
non-planning impulsivity (BIS_Impulsivity). However, error rates (ALL_ER) were 
negatively related to trait self-control (TSC), the overall score of feeling intrinsically 
motivational (IMI_Overall) and the score of feeling interested (IMI_Interest) and 
competent (IMI_Perceived_competence).  
MAX No. was positively related to the overall score of intrinsic motivation 
(IMI_Overall), the score of the subscale interest (IMI_Interest) and competence 
(IMI_Perceived_competence). MAX No. was negatively related to the score of non-
planning impulsivity (BIS_Nonplanning) and executive function problems (WebECF).  
Best performers and their psychological traits 
As shown in Figure 2.6, best performers appeared to have higher scores compared 
to other participants in trait self-control (TSC; t = 3.22, p = .005), overall intrinsic 
motivation (IMI_Overall; t = 6.51, p < .001), and the subscale interest (IMI_interest; t = 
3.11, p = .009) and competence (IMI_Perceived_competence; t = 4.30, p < .001). However, 
best performers appeared to have lower scores compared to other participants in executive 
function problems (WebECF; t = 3.54, p = .003), overall impulsivity (BIS_Overall; t = 
4.04, p < .001), and the subscale attentional impulsivity (BIS_Attentional; t = 4.46, p 
< .001) and non-planning impulsivity (BIS_Nonplanning; t = 3.63, p = .001).  
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Table 2.2 
Experiment 1A. Spearman’s correlations between task-switching performances and 
psychological traits. 
Scales All_ 
Mean 
RT 
ALL_ 
SC 
ALL_ 
ER 
MAX_ 
Mean 
RT 
MAX_ 
SC 
MAX
_ 
No. 
IMI_Interest -.40**  -.37** -.31*  .40** 
IMI_Perceived_choice     -.28*  
IMI_Perceived_competence -.30* -.28* -.46**   .55** 
IMI_Pressure       
IMI_Overall -.37** -.30* -.51**   .59** 
TIPI_Extraversion       
TIPI_Agreeableness       
TIPI_Conscientiousness       
TIPI_Emotionally_stable  -.29*   -.30*  
TIPI_Openness       
SAPS_Standards       
SAPS_Discrepancy  .37**     
SAPS_Overall  .37**     
BIS_Nonplanning   .34**   -.29* 
BIS_Attentional     .28*  
BIS_Motor       
BIS_Overall   .29*    
WebECF  .35** .38**  33* -.36** 
CFS       
TSC   -.30*  -.34*  
Note. IMI = Intrinsic Motivation Inventory; TIPI = Ten-Item Personality Inventory; 
WebECF = Web-based Executive Control Function; SASP = Short Almost Perfect Scale; 
BIS = Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale; CFS = Cognitive Flexibility Scale; TSC = Trait Self-
control Scale. ALL_RT = Mean RT from all mixed blocks; ALL_SC = Switch costs from 
all mixed blocks; ALL_ER = Error rates from all mixed blocks; MAX_RT = Mean RT 
from the MAX block; MAX_SC = Switch costs from the MAX block; MAX_No. = 
Maximum number of consecutive trials correct. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; blanks represent correlations that were not significant at the .05 level 
(two-tailed). 
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Figure 2.6. Scores of each of the psychological scales between best performers (N = 9) and 
other participants (N = 49). The red dots and error bars represent mean and standard error, 
respectively. 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant 
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2.2.3 Experiment 1A Discussion 
Experiment 1A investigated and revealed individual differences in task switching 
using a novel experimental procedure. I conducted both conventional ANOVAs and 
mixed-effect models to study their task-switching performance. I observed a significant RT 
switch cost of +51 ms averaged across all trial conditions, mixed blocks, and participants. 
However, RT switch costs were reduced to +28 ms in the MAX block. In addition, RT 
congruency effects reduced from +31 ms averaged across all blocks to +18 ms in the MAX 
block. The reduced congruency effects suggested that participants had better attentional 
control with reduced interference in the MAX block (Bugg & Braver, 2016). The reduction 
in the task-switch costs can be attributed to increased engagement and motivation, possibly 
relating to more efficient task-switching strategies in the MAX block. It may be argued 
that switch costs in the MAX block and in all mixed blocks were relatively small compared 
to other task-switching studies. Schneider (2017), for example, found significant switch 
costs of +128 ms for a response-time limit of 2,500 ms. With a narrower response window 
of 1,500 ms, our participants experienced more time pressure and were more motivated to 
respond faster in each trial. This may have attenuated RT differences between switch and 
repeat trials. 
I inspected individual performances in MAX blocks in order to identify participants 
who maximally engaged in task switching over many consecutive trials. I found that 16 
participants managed to complete the experiment early by making no error in 200 
consecutive trials in the mixed-task block (100% accuracy). Among these 16 participants, 
9 (about 15% of the total sample) showed non-significant RT switch costs. I labelled these 
high-performing individuals as best performers. The other participants made an error 
and/or showed significant switch costs in their MAX block, even after practicing the tasks 
for over an hour. Surprisingly, Participant 7 showed a negative RT switch cost. This 
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participant might have employed a strategy that led to faster responses in task-switch 
compared to task-repeat trials. 
As expected the GLMM on RTs in the MAX block indicates individual differences 
in task-switch costs although the differences were relatively small throughout our sample 
of participants. It appears that the best performers showed task-switching characteristics 
that were comparable to most other participants. However, the task-switching procedure in 
Experiment 1A was extremely demanding as it encouraged the highest level of accuracy 
(100% accuracy). A participant who completed the 200 trials without making a single 
mistake had to maintain full attention. Therefore the 9 best performers were quite 
exceptional because they were not only 100% accurate in their switching performance over 
200 trials, but also performed task-switch trials as quickly as task-repeat trials. According 
to the failure-to-engage account (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010), these 
participants were able to fully engage in each upcoming trial for an extended period of 
time. In contrast, other participants seemed less capable during task-switching. They 
occasionally failed to engage in the task and therefore made mistakes and/or showed 
significant switch costs in their MAX block. 
The identification of best performers supports previous studies on individual 
differences in task-switching (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007), multi-tasking (Medeiros-Ward 
et al., 2014; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010) and related cognitive tasks 
(Haff & Rouder, 2017, 2018). In these studies some participants learned tasks better than 
others, suggesting superior cognitive abilities or higher motivation. 
It is possible that the best-performing participants also had superior cognitive 
control. In an additional ANOVA I split the MAX block into the first and last 100 trials. 
The results indicated that these participants did not show significant switch costs or even 
congruency effects in either half. Previous research suggested that reduced switch costs 
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may reflect high-level task engagement (Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; De Jong, 2000), and 
reduced congruency effect may reflect better control of attention that is maintained across 
trials (Bugg & Braver, 2016). I conclude that the best performers were highly engaged in 
each trial for an extended period demonstrating better cognitive control. 
It is also possible that by using a novel experimental procedure where participants 
were encouraged to make no mistake, best performers were more strongly motivated by the 
zero-error policy. Using seven different psychological scales I confirmed that better task-
switching performance was associated with higher levels of motivation. This is in line with 
previous studies suggesting that motivation can influence the efficacy of cognitive 
flexibility (Nadler, 2013; Pessoa, 2009), modulate performance on working memory tasks 
(Krawczyk & D' Esposito, 2011) and facilitate effective problem-solving strategies (Deci 
& Ryan, 2008; Struthers et al., 2000; Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2016). Best performers rated the 
task-switching experiment as more interesting and they felt more competent in the 
experiment, which may be associated with improved cognitive functioning and efficient 
switching strategies.  
Other psychological factors may also play a role accounting for the different 
switching performance between best performers and other participants. Compared with 
others, best performers had relatively lower scores in impulsivity. Best performers reported 
that they were able to focus on the task at hand (BIS_Attentional) and plan the task in 
advance (BIS_Nonplanning), in line with previous results that showed a negative 
relationship between trait impulsivity and cognitive performance (Enticott et al., 2006; 
Leshem, 2015; Whitney et al., 2004). These participants reported also better self-control 
whereas fewer executive function problems experienced in their daily life. These results 
support de Ridder and colleagues (2011) who suggested that higher self-control related to 
better inhibition of goal-irrelavant behaviours, and Buchanan and colleagues (2010) who 
suggested that fewer executive function problems correlated with improved cognitive 
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performance. Accordingly, in line with my prediction, the exceptional task-switching 
performance may not only be due to superior cognitive abilities, but also be linked with 
various psychological factors, i.e. higher intrinsic motivation and self-control, while lower 
levels of impulsivity and executive control problems. 
It is unclear whether the best performers also show exceptional switching 
performance in more conventional task-switching paradigms, where participants are 
allowed to make mistakes. To test this, in the following I invited the best performers to 
take part in follow-up Experiment 1B, in which the experimental conditions were critically 
manipulated. I tried to find out whether best performers would show high accuracy and no 
switch costs, independent of experimental conditions. In a second follow-up, Experiment 
1C, I compared the 9 best performers with 9 control participants who had made frequent 
errors in Experiment 1A, using classic task-switching paradigms. 
 
2.3 Experiment 1B 
Experiment 1B was designed as a follow-up on the best-performers in Experiment 
1A. I sought to study the switching abilities of the best performers by using the same 
colour/shape tasks in a more conventional experimental setting where participants can 
make mistakes without having to start again. In particular, I investigated the cue-stimulus 
interval (CSI) and inter-trial interval (ITI) as critical factors that may affect the task-
switching performance of the best performers. I also tried to identify whether there are 
individuals who would show more superior task-switching performance across different 
conditions and paradigms. 
Experiment 1A had a fixed CSI of 650 ms and a fixed ITI of 500 ms in every trial. 
It therefore remained unclear whether CSI or ITI was critical for their task-switching 
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performance. According to both the FTE account and the task-set reconfiguration account, 
the CSI is considered as more important for reducing residual switch costs because task-set 
reconfiguration occurs during this interval (Altmann, 2004a, 2004b; De Jong, 2000; 
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Meiran et al., 2000). One possible explanation for the reduced 
switch costs is that best performers may be more efficient in their advance preparation 
during the CSI. According to the proactive interference account, residual switch costs 
should be reduced for longer ITIs because interference from a previous task set decays 
gradually over time (Allport et al., 1994; Meiran et al. 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; but see 
Horoufchin, Philipp & Koch, 2011; Grange, 2016). This leads to the alternative 
explanation that interference may have decayed more quickly in the best performers. It is 
also possible that both accounts play a role in task-switching because switch costs can be 
the result of both preparation and interference from the previously executed task set (e.g., 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). 
I sought to investigate these possibilities in the nine best performers by 
systematically varying the CSI from 0 to 650 ms and the ITI between 150 ms and 500 ms 
in different blocks. I made three predictions. First, I predicted that a longer CSI (650 ms) 
and a longer ITI (500 ms) in Experiment 1B should result in no significant switch costs in 
best performers, replicating their individual results in Experiment 1A. Second, according to 
the failure-to-engage and the task-set reconfiguration account I predicted that the task-
switching performance should be significantly impaired if the CSI was reduced from 650 
ms to 0 ms. Similarly, according to the proactive interference account, I predicted impaired 
task-switching performance if the ITI was reduced from 500 ms to 150 ms. Third, I 
postulated that the participants who were more exceptional in task switching should be 
resilient to these changes, showing no errors, no switch costs, no congruency effects 
independent of the manipulation of CSI and ITI.  
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2.3.1 Experiment 1B Methods 
Participants 
Nine participants who were identified as the best performers in Experiment 1A (3 
males, 6 females) were invited back to take part in this follow-up experiment 
approximately one month later. Participants were paid £10 each for taking part. 
Apparatus and stimuli 
All aspects of the stimulus presentation were identical to the colour/shape task-
switching paradigm as used in Experiment 1A, except for a change of the task cue in the 
two composite conditions without CSI. That is, in the conditions without CSI, the filled 
white triangles (30 mm each side) were replaced by a bigger isosceles triangle with a base 
length of 29 cm and side lengths of 24 cm. In each trial, both the cue and the target 
stimulus were located at the centre of the screen. The target stimulus always appeared 
inside a triangle which served as the task cue. 
Procedure 
Different from the colour/shape paradigm used in Experiment 1A, both cue-
stimulus interval (CSI: 0, 650 ms) and inter-trial interval (ITI: 150, 500 ms) were 
systematically manipulated within participants leading to four task-switching conditions: 
Condition 650-500, 650-150, 0-500, and Condition 0-150 (see Figure 207). In a pilot study 
I found that performing in the conditions with CSI 650 ms before the condition with CSI 0 
ms helped participants to better recall the task rules, reducing the error rates in the more 
difficult Condition 0-500 and 0-150. The entire experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. In 
each condition, there was a block of 50 trials with the colour task, then a block of 50 trials 
with the shape task, followed by a block of 200 trials with randomly mixed tasks. 
Participants always completed the two single-task blocks to practice the task rules before 
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starting the mixed-task blocks. In this experiment, the zero-error policy was not applied 
because I wanted to study participants’ performance in a more conventional task-switching 
paradigm. 
 
Figure 2.7. Experiment 1B. Schematic depiction of the four combinations of cue-stimulus 
interval CSI (CSI 650 ms, 0 ms) and inter-trial interval (ITI 500 ms, 150 ms) in the 
colour/shape task-switching paradigm. 
 
2.3.2 Experiment 1B Results 
The first trial of each mixed-task block, error trials and the trial following an error 
were excluded from the RT analysis. In contrast to Experiment 1A where the mixed block 
expired once an error was made, in Experiment 1B all trials that immediately followed an 
error were excluded because it is not possible to classify them as task-switch or task-repeat 
trials. I also excluded trial n if it had the same cue-stimulus combination as the preceding 
trial n - 1 because in the conditions with CSI 0 ms cue and the target stimulus were 
presented simultaneously, and a participant could simply repeat the same response as 
previous trial without cognitive processing of the task. After exclusion of these trials, the 
number of valid trials ranged between 665 and 794 per participant, with 156 to 199 RT 
measurements in each condition. I first conducted a conventional ANOVA on mean RTs 
and ERs. In addition, I applied GLMMs to capture individual differences among the best-
performing participants. 
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Mean RTs and ERs in task switching 
Mean RTs and ERs are depicted in Figure 2.8. They are collapsed across ITIs 
which had no significant effects on performance (see Table 2.3 for all conditions). RTs and 
ERs were analysed separately using a four-way ANOVA with repeated measures on factor 
Trial transition (task-repeat, task-switch), Congruency (congruent, incongruent) CSI (0 ms, 
650 ms), and ITI (150 ms, 500 ms).  
Table 2.3 
Experiment 1C. Mean (SE) of RTs (in ms) and error rates (ER as %) of 9 best performers 
ITI Trial transition 
and 
Congruency 
CSI = 0 ms CSI = 650 ms 
 
RT 
 
ER 
 
RT 
 
ER 
150 ms RepCon 679 (34.01) 1.53 (1.23) 457 (35.66) .26 (.26) 
 RepInc 738 (27.35) 7.45 (2.61) 469 (29.78) 1.98 (.92) 
 SwiCon 759 (32.60) 1.27 (.70) 451 (29.65) .69 (.47) 
 SwiInc 812 (24.01) 6.23 (1.87) 474 (30.50) 4.97 (2.11) 
      
 Repeat 708 (22.37) 4.49 (1.57) 463 (22.58) 1.12 (.51) 
 Switch 786 (20.63) 3.75 (1.14) 462 (20.82) 2.83 (1.17) 
 Congruent 719 (24.87) 1.40 (.69) 454 (22.51) .48 (.27) 
 Incongruent 775 (19.77) 6.84 (1.56) 471 (20.69) 3.47 (1.17) 
      
500 ms RepCon 691 (20.33) 2.45 (1.15) 446 (22.71) 2.31 (.86) 
 RepInc 754 (14.04) 5.74 (1.72) 469 (28.53) 3.29 (1.10) 
 SwiCon 792 (24.09) 3.12 (1.06) 456 (23.86) 1.14 (.60) 
 SwiInc 824 (16.56) 6.69 (2.30) 478 (22.66) 5.67 (1.67) 
      
 Repeat 723 (14.18) 4.10 (1.08) 458 (17.93) 2.80 (.69) 
 Switch 808 (14.70) 4.90 (1.30) 467 (16.19) 3.41 (1.02) 
 Congruent 742 (19.56) 2.78 (.76) 451 (16.03) 1.73 (.53) 
 Incongruent 789 (13.54) 6.22 (1.40) 474 (17.70) 4.48 (1.01) 
Note. RepCon = Repeat Congruent; RepInc = Repeat Incongruent; SwiCon = Switch 
Congruent; SwiInc = Switch Incongruent. 
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RTs 
For RTs, I found three significant main effects. There was a significant main effect 
of Trial transition, F(1, 8) = 30.53, p < .001, η2p = .79, with longer mean RTs for task-
switch trials (631 ms) than task-repeat trials (588 ms), participants showing a task-switch 
cost of +43 ms. There was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 8) = 60.06, p 
< .001, η2p = .88. RTs were longer in incongruent trials (627 ms) than in congruent trials 
(591 ms), indicating a congruency cost of +36 ms. There was a significant main effect of 
CSI, F(1, 8) = 275.34, p < .001, η2p = .97, participants showing faster responses in CSI 650 
ms (462 ms) compared to CSI 0 ms (756 ms). The main effect of ITI did not reach 
significance (F < 1). 
More importantly, trial transition interacted with CSI, F(1, 8) = 12.49, p = .008, η2p 
= .61. RT switch costs decreased by 76 ms when the CSI was increased from 0 ms (SC = 
+81 ms, p < .001) to 650 ms (SC = +5 ms, p = .810). In addition, Congruency interacted 
with CSI, F(1, 8) = 6.88, p = .030, η2p = .46. RT congruency effects were +52 ms (p 
< .001) in CSI 0 ms and were +21 ms (p < .001) in CSI 650 ms. A post-hoc comparison 
after Holm correction (Holm, 1972) showed that the congruency effects were equivalent 
between CSIs, p = .065. No other effects reached statistical significance.  
 
ERs 
For ERs, there was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 8) = 16.75, p 
= .003, η2p = .68. Participants made more errors in incongruent trials (5.25%) than in 
congruent trials (1.60%), showing a congruency effect of +3.65%. In addition, I found a 
significant three-way interaction between Congruency, Trial transition and CSI, F(1, 8) = 
5.43, p = .048, η2p = .40. A post-hoc comparison showed that participants had no 
86 
 
significant and equivalent ER switch costs in both congruent and incongruent trials with 
CSI 0 ms and CSI 650 ms. No other effects reached statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Results of Experiment 1B. RTs (top panel) and ERs (bottom panel) for repeat 
and switch trials across CSIs (0 ms, 650 ms) and Congruency (congruent, incongruent). 
Black dots represent outliers whereas red diamonds and error bars denote means and 
standard errors, repectively. 
Note. ***p < .001, ns = non-significant. 
 
Similar to Experiment 1A, I split the trials in the mixed block into two halves and 
analysed the RT data accordingly. The corresponding RT data were then submitted to a 
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five-way repeated-measure ANOVA with factors Trial transition (task-repeat, task-switch), 
Congruency (congruent, incongruent), CSI (0 ms, 650 ms), ITI (150 ms, 500 ms) and 
Block half (first, second). Again, I found a significant interaction between Trial transition 
and CSI, F(1, 8) = 16.39, p = .003, η2p = .67. Participants did not show significant RT 
switch costs in the condition with CSI 650 ms (+5 ms, p = .300), but showed significant 
costs in the condition with CSI 0 ms (+88 ms, p < .001). Block half did not significantly 
interact with Trial transition (F < 1) and CSI (F = 1.30, p = .287). I did not find a 
significant three-way interaction between Trial transition, Block half and CSI (F < 1). 
Similarly, there was no interaction between Congruency and Block half (F < 1). There was 
no three-way interaction between Congruency, Block half and CSI (F < 1). These results 
suggest that switching performance did not differ between the two halves of the block. 
When in trials with a CSI of 650 ms, switch costs were +7 ms in the first half and +6 ms in 
the second half. Congruency effects were +19 ms in the first half and +23 ms in the second 
half. When in trials with a CSI of 0 ms, switch costs were +95 ms in the first half and +83 
ms in the second half. Congruency effects were +40 ms in the first half and +61 ms in the 
second half. No other effects reached statistical significance. 
 
Individual Differences 
I conducted GLMMs to capture individual differences among the best-performing 
participants. The raw RT data were modelled by gamma distributions in a full factorial 
design for fixed effects and different by-subject random effects. I identified the most 
parsimonious model (see GLMM 1B.3 in Table 2.4). Trial transition, Congruency, CSI and 
ITI, and all interactions were entered as fixed effects. The intercept, the main effect of CSI, 
ITI, and the interaction between CSI and Trial transition were featured as by-subject 
random effects. 
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Table 2.4 
Experiment 1B GLMM comparisons based on 9 best-performers’ RT data (the best model 
is in bold; GLMM 1B.3). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma (link = 
“identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM 
1B.1 
RT ~  
Trial.transition + 
Congruency + CSI + ITI 
(1 | subject) 
7 75589 75635 -37787 75575   
GLMM
1B.2 
RT ~  
Trial.transition * 
Congruency * CSI * ITI+  
(1 | subject) 
18 75586 75706 -37775 75550 24.80  .001  
** 
GLMM 
1B.3 
RT ~  
Trial.transition * 
Congruency * CSI * ITI+  
(1+ CSI + ITI + 
Trial.transition : CSI | 
subject) 
32 75294 75508 -37615 75230 319.33 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
1C.4 
RT ~  
Trial.transition * 
Congruency * CSI * ITI+  
(1+ CSI + ITI + 
Congruency + 
Trial.transition : CSI | 
subject) 
38 75299 75553 -37611 75223 7.75 .257 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R. 
 
The fixed effects are consistent with the ANOVA results that responses were 
slower in CSI 0 (763 ms) compared to CSI 650 ms (471 ms), t = 49.83, p < .001. 
Responses were slower in task-switch trials (637 ms) compared to task-repeat trials (597 
ms), t = 10.94, p < .001. Responses were slower in incongruent trials (636 ms) than in 
congruent trials (598 ms), t = 11.89, p < .001. Trial transition significantly interacted with 
CSI, t = 7.65, p < .001, with smaller switch costs in CSI 650 ms (+4 ms) than in CSI 0 ms 
(+78 ms). Switch costs were not different between ITIs, t = 1.21, p = .226.  Congruency 
significantly interacted with CSI, t = 7.41, p < .001, with smaller congruency effects in CSI 
650 ms (+22 ms) than in CSI 0 ms (+56 ms). No other effects reached significance. 
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Figure 2.8. Experiment 1B. Illustration of by-subject random effects. Subject IDs on the 
left correspond to the Subject IDs in Experiment 1A. Top panel: Dotplot illustrates 
individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from 
mean target RT (Intercept = group-average target RT of 617 ms, indicated by the solid 
vertical line centred on zero). Middle panel: Dotplots illustrate individual deviations (dots) 
and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from the mean switch costs in CSI 0 
ms (+79 ms) and CSI 650 ms (+4 ms) collapsed over ITIs. The dashed vertical lines in the 
plots of the middle panel indicate zero switch cost in each condition. Bottom panel: 
Dotplots illustrate individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal 
error bars) from the main effect of CSI (mean RT in CSI 650 ms - mean RT in CSI 0 ms = 
-292 ms,) and ITI (mean RT in ITI 500 ms - mean RT in ITI 150 ms = +7 ms). Please note 
the different RT scales on the x-axes across plots. 
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The by-subject random effects explained considerable variance. The top panel of 
Figure 2.8 shows large individual deviations from the grand mean RT (Intercept). When 
comparing Figure 2.5 with Figure 2.8 regarding mean RTs (Intercepts), I found that most 
best performers were consistent in their mean RTs across experiments. For example, 
Participant 46 was the fastest best-performer in Experiment 1A as well as 1B. Participant 
19 and 41 who were the slowest best-performers in Experiment 1A were again slower in 
the present experiment. However, Participants 13 who was slightly slower in Experiment 
1A performed faster in the present experiment. 
The bottom panel of Figure 2.8 shows individual deviations between different CSIs 
and ITIs. Participant 38 and 45 showed improved RT performance when the CSI was 
increased to 650 ms, while Participant 19, 41, and 46 showed less improved performance. 
Participant 41 and 45 showed faster responses in ITI 500 ms than in ITI 150 ms, while 
other participants performed more slowly in ITI 500 ms. 
Figure 2.8 also shows individual differences in RT switch costs (middle panel). 
Participants showed different deviations from the mean switch costs (solid vertical line) 
and zero switch costs (dashed vertical line) in the CSI 650 ms and in the CSI 0 ms 
condition. Seven participants did not significantly deviate from zero switch cost in the CSI 
650 ms condition whereas Participant 13 and 46 had switch costs significantly higher than 
zero. In contrast, all participants had switch costs significantly higher than zero in the CSI 
0 ms condition. 
 
2.3.3 Experiment 1B Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1B show that on average the best performers developed 
RT switch costs when the CSI was reduced to 0 ms but showed non-significant switch 
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costs for both RTs and ERs when the CSI was 650 ms, confirming the results in 
Experiment 1A. This finding is in line with studies that identified preparation effects on 
task-switching costs (e.g., Altmann, 2004a, 2004b; De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 
2010; Meiran et al., 2000; Monsell, 2003; Schneider, 2016; 2017). However, in none of 
these studies switch costs were eliminated even when preparation intervals were as long as 
2,000 ms (e.g., Meiran et al., 2000; Schneider, 2017). Here, the best performers prepared 
very efficiently within a CSI of 650 ms, showing no significant switch costs except for 
Participant 13 and 46. 
Importantly, the best performers were only affected by CSI. An increase of ITI 
from 150 ms to 500 ms did not improve their switching performance. This is inconsistent 
with the proactive interference account where longer ITIs should lead to reduced switch 
costs (Allport et al., 1994; Meiran et al. 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; but see Horoufchin et 
al., 2011; Grange, 2016). I conclude that the reduced switch costs in best-performers can 
be attributed to efficient task preparation during CSIs. 
Why can best performers prepare more efficiently for a task or reconfigure a task 
set during relatively short CSIs whilst other participants cannot? In the present experiment, 
best performers showed reduced switch costs, even without the zero-error policy. This 
result seems to suggest that the best performers maintained superior switching abilities 
independent of the zero-error policy. However, not all best performers showed trait-like 
switching abilities. For example, Participant 13 and 46 varied considerably in terms of 
switch costs between Experiment 1A and 1B. Since many other participants in Experiment 
1A also performed well, showing no mistakes or non-significant switch costs in their MAX 
block, I need further evidence that sets apart best performers from other participants. 
In order to address this question I studied best performers in different task-
switching paradigms. Yehene and Meiran (2007) suggested that participants should exhibit 
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general task-switching abilities across paradigms. Experiment 1C was conducted to 
compare the general task-switching abilities of best performers with a control group. 
 
2.4 Experiment 1C 
The purpose of this follow-up experiment was to compare the best-performers with 
a control group in conventional task-switching paradigms using different tasks and without 
applying the zero-error policy. Best performers may have better trait-like switching 
abilities if they show significantly smaller or even no switch costs across different tasks 
and conditions compared to controls. 
In addition, I employed Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (APM, Raven et 
al., 1998) in order to test whether both groups of participants differed in general 
intelligence. Studies suggested that general intelligence affects the efficacy of cognitive 
control (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al, 2006) which plays an important role in task-
switching. I therefore made a prediction that group differences in task switching may be 
related to group differences in general intelligence. 
 
2.4.1 Experiment 1C Methods 
Participants 
Nine best-performing participants (3 males and 6 females, M = 23.89 years, SD = 
1.96) were invited to take part in this follow-up experiment approximately two months 
after Experiment 1A. I also invited 9 other participants from Experiment 1A as controls (1 
male and 8 females, M = 23.00 years, SD = 1.80). The control participants are highlighted 
by an open triangle next to the Subject ID in Figure 2.5. I did not select the worst-
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performing participants as controls because they might not sufficiently engage in each trial. 
The participants in the control group matched the best performers in terms of mean RTs 
(Intercepts; see Figure 2.5) but made frequent mistakes even though they had practiced the 
colour/shape task in thousands of trials (M = 1,626 trials, ranging from 1,137 to 2,215 
trials) in Experiment 1A. They had a MAX of less than 50 trials (M = 13 trials, ranging 
from 10 to 45 trials) in their experimental session over 90 minutes. Participants were paid 
£10 each for taking part. 
Apparatus, tasks and stimuli  
The apparatus for stimulus presentation and response collection was identical to 
Experiment 1A and 1B. 
Colour/shape paradigm. All aspects of the colour/shape task-switching paradigm 
were the same as in Experiment 1A, except that I did not apply the zero-error policy. 
Shape/filling paradigm. The shape/filling task was the same as the task used by 
Stoet and colleagues (2013, Experiment 1). In the shape task, participants were asked to 
press a left button if a diamond-shaped target appeared (30.7 mm each side) and a right 
button if a square-shaped target appeared (30.7 mm each side), ignoring the dots inside. In 
the filling task, participants were asked to press the left button for two vertically arranged 
dots and the right button for three vertically arranged dots, ignoring the surrounding shape. 
All stimuli were printed in yellow and presented on the top or bottom of a rectangular 
yellow frame (70 × 80 mm). Participants responded to the surround shape when the target 
was presented in the upper part of the frame and responded to the filling dots when the 
target was presented in the lower part. The “Shape” and “Filling” cues were visible 
throughout each trial to remind participants of the currently relevant task. The inter-trial 
interval was 800 ms. 
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Letter/number paradigm. The letter/number task was the same as the task used by 
Rogers and Monsell (1995, Experiment 1). Participants received a letter/number pair in 
each trial. The task was to either categorise the letter as a vowel or consonant, or to 
categorise the digit as being odd or even. The odd numbers were drawn from the set 3, 5, 7, 
9, and the even numbers were drawn from the set 2, 4, 6, 8, displayed on screen in yellow 
sans-serif with font size 22. The consonant letters were drawn from the set G, K, M, R and 
vowel letters from the set A, E, I, U, also displayed on screen in yellow sans-serif with font 
size 22. To help participants to keep track of the task sequence, the letter/number pair was 
presented on a 2*2 yellow grid (5 cm each side), moving around clockwise inside the grid. 
Participants were told to respond to the letter only when the letter/number pair was shown 
in one of the top two cells, and to respond to the number only when the pair was shown in 
one of the bottom two cells. In the number task, participants were asked to press the left 
button if the number was odd and the right button if the number was even. In the letter 
task, participants were asked to press the left button if the letter was a consonant and the 
right button if the letter was a vowel. The inter-trial interval was 150 ms. 
Intelligence test. Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998) were 
used to measure non-verbal reasoning ability. The Raven advance test is the most difficult 
of the Raven’s Matrices tests, and was designed to differentiate among people with 
“superior intellectual ability” (Raven et al., 1998). This paper-and-pencil test has 48 items, 
consisting of 2 sets, with 12 diagrammatic puzzles in Set I (for practice) and 36 puzzles in 
Set II (for data analysis, with a full score of 36). Each item in the test contains a figure with 
a missing piece, and participants are required to select one out of eight possible answers to 
fit the missing space from the pattern.  
Procedures 
95 
 
Participants in the control group completed all three paradigms. Best performers 
completed only the shape/filling paradigm and the letter/number paradigm. Since the 
colour/shape task was the same as the Condition 650-500 in Experiment 1B, I re-used the 
data of the best performers from this condition only. As before, participants had up to 
1,500 ms to make a response after target onset. If no or an incorrect response was given 
within 1,500 ms, error feedback appeared on screen for 1 second. In each paradigm, 
participants completed a 50-trial block of each single task to practice the task rules, 
followed by a 200-trial mixed block with both tasks intermixed. Note that the tasks were 
randomly mixed in the mixed block of the colour/shape and the shape/filling paradigms but 
not in the number/letter paradigm. After completing the task-switching paradigms, all 
participants took part in a one-hour Raven’s intelligence test. 
 
2.4.2 Experiment 1C Results 
Data pre-processing was the same as in Experiment 1B. After exclusion of trials, 
the number of valid trials ranged between 486 and 583 (ranging between 144 and 195 RT 
measurements per paradigm) for the nine best-performing participants and between 376 
and 519 (ranging between 86 and 192 RT measurements per paradigm) for the nine 
participants in the control group. Next, I conducted conventional ANOVAs on mean RTs 
and ERs. In addition, I applied GLMMs to confirm group effects and to capture individual 
differences in RTs.  
 
Task-switching analyses 
Mean RTs and error rates (ERs) are summarised in Table 2.5. Two four-way 
ANOVAs with mixed effects were conducted on the mean RTs and ERs of each 
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participant. Group (best-performing, control) served as between-subjects factor whereas 
Trial transition (task-repeat, task-switch), Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and 
Paradigm (colour/shape, shape/filling, and letter/number) were within-subjects factors. 
Table 2.5 
Experiment 1C. Mean (SE) of RTs (in ms) and error rates (ER as %)  
Paradigms Trial 
transition and 
Congruency 
Best performers (N = 9) Controls (N = 9) 
 
RT 
 
ER 
 
RT 
 
ER 
Colour/ 
shape 
RepCon 446 (22.71) 2.31 (.86) 508 (28.04) 5.04 (2.11) 
RepInc 470 (28.53) 3.29 (1.10) 529 (24.13) 15.94 (4.52) 
SwiCon 456 (23.86) 1.14 (.60) 574 (36.02) 5.10 (1.35) 
SwiInc 478 (22.66) 5.67 (1.67) 611 (28.27) 22.26 (5.67) 
      
 Repeat 458 (17.93) 2.80 (.69) 519 (18.12) 10.49 (2.76) 
 Switch 467 (16.19) 3.41 (1.02) 592 (22.65) 13.68 (3.51) 
 Congruent 451 (16.03) 1.73 (.53) 541 (23.53) 5.07 (1.21) 
 Incongruent 474 (17.70) 4.48 (1.01) 570 (20.56) 19.10 (3.60) 
      
Shape/ 
filling 
RepCon 629 (21.75) 1.02 (.72) 679 (32.42) 2.13 (.79) 
RepInc 661 (21.88) 4.25 (1.50) 701 (24.29) 5.65 (1.68) 
SwiCon 738 (26.77) .22 (.22) 854 (32.98) 1.91 (.85) 
SwiInc 796 (19.13) 4.68 (1.37) 879 (30.53) 13.12 (2.79) 
      
 Repeat 645 (15.45) 2.64 (.90) 690 (19.83) 3.89 (1.00) 
 Switch 767 (17.47) 2.45 (.86) 866 (22.00) 7.52 (1.96) 
 Congruent 683 (21.31) .62 (.38) 767 (30.87) 2.02 (.56) 
 Incongruent 728 (21.67) 4.46 (.99) 790 (28.68) 9.39 (1.82) 
      
Letter/ 
number 
RepCon 579 (27.27) .97 (.51) 633 (39.94) 2.96 (1.35) 
RepInc 567 (22.92) 1.43 (.52) 675 (39.19) 5.44 (.90) 
SwiCon 701 (30.49) 2.38 (.71) 827 (48.16) 4.06 (1.49) 
SwiInc 734 (33.86) 4.97 (1.35) 842 (37.49) 10.47 (1.87) 
      
 Repeat 573 (17.34) 1.20 (.36) 669 (27.18) 4.20 (.84) 
 Switch 717 (22.46) 3.68 (.80) 834 (29.66) 7.26 (1.40) 
 Congruent 640 (24.73) 1.68 (.46) 745 (36.23) 3.51 (.98) 
 Incongruent 650 (28.31) 3.20 (.82) 758 (33.20) 7.95 (1.18) 
Note. RepCon = Repeat Congruent; RepInc = Repeat Incongruent; SwiCon = Switch 
Congruent; SwiInc = Switch Incongruent 
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RTs 
For mean RTs, I observed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 16) = 9.12, p 
= .008, η2p = .36. Best-performing participants (605 ms) had significantly faster responses 
compared to the participants in the control group (695 ms). There was a significant main 
effect of Trial transition, F(1, 16) = 133.89, p < .001, η2p = .89. Task-switch trials (707 ms) 
were slower compared to task-repeat trials (592 ms), indicating a statistically significant 
RT switch cost of +115 ms. There was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 16) = 
58.32, p < .001, η2p = .78. Incongruent trials (662 ms) were slower compared to congruent 
trials (638 ms), indicating a congruency effect of +24 ms. Participants performed 
differently across paradigms, F(2, 32) = 69.71, p < .001, η2p = .81. Post-hoc comparisons, 
corrected after Holm (Holm, 1979), revealed that participants were significantly faster in 
the colour/shape paradigm (509 ms) compared to the letter/number (698 ms) and 
shape/filling paradigm (742 ms). 
Trial transition significantly interacted with Paradigm, F(2, 32) = 28.14, p < .001, 
η2p = .64. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the switch costs were significant in the 
letter/number (SC = switch – repeat = +155 ms, p < .001) and shape/filling paradigms (SC 
= +149 ms, p < .001), but not in the colour/shape paradigm (SC = +42 ms, p = .160). Trial 
transition also interacted with Congruency, F(1, 16) = 5.36, p = .034, η2p = .25. Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that switch costs were smaller in congruent trials (SC = +107 ms, p 
< .001) compared to incongruent trials (SC = +123 ms, p < .001). Importantly, Trial 
transition significantly interacted with Group, F(1, 16) = 5.43, p = .033, η2p = .25. As 
shown in Figure 2.9, best performers (SC = +92 ms, p = .002) showed smaller switch costs 
compared to the control group (SC = +138 ms, p < .001). I did not find a significant 
interaction between Group and Paradigm (F < 1). Other interaction effects involving 
Group were not significant. 
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Figure 2.9. Results of Experiment 1C. Mean RTs (top panels) and ERs (bottom panels) for 
repeat and switch trials are shown in separate box/violin plots for Group (best-performing, 
control) and in separate panels for Paradigm (colour/shape, shape/filling, letter/number). 
Black dots represent outliers whereas red diamonds and error bars denote means and 
standard errors, respectively. 
Note. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = non-significant 
 
ERs 
For error rates, all four main effects were statistically significant. I observed a 
significant main effect of Group, F(1, 16) = 9.62, p = .007, η2p = 38, as best-performing 
participants made fewer errors (2.70%) compared to participants in the control group 
(7.84%). There was a significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 16) = 16.19, p < .001, 
η2p = 50. Participants made more errors in task-switch trials (6.33%) compared to task-
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repeat trials (4.20%), indicating a significant ER switch cost of +2.13%. There was a 
significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 16) = 35.20, p < .001, η2p = 69. Participant 
made more errors in incongruent trials (8.10%) compared to congruent trials (2.44%), 
indicating a significant congruency effect of +5.66%. Error rates were also different across 
paradigms, F(2, 32) = 9.57, p < .001, η2p = 37. Post-hoc analyses indicated that 
colour/shape paradigm (7.60%) had more errors compared to the letter/number paradigm 
(4.09%) and shape/filling paradigm (4.12%). 
Trial transition significantly interacted with Congruency, F(1, 16) = 18.35, p 
< .001, η2p = 53. Post-hoc analyses showed that the switch costs were larger in incongruent 
trials (SC = +4.20%, p = .007) than in congruent trials (SC = +.07%, p = .961). As 
illustrated in Figure 8, Group significantly interacted with Trial transition, F(1, 16) = 4.83, 
p = .043, η2p = 23. Post-hoc analyses showed that best performers (SC = +0.97%, p = .478) 
had smaller ER switch costs compared to the control group (SC = +3.29%, p = .049). In 
addition, Group significantly interacted with Paradigm, F(1, 16) = 6.49, p = .004, η2p = 29. 
Post-hoc analyses revealed that best performers had significantly fewer errors (3.11%) than 
the control group (12.09%) in the colour-shape paradigm (p < .001), whereas there was no 
significant group difference in the letter/number paradigm and shape/filling paradigm. 
Other interaction effects involving Group did not reach statistical significance. 
 
Individual Differences 
In order to study individual differences in RTs, I analysed the RT measurements 
from each trial using GLMMs as in Experiments 1A and 1B. I compared the most 
parsimonious model with Group effects (GLMM 1C.3) with a corresponding model 
without Group effects (GLMM 1C.2) in order to determine whether factor Group and its 
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interactions improved the model fit. In other words, the model comparison tested whether 
the distinction between best performers and controls was an important predictor of RTs. 
 
Table 2.6 
Experiment 1C GLMM comparisons on RT data (the best model is in bold; GLMM 1C.2). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma (link = 
“identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM 
1C.1 
RT ~  
Trial.transition + 
Congruency + Paradigm 
+ Group+ 
(1 | subject) 
8 114873 114930 -57428 114857   
GLMM
1C.2 
RT ~ 
Congruency* 
Trial.transition*  
Paradigm + 
(1+Paradigm: 
Trial.transition+ 
Paradigm | subject) 
34 113985 114225 -56958 113917 940.24 < .001  
*** 
GLMM 
1C.3 
RT ~ 
Congruency* 
Trial.transition* 
Paradigm*Group + 
(1+Paradigm: 
Trial.transition+Paradigm 
| subject) 
46 113991 114317 -56950 113899 17.50 .13 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
The GLMM 1C.2 turned out to be more parsimonious than 1C.3, suggesting that 
the distinction between best-performers and controls explained little additional variance in 
RTs (Table 2.6). In GLMM 1C.2, Trial transition, Congruency and Paradigm, and their 
interactions were treated as fixed effects. The random effects captured individual 
deviations from the grand mean RT (Intercept), from the main effect of Paradigm and from 
the interaction between Trial transition and Paradigm. The fixed effects without Group 
effects mirror the ANOVA results on RTs. Response times were shorter in task-repeat 
trials (604 ms) than in task-switch trials (723 ms), t = 32.52, p < .001, suggesting a switch 
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cost of +119 ms.  Response times were shorter in congruent trials (651 ms) than 
incongruent trials (676 ms), t = 10.28, p < .001, suggesting a congruency effect of +25 ms. 
Responses were more quickly in the colour/shape paradigm (522 ms), than in the 
letter/number paradigm (716 ms; t = 65.59, p < .001) and shape/filling paradigm (752 ms; t 
= 72.41, p < .001).  
In addition, the model reveals significant two-way interactions. Switch costs were 
smaller in congruent trials (+109 ms) than in incongruent trials (+127 ms), t = -6.50, p 
<.001. Switch costs were smaller in the colour/shape paradigm (+44 ms) than in the 
letter/number (+160 ms), t = -32.68, p < .001; and than in the shape/filling paradigm (+150 
ms), t = -36.17, p < .001. Congruency effects in the colour/shape paradigm (+25 ms) were 
slightly larger than in the letter/number paradigm (+13 ms), t = 3.32, p < .001; but slightly 
smaller than in the shape/filling paradigm (+38 ms), t = -4.81, p < .001. No other effects 
were statistically significant. 
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Figure 2.10. Experiment 1C. Illustration of by-subject random effects in best performers 
and control participants. Subject IDs on the left correspond to participants as in Experiment 
1A and 1B. Top panel: The dotplot shows individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence 
intervals (horizontal error bars) from mean RTs (Intercept = grand mean RT of 664 ms, as 
indicated by the solid vertical line centred on zero). Middle panel: The dotplots from left to 
right illustrate individual deviations from mean switch costs in the colour/shape (+44 ms, 
as indicated by the solid vertical line centred on zero), letter/number (+160 ms) and 
shape/filling (+150 ms) paradigm, respectively. The dashed vertical line in each plot 
indicates zero switch cost for each paradigm. Bottom panel: The dotplots illustrate 
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individual deviations from the RT difference between letter/number and colour/shape 
paradigm (mean difference = +194 ms, as indicated by the solid vertical line centred on 
zero), and between shape/filling and colour/shape paradigm (mean difference = +230 ms). 
Please note the different RT scales on the x-axis across plots.  
Note. C/S = Colour/shape paradigm, L/N = Letter/number paradigm, S/F = Shape/filling 
paradigm 
 
The by-subject random effects explained considerable RT variance. Figure 2.10 
shows individual differences in mean RTs (top panel), with both groups of participants 
showing significant deviations from the grand mean RT. Seven of the best performers were 
significantly faster than average compared to three fast-performing participants in the 
control group. Comparing Figure 2.10 with Figure 2.5 in terms of individual mean RTs 
(Intercepts) indicates that most participants performed consistently in terms of mean RTs 
across both experiments. In the control group, for example, Participant 52 was the slowest 
whereas Participants 18 and 50 were the fastest, ranking similarly in terms of mean RTs in 
both experiments. In the group of best-performers, Participant 19, who was slower than the 
sample average RT in Experiment 1A, also responded more slowly in Experiment 1C. In 
addition, I found that five of the best performers, Participant 27, 38, 45, 46 and 56, 
responded faster than the sample average in both experiments. Participant 13, however, 
varied considerably in mean RT. This participant was one of the slowest best performers in 
Experiment 1A but the fastest participant in Experiment 1C.  
Figure 2.10 also shows that across the three paradigms, some of the participants 
showed significant deviations from the mean switch costs (middle panel). Importantly, in 
the colour/shape paradigm, all of the best performers except for Participant 13 were close 
to zero RT switch costs (dashed vertical line), while participants in the control group 
showed switch costs significantly larger than zero with the exception of Participants 8 and 
33. Both groups of participants demonstrated similar switching performance with 
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significant deviations from zero switch costs (dashed vertical lines) in the letter/number 
and shape/filling paradigm, although best performers exhibited somewhat more 
homogenous random effects in those paradigms.  
Note that best performers and controls deviated significantly from the mean RT 
difference between paradigms (the bottom panel of Figure 2.10), suggesting that 
participants from both groups varied considerably in their RTs between tasks and 
conditions.  
 
Raven’s intelligence scores 
The intelligence scores for best performers and controls were compared in a two-
sample t-test. I found a statistically significant difference between groups, t (16) = 2.52, p 
= .023, Cohen’s d = 1.19. The best performers had on average significantly higher 
intelligence scores (Mean = 28.33, ranging from 17 to 34) compared to the control group 
(Mean = 22.33, ranging from 14 to 29). 
 
2.3.3 Experiment 1C Discussion 
In line with my prediction, Experiment 1C confirmed that, even though the zero-
error policy was not applied, best performers showed better task-switching performance 
than participants in the control group. The results of the ANOVAs suggest that best 
performers had on average shorter RTs and reduced ERs than controls across different 
paradigms. Moreover, the analyses suggest that the best-performing participants had on 
average smaller RT and ER switch costs compared to the controls. The difference in task-
switching performance between the two groups may be related to their difference in 
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general intelligence sores, supporting previous studies that have showed a relationship 
between cognitive abilities and general intelligence (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al, 
2006). 
Although the comparison between models with and without Group effects suggests 
that the distinction between best performers and controls was not important, a significant 
group difference for RT switch costs was detected in the colour/shape paradigm: 8 out of 9 
best performers had smaller and non-significant switch costs. In contrast, only 2 out of 9 
controls showed non-significant switch costs. This confirms the finding from Experiment 
1A where the best performers also showed more consistent and more efficient task-
switching in this paradigm. 
In the shape/filling and the letter/number paradigms, however, the best-performing 
participants showed significant RT switch costs similar to the control group. In the 
shape/filling and letter/number paradigm both the cue and the target stimulus were 
presented simultaneously leaving no or little opportunity to prepare for the upcoming task. 
As suggested by the failure-to-engage and the task-set reconfiguration account, the cue-
stimulus interval (CSI) is important because the relevant task-set can be re-configured 
within a certain CSI (e.g., Lindsen & De Jong, 2010). The critical advantage of the best 
performers may have been that they were able to efficiently prepare each task-set 
following a cue, suggesting better cognitive control. This may be related to their higher 
general intelligence scores and other superior traits as shown in Experiment 1A. However, 
consistent with the results in Experiment 1B, their advantage disappeared as soon as the 
cue-stimulus interval was reduced to zero. None of them showed more exceptional 
switching performance with minimal errors and no switch costs independent of tasks and 
conditions. 
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2.5 General Discussion 
In an experiment and two follow-ups I examined individual differences in task 
switching. In a reasonably large sample of participants, I tried to identify whether few 
participants show superior task-switching performance independent of tasks, conditions 
and paradigms.  
In Experiment 1A I applied a “zero-error policy” to motivate participants to 
maintain full attention and high engagement during a block of randomly mixed tasks. I 
found reduced switch costs in their MAX block. In addition, I found large individual 
differences in participant’s mean RTs and ERs. I identified the 9 best-performing 
participants in the sample who showed no errors and no significant switch costs. I reasoned 
that their superior performance may be due to increased motivation to engage in task 
switching, superior task-switching abilities, or both. Using 7 different psychological scales, 
best performers indeed had relatively higher scores in motivation and self-control, while 
lower scores in impulsivity and executive problems experienced in daily life. These results 
are in line with previous studies suggesting a positive relationship between motivation and 
cognitive/attentional flexibility (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Krawczyk & D' Esposito, 2011; 
Nadler, 2013; Pessoa, 2009; Struthers et al., 2000; Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2016) but negative 
relationship between impulsivity and working memory capacity, information processing 
and interference resolving (Enticott et al., 2006; Whitney et al., 2004). 
In two follow-up experiments, in which participants could make mistakes without 
the need to restart a block, the best performers were still able to eliminate switch costs in 
trials with a CSI of 650 ms but not in trials with a CSI of 0 ms. Only in conditions with 
CSIs, did best performers show better task-switching performance than controls. The 
results of the two follow-up experiments suggest that the reduced switch costs in best 
performers is unlikely to be attributed to increased motivation or task engagement in order 
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to make no mistakes because in both follow-up experiments there was less pressure to 
avoid mistakes. 
Alternatively, best performers may have task-switching abilities and/or efficient 
strategies that can be applied across different task-switching conditions (cf., Yehene & 
Meiran, 2007). However, there was no convincing evidence that the best performers had 
extraordinary trait-like switching abilities. GLMMs revealed that best performers shared 
RT characteristics with many other participants. In addition, their switching abilities 
cannot be generalised to other tasks and conditions with simultaneous presentation of cue 
and target stimulus. In the two follow-ups, I confirmed that best performers were only able 
to eliminate switch costs when there was a cue-stimulus interval of 650 ms. I attribute this 
superior performance to more efficient task preparation following a cue. 
The reduced switch costs of the best performers support the failure-to-engage 
account of task-set reconfiguration (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) suggesting that full reconfiguration of the task-set 
during a CSI of 650 ms is achievable, at least for some participants. In contrast, the 
findings on best performers seem incompatible with the two-stage theory (Hydock & Sohn, 
2011; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Weidler & 
Abrams, 2013). This theory posits that task-rule reconfiguration can only start after onset 
of a target stimulus which would make it impossible for participants to eliminate switch 
costs. As a result, each participant should have significant residual switch costs across 
different conditions. 
The identification of best performers addresses the general question, also posed by 
Haff and Rouder (2017, 2018), whether everyone shows the same “true effect” in cognitive 
tasks. I found that some individuals showed significant switch costs while a few 
individuals did not display any switch costs in the pre-cued conditions. In previous studies 
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it was reported that even after extended preparation times (> 2,000 ms), significant residual 
switch costs were found (Meiran et al., 2000, Poboka et al., 2014; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995; Schneider, 2016, 2017). Several authors have tried to increase the motivation of 
participants so that they would prepare for upcoming tasks more efficiently but these 
studies had limited success in eliminating switch costs (Lien et al., 2005; Meiran & 
Chorev, 2005; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002, Schneider, 2016, 2017; see however 
Verbruggen et al., 2007). These results suggest that, on average, switch costs can be 
reduced but not eliminated by task preparation so that residual switch costs should always 
remain. Although this may be true for most individuals, it ignores individual differences in 
task-switching because participants may be motivated differently, have different 
characteristics, and may have different cognitive abilities and strategies. Striking evidence 
of individual differences has been reported in a variety of cognitive, memory and 
perceptual tasks (Haff & Rouder, 2017, 2018; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Mallow et al., 
2015; Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Ramon et al., 2016; Robertson et al., 2016; Russell et 
al., 2009; Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010). 
I studied individual differences in task switching. I first conducted ANOVAs on 
averaged RTs and ERs and found significant mean switch costs, confirming the results of 
previous task-switching experiments. In addition, I employed general linear mixed models 
(GLMMs) on single-trial RTs in order to study how individuals varied in their performance 
across conditions, paradigms, and experiments. I identified best performers, who seemed 
more capable in task-switching, and showed minimal switch costs in some experimental 
conditions. Nevertheless, their superior performance did not generalise to conditions and 
paradigms with simultaneous presentation of cue and target stimulus. Here they also 
showed individual differences and significant switch costs similar to a control group. I 
argue that analysing averaged performances may overlook individual variability across 
conditions and paradigms, and may be responsible for the commonly observed residual 
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switch costs in previous task-switching studies (e.g., De Jong, 2000; Meiran et al., 2000; 
Schneider, 2016, 2017). It is possible that although significant residual switch costs were 
reported, a good number of participants may have successfully eliminated switch costs in 
various conditions. 
Further studies are needed because it is unclear what gave the best performers an 
advantage in task switching over controls. The Raven’s intelligence test suggests that best 
performers had slightly higher general intelligence, which may be related to improved 
executive functioning and cognitive abilities. More specifically, best performers may have 
developed more efficient cue encoding, rule activation, or both. Compared to a paradigm 
with “two-to-one cue-task mappings”, task switching with simpler “one-to-one cue-task 
mappings” should simplify perceptual processing of multiple cues. With simpler one-to-
one cue-task mappings best performers might quickly translate a task cue (i.e., a solid 
triangle) into a “task-name mediator” (e.g., “colour” in trials with triangle pointing 
upward), followed by earlier task-goal and task-rule retrieval. This is consistent with the 
idea of mediated retrieval (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2006). It is also 
possible that best performers employed other more specific switching strategies: Based on 
the cue-task association hypothesis proposed by Arbuthnott & Woodward (2002), the best 
performers may have established stronger associations between task cues and task 
representations after extensive practice of the colour/shape tasks. As soon as a cue is 
presented, the relevant task feature and response mappings are immediately activated in 
working memory, so that responses in task-switch trials are as fast and accurate as 
responses in task-repeat trials. As mentioned before, another explanation may be that 
participants with no or reduced switch costs did not “fail to engage” (De Jong, 2000; 
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Poboka et al., 2014). In contrast, participants with switch costs 
“failed to engage” in task-set reconfiguration, effectively performing task switching 
according to the two-stage theory (Hydock & Sohn, 2011; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & 
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Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Weidler & Abrams, 2013). These possibilities may 
be addressed in future research. 
The difference in general intelligence between best performers and controls has to 
be interpreted with caution. Previous studies indicated a strong relationship between 
information updating and general intelligence (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al, 2006), 
suggesting that higher intelligence scores may be related to improved goal-updating 
capabilities, resulting in fewer errors and lower switch costs in task switching. However, 
there are multiple sub-processes involved in preparation that may collectively lead to 
improved task-switching performance. Thus, it remains unclear whether the group 
differences in general intelligence can fully explain group differences in task-switching 
performance. 
In sum, the results of Chapter 2 collectively suggest that there were large individual 
differences in task-switching. By focusing on individual response times and error rates, I 
identified best performers who showed superior switching performance in conditions with 
cue-stimulus intervals. However, in two follow-up experiments the best-performing 
participants exhibited no superior task-switching in conditions and paradigms with 
simultaneous presentation of cue and target, performing similar to a group of control 
participants. The advantage of the best performers may be related to faster than average 
processing of cue information and rapid task-set reconfiguration before target onset. 
Accordingly, individuals differed in the degree of efficient switching, which is mainly due 
to different preparation process after cueing. In next chapter, Chapter 3, I will try to 
improve task preparation in participants using carefully designed “priming” cues while 
monitoring individual differences between the priming cues and standard or “non-priming” 
cues. Meanwhile, I will employ electroencephalogram (EEG) measures to investigate the 
temporal dynamics of preparation between two types of cues.  
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CHAPTER 3 Effect of Cue type on Task-switching Performance and 
ERP Components  
3.1 General Introduction 
In this Chapter, I studied the effect of cue type on task-switching performance and 
related ERP components. By employing a novel cue type, I sought to maximally facilitate 
efficient task preparation and reduce switch costs in typical participants. In addition, I 
studied individual differences in task-switching using different task cues and response 
conditions. 
Previous research has suggested that task-switch costs are typically smaller for 
“transparent” compared to “non-transparent” or standard cues (e.g., Arbuthnott & 
Woodward, 2002; Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Miyake, Emerson, 
Padilla, & Ahn, 2004; Schneider, 2016). Transparent cues are directly associated with the 
task goals minimizing the difficulty of cue interpretation, whereas non-transparent cues 
require learning of a cue-task association in order to improve task preparation and 
ultimately task switching (Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). Moreover, 
researchers have suggested that associations between transparent cues and task goals are 
stronger than associations between non-transparent cues and task goals, so that the relevant 
task rules or goals can be retrieved more quickly for transparent cues (Arbuthnott & 
Woodward, 2002; Miyake et al., 2004).  
Even though switch costs can be reduced with transparent cues, significant residual 
switch costs remained. In a recent study, Schneider (2016) conducted task-switching 
experiments in which participants were asked to categorize single digits according to their 
parity or magnitude. Both transparent (“odd-even” or “small-large” in Experiment 1, 2 and 
3) and non-transparent cues (“C” or “U” in Experiment 4) were employed in this study. 
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Schneider (2016) found significant residual switch costs for both types of cues, although 
on average the switch costs were reduced for transparent cues (+73 ms) compared to non-
transparent cues (+110 ms). 
I argue that task-switch costs can be further reduced or even eliminated if typical 
participants prepare tasks similar to best-performers. Improved task preparation may be 
achieved by providing cues that not only inform about the task goal but also pre-activate 
the task-response mappings and prime the relevant features of the upcoming target. Studies 
have successfully employed transparent target-feature cues in a target location task 
(Grange & Houghton, 2010; Houghton, Pritchard & Grange, 2009) where the cues 
contained a visual representation of the target feature. With the help of these cues the target 
location was more quickly identified. They suggested that such a transparent cue makes the 
activation of the target feature in working memory relatively easy. According to load 
theory of selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie, Hirst, Fockert, & Viding, 2004), 
a transparent target-feature cue may reduce cognitive load thereby freeing capacity in 
working memory for task preparation.  
If typical participants are instructed by a cue that primes both the target feature and 
the response mapping, they should be able to prepare more efficiently. These participants 
may be able to complete task preparations before the target stimulus is presented, 
assimilating the performance of best performers. In order to test the task-switching 
differences between standard cues and priming cues, I compared trials with standard cues 
with trials featuring target-feature cues. Importantly, by comparing these two types of cues, 
I can test the assumption of the two-stage theory (e.g., Hydock & Sohn, 2011; Rubinstein 
et al., 2001) which suggests that task preparation can only be completed after target 
stimulus onset, therefore contributing to the residual switch costs. If residual switch costs 
can be eliminated with the help of priming cues, then this would support the FTE account 
by De Jong and colleague (2000, 2010) instead of the two-stage theory. According to FTE, 
113 
 
preparation can start at any time within a CSI and may be completed before the target 
stimulus is displayed. 
I manipulated cue types between subjects in Experiment 2A, and within-subjects in 
Experiment 2B. In order to better understand the temporal dynamics of the task-
preparation process for the two types of cues, I studied the cue-locked and the target-
locked event-related potentials (ERPs) and related topographies in Experiment 2C, where 
the cue types varied within subjects. 
 
3.2 Experiment 2A 
I conducted Experiment 2A to achieve two main goals. First, I sought to investigate 
whether a priming cue, compared to a non-priming (standard) cue, would enable 
participants to reduce or even eliminate switch costs. In the experiment, all participants 
were asked to perform the colour task and the shape task using coloured rectangular bars as 
target stimuli. Half of the participants had priming cues and the other half had non-priming 
cues. Based on previous results on transparent cues I predicted that priming cues would 
facilitate task preparation. The responses should be faster and task-switch costs should be 
smaller in the group with priming cues compared to the group with non-priming cues 
because participants in the latter group need to recall the task-relevant features as well as 
retrieve task-response mappings in order to respond to a target stimulus.  
Second, Experiment 2A also investigated whether there are differences in cue 
processing between the two types of cues by employing a double-response procedure in 
half of the trials with long CSI. The double-response procedure in task switching was first 
developed by Arrington, Logan and Schneider (2007, Experiment 3). Arrington and 
colleagues asked participants to first respond to the cue by a key/button press in order to 
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indicate the task they were expected to perform before they responded to the target 
stimulus itself. However, their study did not investigate individual differences in cue 
response times for different cue types, whereas the present experiment explicitly addressed 
this issue. Similar to the study by Arrington et al. (2007), each participant responded to the 
task cue before they responded to the target stimulus at CSIs of 1100 ms and 1700 ms in 
some trials. I labelled the trials with additional cue responses the “cue-response condition” 
whereas trials with no cue response were called “standard condition”. Observing both cue-
response times and target-response times should help us to better understand processing of 
the different cue types and therefore the task preparation process. According to previous 
results (Arrington et al., 2007), I predicted that participants would respond faster in cue-
repetition trials than in cue-switch trials showing cue-switch costs. In addition, I predicted 
that participants would process the cue differently and therefore show individual 
differences in cue-response times for two cue types.  
 
3.2.1 Experiment 2A Method 
Participants 
Forty-four students from the University of Glasgow took part and received £8 for 
participation in the experiment. The sample size was determined by power analysis (power 
= .85, α = .05, effect size Cohen’s f = .25; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the group with priming or non-priming cues. There 
were 23 participants (7 males and 16 females, mean age = 21.70 years, SD = 3.92) with 
non-priming cues and 21 participants (6 males and 15 females, mean = 21.95 years, SD = 
2.92) with priming cues. All participants were naive as to task switching, and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants passed a colour-blindness test (Ishihara, 
1983). Two participants (1 male and 1 female) in the non-priming group had to be 
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excluded because their overall accuracy was below a predetermined inclusion criterion of 
80% correct.  
Tasks and Stimuli 
The tasks and the target stimuli were the same as the colour/shape task-switching 
stimuli employed in Experiment 1A. However the task cues, the mask and the cue-stimulus 
intervals were different. In the trials with the non-priming cues, the task cue was either a 
circle (diameter 4 cm) or a hexagon (4 cm x 4 cm), signalling the colour and shape task, 
respectively. In the trials with priming cues, the colour cue consisted of two horizontally 
adjacent plus signs “++” (7 cm x 3.4 cm), with a red “+” sign appearing on the left and a 
green “+” sign appearing on the right. The shape task cue was similar in appearance to the 
colour cue, showing a grey “++” sign (7 cm x 3.4 cm) with a highlighted vertical bar on 
the left “+” sign and a highlighted horizontal bar on the right “+” sign (Figure 3.1A). A 
fixation cross (4 cm x 4 cm) was displayed between the cue and the target stimulus. 
Responses to cues and target stimuli were made with the right and left hand, respectively. 
Cue responses were made with the right hand by pressing the keys E (colour task) or X 
(shape task) on a QWERTY keyboard. Target responses were made with the left hand by 
pressing the keys A (red/high) or S (green/wide). Please note that the position of the keys 
on the left and right corresponded with the colour/shape arrangement of the priming cues.    
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two cue-type conditions. 
Instructions were presented on screen and were also explained verbally by the 
experimenter. After receiving instructions, participants completed a practice block with 36 
trials before they started the experiment proper. The experiment had two sessions. The first 
session consisted of 12 blocks with 64 standard trials in each block (4 blocks for each of 
the three CSI conditions: 650 ms, 1100 ms and 1700 ms). The second session consisted of 
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8 blocks with 64 cue-response trials in each block (4 blocks for each of the two CSI 
conditions: 1100 ms and 1700 ms). Most participants finished both sessions on consecutive 
days.  
In a standard trial, a cue appeared briefly at the centre of the screen for 250 ms and 
was replaced by a fixation sign that was displayed for 400 ms, 850 ms, or 1,450 ms. This 
corresponds to a CSI of 650 ms, 1,100 ms, and 1,700 ms, respectively. CSI varied 
randomly across blocks. The fixation sign was then replaced by a target stimulus which 
remained on the screen until a response was given or until the maximum response time of 
1,500 ms expired. If the response was incorrect or if no response was made, the 
corresponding feedback (“mistake”, “too slow”) appeared for 3 seconds at the centre of the 
screen.  
The cue-response condition was similar to the standard condition with the 
exception that only CSIs of 1,100 ms and 1,700 ms were included in the cue-response 
condition. A shorter CSI would have been too demanding for a cue response. Critically, 
participants were asked to also respond to the task cue by pressing a separate key for each 
cue within each CSI. If the participant managed to respond to the task cue, a stimulus 
appeared after the remaining CSI expired (CSI remaining = CSI total – RT cue). If an 
incorrect cue response was given or when the total CSI was exceeded, feedback appeared 
for 3 seconds as in the standard trials. The next trial started after an inter-trial interval (ITI) 
of 500 ms (Figure 3.1B).  
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Figure 3.1. Experiment 2A. Illustration of cues and timeline of trials. A. Non-priming cues 
and priming cues in the colour and shape task. B. Timeline of a single trial with a non-
priming cue in the cue-response condition (left timeline) and a trial with a priming cue in 
the standard condition without cue response (right timeline). 
 
3.2.2 Experiment 2A Results 
The first trial of each block and the trial immediately following an error were 
excluded from further analyses. Error trials were excluded from the RT analysis. After 
exclusion, first, I conducted task-switching analyses on cue and target RTs and ERs using 
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conventional ANOVAs. In addition, I conducted GLMMs on single trial RTs to investigate 
individual differences in cue and target RT performance. 
 
Task-switching analyses 
Effect of cue type on task switching (responses on target stimuli) 
This analysis focused on the standard condition with trials that did not require a cue 
response. I tried to determine whether cue type affected task-switching performance across 
different CSIs. In order to simplify the design and statistical analyses, I did not include 
factor Congruency as a prior analysis suggests no difference for the congruency effect 
between cue types (F < 1). This experiment aimed to investigate whether priming cues can 
reduce or eliminate residual switch costs. Mean target RTs and ERs in the standard 
condition are presented in Table 3.1. ANOVAs for a mixed design were conducted on 
averaged individual target RTs and ERs. Cue type (non-priming, priming) was varied 
between subjects whereas Task (colour, shape), Trial transition (task repeat, task switch) 
and CSI (650 ms, 1100 ms, and 1700 ms) were varied within subjects. 
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Table 3.1 
Experiment 2A. Mean target response times (RTs in ms) and error rates (ERs, in %). 
Task Trial 
transition 
and CSIs 
Cue-response condition  Standard condition 
     
target RT target ER  target RT target ER 
  Priming cue (N = 21) 
Colour Repeat      
 650 - -  503 (24.02) 2.77 (0.79) 
 1100 473 (23.38) 8.67 (1.16)  481 (25.15) 3.37 (1.18) 
 1700 467 (18.20) 8.56 (1.33)  514 (29.34) 3.17 (0.84) 
        Switch      
 650 - -  532 (26.85) 6.95 (1.21) 
 1100 508 (20.39) 13.75 (1.57)  496 (23.78) 5.49 (1.20) 
 1700 482 (17.99) 7.73 (1.47)  529 (26.04) 5.68 (1.20) 
       Shape Repeat      
 650 - -  519 (27.26) 4.99 (1.46) 
 1100 490 (21.35) 10.85 (1.14)  499 (27.06) 5.74 (1.46) 
 1700 491 (18.33) 10.49 (1.61)  532 (30.87) 4.05 (1.28) 
        Switch      
 650 - -  549 (31.05) 8.65 (1.58) 
 1100 527 (24.38) 11.35 (1.66)  524 (28.27) 8.16 (1.49) 
 1700 498 (18.85) 10.77 (1.69)  540 (27.89) 7.66 (1.62) 
       
All Repeat 481 (10.09) 9.64 (.66)  508 (11.05) 4.02 (.49) 
 Switch 503 (10.25) 10.90 (.82)  528 (11.06) 7.10 (.57) 
       
  Non-priming cue (N = 21) 
Colour Repeat      
 650 - -  506 (13.57) 5.51 (1.13) 
 1100 521 (19.25) 10.68 (1.42)  505 (11.20) 6.13 (1.11) 
 1700 523 (14.89) 8.69 (1.10)  542 (17.13) 3.79 (0.67) 
        Switch      
 650 - -  565 (15.70) 10.24 (1.25) 
 1100 568 (23.47) 14.42 (1.81)  560 (14.63) 8.99 (1.65) 
 1700 585 (19.86) 12.08 (1.63)  577 (17.34) 8.64 (1.70) 
       Shape Repeat      
 650 - -  519 (13.58) 5.71 (1.25) 
 1100 522 (20.16) 12.44 (1.53)  503 (12.48) 3.74 (0.72) 
 1700 523 (14.44) 10.06 (1.20)  520 (15.49) 4.24 (0.89) 
        Switch      
 650 - -  576 (16.24) 8.90 (1.56) 
 1100 594 (25.56) 16.91 (1.69)  559 (16.08) 7.03 (0.99) 
 1700 583 (22.88) 12.76 (1.48)  570 (21.64) 5.93 (1.14) 
       
All Repeat 522 (8.53) 10.47 (.67)  516 (5.74) 4.85 (.40) 
 Switch 582 (11.35) 14.04 (.84)  568 (6.86) 8.29 (.58) 
Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
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I did not find a statistically significant main effect for Cue type (F < 1) and Task (F 
= 3.89, p = .060, η2p = .09) on mean RTs. However, I found a significant main effect of 
Trial transition, F(1, 40) = 70.64, p < .001, η2p = .64. The averaged RTs were longer in 
task-switch trials (548 ms) than in task-repeat trials (512 ms), indicating a task-switch cost 
of +36 ms. There was a significant main effect of CSI, F(2, 80) = 4.45, p = .015, η2p = .10. 
RT difference between CSI 650 ms (534 ms) and CSI 1700 ms (541 ms) was not 
significant, p = .252. The difference between CSI 1100 ms (516 ms) and CSI 1700 ms was 
significant, p < .001; as well as the difference between CSI 650 ms and CSI 1100 ms, p 
< .001. The interaction between Trial transition and CSI did not reach statistical 
significance, F(2, 80) = 2.85, p = .064, η2p = .07.  
As predicted, there was a significant interaction between Cue type and Trial 
transition, F(1, 40) = 13.22, p < .001, η2p = .25 (Figure 3.2). Task-switching costs were 
reduced by more than 50% for priming cues (+20 ms, p = .319) compared to non-priming 
cues (+52 ms, p < .001). Target responses in task-switch trials with priming cues were 39 
ms faster compared to non-priming cues (p = .009) whereas there was no significant 
difference between the two cue types in task-repeat trials (p = .641). No other effects were 
statistically significant.  
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Figure 3.2. Results of Experiment 2A. Violin/box plots of target responses in standard 
trials without cue responses. Mean target RTs (top panel) and ERs (bottom panel) for CSI, 
Cue type, and Trial transition.  
Note. *** p < . 001, ** p < . 01, * p < .05, ns = non-significant. 
 
In terms of mean target ERs, participants made more errors in task-switch trials 
(7.69%) than in task-repeat trials (4.44%), F(1, 40) = 63.93, p < .001, η2p = .62. ERs were 
slightly different across CSIs, F(2, 80) = 3.17, p = .047, η2p = .07. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons (corrected after Holm) indicated that ERs were reduced by 1.32% from 6.72% 
for a CSI of 650 ms to 5.40% for a CSI of 1700 ms (p = .044). There was no main effect of 
Task (F < 1) or Cue type (F < 1) for ERs. However, participants in the group with non-
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priming cues made more errors in the colour task (7.22%) than in the shape task (5.93%), 
whereas participants in the group with priming cues made more errors in the shape task 
(6.54%) compared to the colour task (4.57%), resulting in a significant interaction between 
Cue type and Task, F(1, 40) = 6.75, p = .013, η2p = .17. No other effects were statistically 
significant.  
I also compared target RTs and ERs of the cue-response condition with the 
standard condition for CSIs of 1100 ms and 1700 ms (mean RTs and ERs for all conditions 
are presented in Table 3.1). The results of the corresponding ANOVAs are presented in 
Appendix A and show the same pattern of results for Cue type as the results for the 
standard condition with only no-cue-response trials. 
 
Effect of cue type on cue processing (responses on cues) 
Cue RTs and ERs (Table 3.2) were analysed in a mixed design ANOVA with 
between-subjects factor Cue type (non-priming, priming) and within-subjects factors Trial 
transition (task-repeat, task-switch), Task (colour, shape) and CSI (1100 ms, 1700 ms). 
Cue responses in cue-response trials were considered “correct” regardless of the target 
response. Statistical testing suggested that cue RT was not significantly affected by Cue 
type, F(1, 40) = 1.43, p = .239, η2p = .03, and CSI, F(1, 40) = 2.61, p = .114, η2p = .06. 
Task had a significant main effect on cue RT, F(1, 40) = 20.19, p < .001, η2p = .34, 
indicating that on average the shape-task cue (344 ms) was processed 22 ms faster than the 
colour-task cue (366 ms).  
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Table 3.2 
Experiment 2A. Mean cue RTs (in ms) and error rates (ERs in %). 
Task Trial 
transition 
and CSIs 
Priming cue  Non-priming cue 
     
cue RT  cue ER   cue RT cue ER 
Colour Repeat      
 1100 356 (18.98) 5.39 (0.85)  322 (18.00) 6.37 (1.29) 
 1700 389 (24.39) 4.94 (1.08)  337 (18.25) 4.58 (0.84) 
       
 Switch      
 1100 385 (20.07) 7.88 (0.99)  360 (19.68) 6.40 (1.29) 
 1700 402 (25.11) 3.39 (0.78)  377 (17.83) 4.07 (0.84) 
       
Shape Repeat      
 1100 346 (18.15) 5.06 (0.82)  310 (16.75) 6.62 (0.99) 
 1700 364 (23.47) 4.19 (0.79)  314 (18.91) 5.01 (0.92) 
       
 Switch      
 1100 348 (17.51) 3.63 (0.58)  343 (17.11) 7.62 (1.27) 
 1700 367 (24.67) 3.53 (0.75)  355 (18.98) 4.56 (1.09) 
       
All Repeat 364 (10.72) 4.90 (.44)  321 (8.91) 5.65 (.51) 
 Switch 375 (11.04) 4.61 (.44)  359 (9.14) 5.66 (.58) 
Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
Since each cue was matched with a single task, “cue-switch trials” and “cue-repeat 
trials” indicate task-switch and task-repeat trials, respectively. Correspondingly, the RT 
difference between cue-repeat trials and cue-switch trials indicate “cue-switch costs” in 
cue RTs, which is analogous to task-switch costs for target RTs. Trial transition had a 
significant main effect on cue RTs, F(1, 40) = 29.56, p < .001, η2p = .42, demonstrating a 
significant difference of +24 ms in cue RTs between cue-switch trials (367 ms) and cue-
repeat trials (343 ms), suggesting a significant cue-switch cost.   
In addition, Task interacted with Trial transition, F(1, 40) = 4.97, p = .032, η2p 
= .11, revealing that cue-switch costs were significantly larger when switching from the 
shape to the colour task (SC = +30 ms, p = .036) compared to switching from the colour to 
the shape task (SC = +19 ms,  p = .173). Importantly, as in the analysis on target RTs, Trial 
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transition interacted with Cue type, F(1, 40) = 8.17, p = .007, η2p = .17 (Figure 3.3). Post-
hoc analyses showed that cue-switch costs were only significant for non-priming cues (SC 
= +38 ms, p = .032) whereas the costs were not statistically significant for priming cues 
(SC = +11 ms, p = .817). Post-hoc analyses also indicated that cue RTs in trials with 
repeated non-priming cues were significantly shorter compared to repeated priming cues (-
43 ms, p = .013) whereas no significant difference emerged between the two cue types in 
trials with cue-switching (p = .696). No other effects reached statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Results of Experiment 2A. Violin and box plots of mean cue RTs and ERs for 
Task, Cue type and Trial transition.  
Note. * p < .05, ns = non-significant. 
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For the cue-response ERs, there was no significant main effect for Trial transition 
(F < 1), Cue type (F < 1), and Task (F < 1). However, there was a significant main effect 
of CSI, F(1, 40) = 14.64, p < .001, η2p = .27. Participants made 1.83% more errors in trials 
with a CSI of 1100 ms (6.12%) compared to trials with a CSI of 1700 ms (4.29%).  
There was a significant interaction between CSI and Trial transition for ERs, F(1, 
40) = 4.89, p = .033, η2p = .11, suggesting that cue-switch costs were larger for CSI of 
1100 ms (SC = +0.53%) than for CSI of 1700 ms (SC = -0.80%). Moreover, Task 
significantly interacted with Cue type, F(1, 40) = 4.81, p = .034, η2p = .11 (Figure 3.3), 
indicating that ERs for responses to shape cues were increased by 1.85% for trials with 
non-priming cues (5.95%) compared to trials with priming cues (4.10%). This difference 
was not significant for colour cues. There were no other statistically significant effects. 
 
Relationship between cue RT and the followed target RT 
RT distribution for cue and target responses and their relationships in each cue type 
and trial condition are presented in Figure 3.4. I found that cue RT was positively 
correlated with target RT in different trial conditions and cue types. Participants with 
priming cues showed a significant correlation between cue RT and target RT, for repeat 
and switch trials. 
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A.                                                                    B. 
      
Figure 3.4. Relationship between cue RT and target RT for priming (red) and non-priming 
cues (green) in repeat (matrix A) and switch trial conditions (matrix B). In the lower 
diagonal of matrix A and B, each dot in the scatter plot illustrates individual mean cue and 
target response times in ms for priming and no-priming cue. The regression line shows 
linear relationship between cue RT and target RT in each cue type (95% CI is in grey 
shades). RT Distributions for cue responses and target responses are on the diagonal and 
correlations are written in the upper diagonal. 
Note. **p < .001, *p < .05, ns = non-significant. 
 
Individual differences in target RTs and cue RTs 
Individual differences in target RTs 
In order to investigate individual differences in target RTs for the two types of 
cues, I analysed the single-trial target RTs using GLMMs. In order to study whether there 
were significant differences in target RTs between the two types of cues, I tested the 
model, GLMM 2A.2, without a main effect of Cue type and all interactions involving Cue 
type, while keeping the random-effects structure the same as in GLMM 2A.3. However, 
the most complex model tested here, GLMM 2A.3, turned out to be the model with the 
lowest AIC and BIC values (Table 3.3). The model with fewer fixed effects, GLMM 2A.2, 
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was worse than the model with full factorial design, GLMM 2A.3, with differences in 
information criteria of ΔAIC = 139, ΔBIC = 42. This suggests that the differences between 
target RTs for trials with priming and non-priming cues were important and explained a 
substantial amount of variability.  
In GLMM 2A.3, the factor “Task”, “Trial transition”, “Cue type” and “CSI” 
outside the parentheses denote fixed effects and their interactions. The terms inside the 
parentheses denote the random intercept, Task and Trial transition for each participant or 
subject. 
 
Table 3.3 
Experiment 2A GLMM comparisons based on target RT data (the best model is in bold; 
GLMM 2A.3). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma (link 
= “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM 
2A.1 
Target.RT~ 
Task+Trial.transition + 
Cuetype+CSI+(1| 
subject) 
8 336719 336785 -168352 336703   
GLMM 
2A.2 
Target.RT~ 
Task*Trial.transition* 
CSI+(1+Task+ 
Trial.transition| subject) 
1
9 
336512 336668 -168237 336474 228.96 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
2A.3 
Target.RT~ 
Task*Trial.transition* 
Cuetype*CSI+ 
(1 + Task 
+Trial.transition| 
subject) 
3
1 
336373 336626 -168155 336311 163.32 < .001 
*** 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
In contrast to the ANOVA results on target RTs, GLMM 2A.3 suggests that all 
main effects were statistically significant for target RTs – responses were faster in task-
repeat trials (521 ms) compared to task-switch trials (558 ms), t = 24.5, p < .001; and 
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responses were faster in trials with a CSI of 1100 ms (527 ms) compared to the CSI of 650 
ms (545 ms), t = 15.3, p < .001, whereas there was no significant difference between CSI 
650 ms and CSI 1700 ms (547 ms), t = 1.8, p = .075. These results were in line with the 
results of ANOVA. However, in contrast to the ANOVA results, responses were faster in 
priming cues (532 ms) compared to non-priming cues (547 ms), t = 10.5, p < .001; and 
target responses were faster in colour tasks (535 ms) compared to shape task (545 ms), t = 
6.4, p < .001.  
Consistent with the ANOVA results on target RTs, Trial transition significantly 
interacted with Cue type, t = 17.7, p < .001. Task-switch costs were smaller in priming 
cues (SC = +22 ms) compared to non-priming cues (SC = +52 ms). However, different to 
the ANOVA results, the GLMM 2A.3 further suggests that the difference between priming 
and non-priming cues was significantly larger for CSI 1,100 ms (non-priming - priming = 
23 ms) compared to CSI 1,700 ms (15 ms), t = 4.9, p < .001, and also compared to CSI 650 
ms (7 ms), t = 10.3, p < .001.  
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Figure 3.5. Results of Experiment 2A. Illustration of by-subject random effects for target 
RT. Dotplots in top row show target performance with priming cues and in the bottom row 
with non-priming cues. Dotplots from the left to right illustrate individual deviation (dot) 
and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bar) from conditional mean target RT, and 
individual deviations from the fixed effects of Trial transition and Task for each type of 
cue. In the top row, the solid vertical red lines centred on zero in the left, middle, and right 
panel denote the group-level RT for priming cues (Intercept = priming mean target RT of 
532 ms), fixed effects of Trial transition (switch cost = switch - repeat = +22 ms) and Task 
(shape - colour = +20 ms), respectively. In the bottom row, the solid vertical black lines 
centred on zero in the left, middle, and right panel denote the non-priming group-level RT 
(Intercept = non-priming mean target RT of 547 ms), fixed effects of Trial transition 
(switch cost = switch - repeat = +52 ms) and Task (shape - colour = -1 ms) in non-priming 
cues, respectively. Please note the different scales on the x-axes (in ms) in the plots. The 
dashed vertical red and black line in the middle and on the right plot indicates zero task-
switch costs and zero differences between tasks, for priming and non-priming cue, 
respectively. 
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The random effects of GLMM 2A.3 explained individual deviations from the mean 
target RTs (Intercept) as well as deviations from mean task-switch costs (Trial transition) 
and mean differences between the colour and shape tasks, as illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
There were large individual deviations from the group-average RT (Intercept) for each cue 
type. Participants with priming cues showed slightly more variability around the group 
mean compared to the participants with non-priming cues. However, the priming-cue 
group was more homogeneous in terms of task-switch costs, with all participants not 
significantly deviating from the group mean switch costs except for Participant 31 and 37. 
Fourteen out of twenty-one participants in the priming-cue group had switch cost estimates 
that were not significantly different from zero switch costs. In contrast, all participants in 
the non-priming cue group showed significant switch costs and most participants with the 
non-priming cues, except for Participant 5, 9, 20 and particularly 6, did not significantly 
deviate from the group mean switch costs.  
The individual differences for the main effect of Task were similar for the priming 
and non-priming cues group. Many participants in the group with non-priming cues 
performed the shape task as quickly as the colour task, suggesting no difference in target 
response times between tasks.   
 
Individual differences in cue RTs 
In addition to the individual differences in target RTs, I also studied individual 
differences in cue responses. In order to study whether the differences between the two 
types of cues were important, I tested the model without the main effect of Cue type and all 
interactions involving Cue type, while including the same random-effect structure as in 
GLMM 2A.6. However, the more complex model GLMM 2A.6 gave lower AIC and BIC 
values (ΔAIC = 1, ΔBIC = 38, see also Table 3.4). The model, GLMM 2A.5, with fewer 
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fixed effects was worse than the model, GLMM2.6, with full factorial design. This 
suggests that the fixed effect of Cue type was important and that both groups differed 
significantly in cue RTs. In GLMM 2A.6, the factor “Task”, “Trial transition”, “Cue type” 
and “CSI” outside the parentheses denote fixed effects and their interactions. The terms 
inside the parentheses denote the random intercept, Task, Trial transition and CSI for each 
participant or subject.  
 
Table 3.4 
Experiment 2A GLMM comparisons based on cue RT data (the best model is in bold; 
GLMM 2A.6). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma 
(link = “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM 
2A.4 
Cue.RT ~  
Task 
+Trial.transition + 
Cuetype + CSI +  
(1 | subject) 
7 213862 213916 -106924 213848   
GLMM 
2A.5 
Cue.RT ~  
Task * 
Trial.transition 
*CSI+  
(1+Trial.transition+ 
Task+ CSI | subject) 
19 211981 212228 -105971 211943 1904.99 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
2A.6 
Cue.RT ~  
Task * 
Trial.transition * 
Cuetype * CSI +  
(1+Trial.transition+ 
Task+ CSI | 
subject) 
27 211980 212190 -105963 211926 16.54 .035 * 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R. The ID/name 
of the model for cue RT data follows the ID/name of the model for target RT data. 
 
Inconsistent to the ANOVA results on cue RTs, GLMM 2A.6 suggests that all 
fixed effects were statistically significant on cue RT- cue responses were faster in priming 
cues (350 ms) compared to non-priming cues (383 ms), t = 13.35, p < .001; responses were 
faster in shape task (354 ms) compared to colour task (379 ms), t = -13.86, p < .001; 
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responses were faster in repetitions (354 ms) compared to switches (379 ms), t = 16.72, p 
< .001; and responses were faster in trials with a CSI of 1100 ms (357 ms) compared to the 
CSI of 1700 ms (376 ms), t = 11.23, p < .001. 
In addition, GLMM 2A.6 shows significant interactions similar as the ANOVA 
results on cue RTs. Trial transition interacted with Cue types, t = -15.64, p < .001, 
implying that cue-switch costs were smaller in priming cues (+12 ms) compared to non-
priming cues (+38 ms). GLMM 2A.6 also indicated a significant interaction between Trail 
transition, Cue type and Task, t = -7.98, p < .001; and a significant interaction between 
Trial transition, Cue type and CSI, t = -7.21, p < .001. The difference between cue types in 
cue-switch cost was more pronounced in the shape task (SC non-priming - SC priming = 
+32 ms) than in the colour task (+17 ms); and more pronounced with CSI 1700 ms (+ 
30ms) than with CSI 1100 ms (+19 ms). 
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Figure 3.6. Results of Experiment 2A. Illustration of by-subject random effects for cue RT. 
Subject IDs on the left correspond to the Subject IDs for target RT in Figure 3.5. Dotplots 
in top row show performance with priming cues and in the bottom row with non-priming 
cues. Dotplots from the left to right panel illustrate individual deviation (dot) and 95% 
confidence intervals (horizontal error bar) from conditional mean cue RT and individual 
deviations from the fixed effect of Task, Trial transition and CSI for each type of cue. In 
the top row, the solid vertical red lines centred on zero from left to right denote the priming 
group-level RT (Intercept = priming mean cue RT of 383 ms), fixed effects of Trial 
transition (switch cost = switch - repeat = +12 ms), Task (shape - colour = -29 ms) and CSI 
(CSI 1100 ms - CSI 1700 ms = -26 ms), respectively. In the bottom row, the solid vertical 
black lines centred on zero from left to right panel denote the non-priming group-level RT 
(Intercept = priming mean cue RT of 350 ms), fixed effects of Trial transition (switch cost 
= switch - repeat = +38 ms), Task (shape - colour = -21 ms) and CSI (CSI 1100 ms - CSI 
1700 ms = -13 ms), respectively. Please note the different scales on the x-axes (in ms) in 
the plots. The dashed vertical red and black line, in the three plots for cue RTs indicates 
zero switch cost, zero difference between tasks, and zero difference between CSI 1,100 ms 
and CSI 1,700 ms, for priming and non-priming cue respectively.  
 
Similar to the individual difference in target RTs, Figure 3.6 illustrates large 
individual deviations from the mean cue RTs for each type of cues. Figure 3.6 also shows 
that participants in the group of priming cues had smaller deviation from the group mean 
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cue-switch costs and zero cue-switch costs. Fourteen out of 21 participants with priming 
cues, did not show significant cue-switch costs. In contrast, participants in the group of 
non-priming cues appeared to be less homogenous in their cue-switch costs, with only two 
participants showing switch costs no different from zero. Both groups of participants 
showed significant deviations from the main effect of Task and CSI. 
Many Individual participants showed consistent performance ranking similar in 
their cue RT and target RT. For example, Participant 25 who was the slowest in cue RT 
performed also slowly in target RT. Similarly, Participant 1, 8, 9, 12, 17, 18, 35 showed 
slower than average responses for cue and target. Many other participants, e.g., Participant 
5, 16, 32, 40 responded faster than average with shorter cue RT and target RT. However, 
Participant 15 and 19 with non-priming cues and Participant 22, 23, 26, 27 with priming 
cues who were more slowly in cue responses, responded quickly for targets.  
 
3.3 Experiment 2B 
In order to confirm the difference between task-switch costs for the two types of 
cues, I conducted a follow-up experiment varying cue types within-subjects rather than 
between-subjects.  
 
3.3.1 Experiment 2B Method 
Participants 
Twenty-nine students (7 males and 22 females; mean age = 21.62 years, SD = 2.27) 
from the University of Glasgow participated in this study and received £12. The sample 
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size was determined by power analysis (power = .85, α = .05, effect size Cohen’s f = .25; 
Faul et al., 2007). None of the students had participated in the previous experiments.  
Task, Stimuli and Procedure 
The tasks, task cues, and target stimuli were identical to Experiment 2A. All 
participants completed a session of priming cues (about 45-50 min) and a session of non-
priming cues (about 45-50 minutes). Both sessions were completed on separate days within 
a week. The order of the cue types was counterbalanced across participants. Unlike in 
Experiment 2A, only standard-trial condition without cue responses were included in the 
present experiment. Otherwise, the experimental procedures were identical to Experiment 
2A. 
 
3.3.2 Experiment 2B Results 
First, I conducted task-switching analyses on target RTs and ERs using 
conventional ANOVAs. Then, I conducted a GLMM to investigate the individual 
differences in target RT performance. 
 
Effect of cue type on task switching 
Mean RTs and ERs are presented in Table 3.5. A four-way ANOVA with repeated 
measurements was conducted on averaged individual target RTs and ERs. Cue type (non-
priming, priming), Task (colour, shape), Trial transition (task repeat, task switch) and CSI 
(650 ms, 1100 ms, and 1700 ms) were varied within subjects. There was a significant main 
effect of Trial transition, F(1, 28) = 68.99, p < .001, η2p = .71, with responses 31 ms faster 
in task-repeat trials (467 ms) than in task-switch trials (498 ms). Unlike in Experiment 2A, 
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there was a main effect of Cue type, F(1, 28) = 9.17, p = .005, η2p = .24, revealing 
responses that were 42 ms faster for priming cues (462 ms) compared to non-priming cues 
(504 ms). 
 
Table 3.5 
Experiment 2B. Mean target response times (RTs in ms) and error rates (ERs in %). 
Task Trial 
transition 
and CSIs 
Priming  Non-priming 
     
target RT target ER  target RT target ER 
Colour Repeat      
 650 453 (12.74) 2.88 (.45)  478 (14.49) 4.14 (.60) 
 1100 441 (11.43) 2.13 (.36)  471 (10.80) 3.35 (.50) 
 1700 444 (11.65) 2.45 (.39)  489 (13.63) 3.22 (.50) 
       
 Switch      
 650 479 (15.65) 6.56 (.76)  535 (19.77) 7.65 (1.05) 
 1100 463 (12.64) 4.80 (.68)  527 (17.73) 7.10 (.94) 
 1700 461 (13.16) 4.83 (.62)  539 (18.04) 7.54 (.83) 
       
Shape Repeat      
 650 470 (13.89) 3.21 (.77)  481 (13.28) 4.05 (.67) 
 1100 458 (13.14) 3.63 (.56)  478 (12.21) 2.89 (.50) 
 1700 457 (11.57) 3.63 (.67)  491 (13.55) 3.09 (.44) 
       
 Switch      
 650 479 (12.73) 5.37 (.76)  527 (19.61) 7.51 (.64) 
 1100 468 (12.11) 5.77 (.83)  505 (15.25) 5.20 (.67) 
 1700 471 (12.52) 5.06 (.63)  521 (16.94) 4.10 (.52) 
       
All Repeat 454 (5.06) 2.99 (.23)  482 (5.27) 3.46 (.22) 
 Switch 470 (5.33) 5.40 (.29)  526 (7.27) 6.52 (.34) 
Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 
Task significantly interacted with Trial transition, F(1, 28) = 11.72, p = .002, η2p 
= .29. The task-switch costs were significant when switching from the shape to the colour 
task (SC = +38 ms, p < .001) and when switching from the colour to the shape task (SC = 
+23 ms, p = .025). A post-hoc comparison showed that the switch costs were larger when 
switching to the colour task, p = .002. 
137 
 
As in Experiment 2A, Trial transition significantly interacted with Cue type, F(1, 
28) = 24.58, p < .001, η2p = .47 (see Figure 3.7). Task-switch costs were reduced to +16 ms 
for priming cues (p = .096) compared to +44 ms for non-priming cues (p < .001). No other 
effects on RT were statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Results of Experiment 2B. Mean target RTs (top row) and ERs (bottom row) 
for CSI, Cue type, and Trial transition.  
Note. *** p < . 001, ** p < . 01, * p < .05, ns = non-significant. 
 
In terms of mean ERs, participants made more errors in task-switch trials (5.96%) 
compared to task-repeat trials (3.22%), F(1, 28) = 72.77, p < .001, η2p = .72. ERs varied 
across CSIs, F(2, 56) = 5.14, p = .009, η2p = .16. There were more errors in CSI 650 ms 
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(5.17%) compared to CSI 1100 ms (4.36%), p = .047. Error rates were also higher in CSI 
650 ms than in CSI 1700 ms (4.24%), p = .028. Participants made more errors in trials with 
non-priming cue trials (4.99%) compared to priming-cue (4.19%), F(1, 28) = 6.04, p 
= .020, η2p = .18. 
Task significantly interacted with Trial transition, F(1, 28) = 6.39, p = .017, η2p 
= .19. Participants had significant ER switch costs when switching to the colour task (SC = 
+3.39%, p < .001) and when switching to the shape task (SC = +2.08%, p < .001). A post-
hoc pairwise comparison showed that switch costs were significantly larger when 
switching from the shape to the colour task, p = .017. 
Task significantly interacted with Cue type, F(1, 28) = 5.20, p = .030, η2p = .16. 
With non-priming cues, ERs were slightly higher in the colour task (5.50%) than in the 
shape task (4.47%), p = .052. No statistically significant difference between tasks was 
found for priming cues, p = .598. No other effects reached statistical significance. 
 
Individual differences in target RTs 
In order to investigate individual differences in target RTs for the two types of task 
cues, I analysed the target RTs using GLMMs. The models listed in Table 3.6 range from a 
simple GLMM 2B.1 with main fixed effects and random intercept only to a more complex 
GLMM 2B.3 with full factorial fixed effects and specific random effects. GLMM 2B.3 had 
the lowest AIC and BIC values of the models tested. The factor “Task”, “Trial transition”, 
“Cue type” and “CSI” outside the parentheses denote fixed effects and their interactions. 
The terms inside the parentheses denote the random intercept, the random effect of Cue 
type, and the random effect of Trial transition for different types of cues.  
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Table 3.6 
Experiment 2B GLMM comparisons based on target RT data (the best model is in bold; 
GLMM 2B.3). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma 
(link = “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chis
q) 
GLMM 
2B.1 
Target.RT~ 
Task+Trial.transition
+Cuetype+CSI+(1| 
subject) 
8 502867 502936 -251426 502851   
GLMM 
2B.2 
Target.RT~ 
Task*Trial.transition
*Cuetype*CSI+(1+ 
Cuetype+ 
Trial.transition| 
subject) 
31 499585 499852 -249762 499523 3328.07 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
2B.3 
Target.RT~ 
Task* 
Trial.transition* 
Cuetype*CSI+ 
(1+Cuetype+ 
Cuetype: 
Trial.transition| 
subject) 
35 499481 499782 -249706 499411 114.39 < .001 
*** 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
GLMM 2B.3 shows that all main effects were statistically significant for target RT 
– target responses were slightly faster in the colour task (488 ms) compared to the shape 
task (491 ms), t = 3.5, p < .001; responses were faster in task-repeat trials (473 ms) 
compared to task-switch trials (506 ms), t = 27.63, p < .001; responses were faster for 
priming cues (468 ms) compared to non-priming cues (511 ms), t = -29.88, p < .001; and 
responses were faster in trials with a CSI of 1,100 ms (484 ms) compared to the CSI of 650 
ms (493 ms), t = 9.22, p < .001, and CSI 1,700 ms (491 ms), t = 6.20, p < .001.  
In addition, in line with the ANOVA results on RTs, Trial transition significantly 
interacted with Cue type, t = -18.77, p < .001. Task-switch costs were smaller in priming 
cues (SC = +18 ms) compared to non-priming cues (SC = +49 ms). Task significantly 
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interacted with Trial transition, t = -9.72, p < .001. Task-switch costs were larger when 
switching from the shape to the colour task (SC = +39 ms) compared to switching from the 
colour to the shape task (SC = +28 ms). Different from the ANOVA results, the model 
estimates suggest that the difference between priming and non-priming cues was smaller 
for CSI 1100 ms (non-priming - priming = 41 ms) than for CSI 1700 ms (52 ms), t = -
11.03, p < .00, but larger for CSI 1100 ms than for CSI 650 ms (37 ms), t = 2.62, p = .009. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Results of Experiment 2B. Illustration of by-subject random effects for target 
RT. Dotplots from the left to right illustrate individual deviation (dot) and 95% confidence 
intervals (horizontal error bar) from mean target RT (Intercept = grand mean target RT of 
489 ms) and individual deviations from the fixed effect of Cue type (priming – non-
priming = -43 ms) and Trial transition for non-priming cues (switch - repeat = +49 ms) and 
priming cues (switch - repeat = +18 ms). The vertical lines centred on zero denote the 
group-level RT or conditional fixed effects. Please note the different scales on the x-axes 
(in ms) in each plot. The dashed vertical lines in the right three panels (from left to right) 
indicate zero difference between cue types, zero task-switch costs for non-priming cues 
and for priming cues, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.8 illustrates individual deviations from the mean RT (Intercept), from the 
mean effect of Cue type, and from the mean task-switch costs (Trial transition) in non-
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priming and priming cues. Individual variability is most prominent for mean RTs and the 
effect of cue type, explaining considerable variance. Overall task-switch costs are more 
than halved for priming cues compared to non-priming cues. The individual variability is 
reduced for priming cues, with seven participants performing not significantly different 
from zero switch costs compared to four participants in the non-priming condition. In the 
condition with priming cues the participants appeared to be more homogenous in their 
task-switch costs, replicating the results of Experiment 2A. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2A and 2B 
Several important findings emerged from the results of the between-subject design 
in Experiment 2A and the within-subject design in Experiment 2B. First, task-switch costs 
for both RT and ER remained significant in trials with non-priming cues. In trials with 
priming cues, in line with my prediction, RT task-switch costs were reduced and no longer 
statistically significant, irrespective of CSIs. This finding supports my hypothesis that 
priming cues can facilitate efficient task preparation, resulting in reduced RT in switch 
trials and therefore reduced RT task-switch costs. The results of the GLMM suggest that 
typical participants had more homogenous task-switch costs and improved switching 
performance if appropriate priming cues are employed. Although I observed no task-switch 
costs in RTs in trials with priming cues, there were significant task-switching costs in 
terms of error rates in priming and non-priming cues of Experiment 2A and 2B.  
The non-significant residual switch costs for RTs in the condition with priming is 
consistent with previous results showing that “transparent” cues can substantially decrease 
residual switch costs because task goals are activated more easily (e.g., Arbuthnott & 
Woodward, 2002; Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Miyake et al., 2004; 
Schneider, 2016). However, residual switch costs remained significant although 
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transparent task cues were employed in these studies. The critical difference in the present 
experiment was that I employed “priming” cues that not only pre-activate the upcoming 
task features of the target but also inform about the task-response mappings for the 
upcoming task, essentially providing a shortcut for task-rule retrieval and response 
selection. This type of cue may improve preparatory adjustments and may help trial-by-
trial task-set retrieval.  
Measuring cue RTs in Experiment 2A provided evidence of individual differences 
and different task-switching preparation for the two different types of task cues. I found 
that priming cues had smaller and non-significant cue-switch costs, although the average 
cue RTs were longer in trials with priming cues. Participants spent longer time to process 
the information of priming cues, which may imply more elaborate cue processing in cue-
repeat and cue-switch trials. In contrast, participants with non-priming cues showed larger 
and significant cue-switch costs in RTs. Non-priming cues were visually simpler and 
therefore led to faster cue processing. However, participants with non-priming cues 
responded even more quickly if the cue (i.e., task) was repeated from the previous trial. 
Different performance between two types of cues may explain the different task-switching 
performance after target onset. Indeed, the correlation analyses showed a positive 
relationship between cue RT and target RT, providing evidence that fast target encoding 
and fast response execution may be related to fast cue processing and cue-based 
preparation.  
The present results suggest that participants were able to better prepare in trials 
with priming cues. The suggestion that task preparation can be completed within a shorter 
interval for priming cues seems incompatible with the two-stage theory (e.g., Hydock & 
Sohn, 2011; Rubinstein et al., 2001). This theory posits that task-rule activation can only 
be completed after onset of a target stimulus. On the other hand, the present results favour 
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De Jong and colleague’s (2000, 2010) FTE account because completed preparation within 
a relatively long CSI is possible so that residual switch costs can be considerably reduced.  
In addition to more efficient preparation, it seems reasonable to assume that in a 
condition with priming cues participants experienced less interference in task-switch trials. 
This is because when judgments are required in visual detection or discrimination tasks, 
cues that prime target features provide more depictive representations and have the 
advantage of being self-explanatory (see Grange & Houghton, 2010; Houghton et al., 
2009). Consistent with the load theory of selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie et 
al., 2004), in the task-switching context with attention shifting between the colour and the 
shape, iconic feature cues can reduce the cognitive load of task-set reconfiguration because 
these feature cues depict a clear image about the upcoming task. Meanwhile, reduced 
cognitive load may allocate selective attention towards task-relevant features (e.g., if in the 
colour task, focus on the colour exclusively) and away from irrelevant features (e.g., if in 
the colour task, ignore the shape completely), resulting in less interference when target 
onset in trials with priming cues. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 2A and 2B show that RT task-switch costs 
can be reduced to a non-significant level when priming cues are used, irrespective of CSI. 
This finding can be explained by reduced cognitive load for priming cues: There was more 
working memory capacity available to prepare task-relevant responses while minimizing 
interference. A separate analysis on cue responses in Experiment 2A indicated different 
levels of task preparation for the different types of cues, which helps to understand 
differences in task switching. Moreover, Experiment 2A revealed substantial individual 
differences, not only for cue RTs but also for target RTs. Experiment 2B showed a similar 
pattern of results as in Experiment 2A, while strengthening the interpretation of more 
efficient task preparation because the same participants showed smaller differences in task-
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switch costs for priming compared to non-priming cues, reminiscent of best performers in 
Experiment 1A, 1B and 1C. 
In the next experiment, Experiment 2C, in order to test whether there are 
differences between the temporal dynamics underlying the preparation process for priming 
and non-priming cues, I employed EEG measures while conducting the task-switching 
experiment. I studied cue-locked and target stimulus-locked ERPs and related brain 
topographies.  
 
3.4 Experiment 2C 
A number of electrophysiological task-switching studies have measured brain 
potentials that are time-locked to cue onset and target stimulus onset, providing neural 
evidence of when preparation occurs and the approximate brain areas that are involved in 
the preparation process (for reviews see Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis et al., 2010; and 
Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014).  
 
Cue-locked ERPs and scalp topographies 
Research has identified several cue-locked ERP components related to preparation 
process but these components vary strongly across paradigms and tasks (Jamadar et al., 
2015; Karayanidis et al., 2010; Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). However, during the cue-
based preparation interval, researchers have consistently reported that there is a larger 
positive waveform for task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials that is most evident 
over central and parietal electrodes, labelled as the differential switch positivity or switch 
positivity (e.g., Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Karayanidis et al., 2009; Li, Wang, Zhao & 
145 
 
Fogelson, 2012; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006; Steinhauser et al., 2017). The cue-locked 
centrally switch positivity can emerge as early as about 80 - 150 ms after cue onset and 
typically peaks around 350-400 ms post cue over centro-parietal sites. In addition, these 
studies also indicated that within the CSI, the switch positivity is often followed by a 
centro-parietally maximal negativity that peaks at onset of the target stimulus in short CSI 
(i.e., 150 ms) and can complete before target stimulus onset in longer CSI (i.e, 600 ms, 
1050 ms).  
It has been consistently suggested that cue-locked switch positivity reflects a state 
of preparation, including a general switch preparation and a task-specific preparation 
(Elchlepp, Lavric, Mizon & Monsell, 2012; Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Jost, Mayr & 
Rosler, 2008; Karayanidis et al., 2009; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006; but see Travers & 
West, 2008). For example, Nicholson et al. (2006) compared differential waveform for 
“switch-to” cues with “switch-away” cues within the long preparation intervals of 1000 
ms. The switch-to cues indicated an upcoming task, in contrast, the switch-away cues 
indicated performing a different task in the upcoming trial. Nicholson and colleagues 
observed that both cue types elicited an earlier cue-locked switch positivity, emerging from 
about 100 ms post cue at central sites and later stronger at parietal and occipital sites from 
about 400-450 ms post cue. However, the switch positivity was smaller in amplitude and 
lasted shorter in switch-away cues centro-parietally over approximately 400-450 ms and 
700-750 ms post cue. Nicholson et al. (2006) concluded that the early positivity is 
associated with a general preparation of a task switch. The later positivity may reflect more 
specific task preparation, which was only elicited by switch-to cues. Similar results were 
found by Jamadar et al. (2010a, 2010b) using informatively cues and non-informatively 
cues.  
Elchlepp and colleagues (2010) found no significant difference between switch 
costs for word cues (i.e., “COLOUR” represents colour task, and “SHAPE” represents 
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shape task) and for picture cues (i.e., colour task is cued by a collage of the four 
overlapped colours, shape task is cued by a collage of the four overlapped shapes). 
Correspondingly, they observed no reliable difference in cue-locked switch positivity 
between word and colour cues, suggesting no difference in the cue-based preparation 
between two types of cues. Accordingly, these studies suggest that the amplitude and the 
duration of the cue-locked switch positivity are related to the process of task preparation, 
with a larger cue-locked switch positivity being associated with better preparation and 
smaller RT switch costs.  
In addition, there is a cue-locked pre-target negativity that is associated with 
anticipatory attention and task preparedness. A larger pre-target negativity was found to be 
associated with faster responding to the upcoming target. In Nicholson et al., (2006), 
participants showed faster responses in switch-to trials than in switch-away trials. They 
found that the switch negativity in switch-away trials appeared later (~360 ms) than 
switch-to trials (~200 ms), and returned to baseline around 700 ms post cue similar to 
switch-to trials. Switch-to cues that provided valid information about the identity of the 
upcoming task improved task preparedness and led to faster responses. Similar studies and 
findings were summarised by Karayanidis and Jamadar (2014). 
Therefore, one purpose of conducting Experiment 2C was to study the cue-locked 
ERP difference waveforms for priming and non-priming cues in different CSIs. Based on 
the results of Experiment 2A and 2B, I expected large and significant cue-locked switch 
positivity in priming cues, corresponding to shorter response times and smaller response 
time switch costs. 
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Target-locked ERPs and scalp topographies 
Although ERP studies of task switching have focused primarily on preparation-
related processes occurring during the CSI, ERPs also show robust effects of task 
switching after target stimulus onset. Target-locked ERP waveforms measure task-switch 
versus task-repeat differences after target stimulus appears and can test the cognitive 
control processes necessary to overcome target-driven interference from the irrelevant task 
set. Researchers have consistently reported that target-locked ERPs were more negative 
over fronto-central and parietal regions in task-switch than task-repeat trials, indicating a 
differential switch negativity or switch negativity. This negativity reflects greater difficulty 
of task implementation and increased target-driven interference in task-switch trials 
compared to task-repeat trials, i.e., the task-irrelevant target feature can attract attention 
especially when the feature was relevant in the previous trial with a different task (e.g., 
Elchlepp, et al., 2012; Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Lavric et al., 2008; Li et al., 2012; 
Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006; for reviews see Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis et al., 2010; 
and Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014).  
Nicholson et al. (2005) reported that in trials with a CSI of 600 ms, switch 
negativity emerged as early as 40 ms post target at parietal and occipital sites and peaked 
around 400 ms post target over central and parietal scalp. The switch negativity was larger 
for 600-ms than for 1050-ms cue-stimulus intervals. Similar results were reported in Li et 
al. (2012). Accordingly, with a long and informative preparation interval before target 
onset, ERP data suggests reduced interference on decision and response selection when 
target stimulus is presented.  
In another study, Nicholson et al. (2006) found that switch-to trials showed an early 
and prolonged centro-parietally switch negativity from around 200 ms after target onset. In 
contrast, switch-away trials showed an early switch positivity approximately 150 ms after 
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target onset, spread across all midline sites. This early positivity in the switch-away trials 
was quickly replaced with a switch negativity around 360 ms following the target stimulus, 
spread broadly across the scalp. Nicholson and colleagues (2006) suggested that the post-
target differential positivity for switch-away cues reflects the delayed activation of the 
relevant task-set, since for switch-away cues it is only possible to initiate the task-set 
reconfiguration after the target stimulus has been presented. However, Elchlepp and 
colleagues (2012) also studied post-target activity between different types of cues, but they 
did not find differences between switch negativity for trials with word cues and with 
picture cues following either short (200 ms) or long CSIs (800 ms) and after either 
univalent or bivalent stimulus. RT switch costs were not different between two cue types. 
Both word and picture cues may provide equal amount of valid information about an 
upcoming task, leading to similar preparation and interference. 
Therefore, the second purpose of conducting Experiment 2C was to study the target 
stimulus-related activity. Based on my previous results on priming and non-priming cues, I 
predicted that priming cues should elicit small target-locked negativity. This is because 
priming cues which informed target feature and response mappings should facilitate 
feature categorisation/discriminability with reduced interference after target stimulus onset. 
 
3.4.1 Experiment 2C Method 
Participants 
Nineteen students (7 males and 12 females; mean age = 24.42 years, SD = 2.63) 
from the University of Glasgow participated in this study and received £15. The sample 
size was determined by power analysis (power = .85, α = .05, effect size Cohen’s f = .30; 
Faul et al., 2007). I excluded 6 participants because their response accuracy was below 
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than a preset inclusion criterion of 80 % (~50 trials) for each of the trial conditions in CSI 
650 ms, CSI 1100 ms and CSI 1700 ms.  I also excluded one other participant due to 
irreducible scalp impedance (>30 kΩ for most electrodes). For the rest of 12 participants, 
all were right-handed and none of the them had participated in Experiment 2A and 2B. All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal colour vision.  
Task and Apparatus 
The colour/shape discrimination task was identical to the task of Experiment 2A 
and 2B, with the exception that in Experiment 2C the task was programmed in PsychoPy 
software (Peirce & MacAskill, 2018) and displayed on a 27-inch monitor (60 × 34 cm). 
Target responses were made with the left and right index finger by pressing the arrows left 
(red/high) or right (green/wide), respectively, on a QWERTY keyboard.  
Procedure 
All participants were seated comfortably 75 cm away from the monitor during the 
testing. They were required to focus on the centre of the screen in an acoustically and 
electrically shielded booth with dim light. Before the testing session, each participant was 
trained in a session without EEG recording; it consisted of 6 blocks of 24 mixed-task trials, 
in which both colour and shape tasks were randomly mixed. The testing session consisted 
of 12 blocks of 64 mixed-task trials in which participants were tested with two blocks for 
each CSI condition (650 ms, 1100 ms, and 1700 ms) of each cue type (priming cue, non-
priming cue). CSI was constant throughout a block and changed randomly between blocks. 
The order of the cue types was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible when 
the target stimulus onset. If a response was incorrect or if no response was made, a 
corresponding feedback appeared for 1 second at the centre of the screen. Following each 
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block, mean RTs and error rates were displayed on the screen and participants were 
encouraged to improve their performance. 
EEG Recording and Pre-processing  
The electroencephalogram (EEG) signals were recorded during the testing session, 
using a plastic cap (EASYCAP, Falk Minow, Munich, Germany) with 64 electrodes from 
channels Fp1, Fp2, F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4, O1, O2, F7, F8, T7, T8, P7, P8, Fz, Cz, Pz, Oz, 
AF1, AF2 FC1, FC2, CP1, CP2, PO1, PO2, FC5, FC6, CP5, CP6, F1, F2, C1, C2, P1, P2, 
AF5, AF6, FC3, FC4, CP3, CP4, PO5, PO6, F5, F6, C5, C6, P5, P6, AF7, AF8, FT7, FT8, 
TP7, TP8, PO7, PO8, Fpz, FCz, CPz, NFpz as well as an electrode on the left mastoid 
served as reference and an electrode on the chin served as ground. The EEG was sampled 
continuously at 1000 Hz and connected to BrainAmp amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, 
Germany). The impedances of all electrodes were kept below 20 kΩ.  
EEG data pre-processing and data analyses were performed using EEGLAB 
version 11.0.5 (http://www.sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab) running under MATLAB 2012b 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA). EEG data were band-pass filtered off-line to 0.5 - 40 Hz and 
were transformed to average reference, before signals were segmented into event-related 
epochs of different lengths (cf., Elchlepp et al, 2012; Jost et al., 2008). Cue-locked epochs 
were extracted from 100 ms before cue onset to the end of the CSI (i.e., 750 ms-long 
epochs for the CSI 650 ms condition, 1,200 ms-long epochs for the CSI 1,100 ms condition 
and 1,800 ms-long epochs for the CSI 1,700 ms condition). Stimulus-locked (target-
locked) epochs were extracted from 100 ms before target stimulus onset to 700 ms after 
target onset. The baseline was set to 100 ms before the onset of the task cue and the onset 
of target stimulus.  
As in Elchlepp et al. (2012), cue-locked and stimulus-locked epochs were visually 
inspected and rejected for muscle, drift and other non-ocular artefacts. As in the 
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behavioural data pre-processing of Experiment 2A and 2B, the first epoch of every block, 
epochs associated with an incorrect response, epochs immediately following an incorrect 
response were excluded. In addition, epochs on which RTs were shorter than 200 ms were 
also excluded from data analyses. Eye-movement and eye-blink artefacts from the 
remaining epochs were de-noised using Independent Component Analysis (ICA, Bell & 
Sejnowski, 1995). After data pre-processing, cue-locked individual ERP waveforms 
included 317 ± 23 epochs in the priming cues and 314 ± 23 epochs in the non-priming 
cues. Stimulus-locked individual ERP waveforms included 325 ± 22 epochs in the priming 
cues and 328 ± 24 epochs in the non-priming cues.  
 
3.4.2 Experiment 2C Results 
Behavioural Data 
Mean RTs and ERs are presented in Table 3.7. Three-way ANOVAs with repeated 
measurements was conducted on individual mean RT and ER. Cue type (non-priming, 
priming), Trial transition (task repeat, task switch) and CSI (650 ms, 1100 ms, and 1700 
ms) were varied within subjects, in order to focus on studying the differences between 
task-switch costs for two cue types across CSIs. 
For RTs, there was a significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 11) = 5.16, p 
= .044, η2p = .32. Participants showed slightly faster responses in task-repeat trials (526 
ms) than in task-switch trials (537 ms), indicating a switch cost of only +11 ms. However, 
I did not find statistically significant effect of CSI (F < 1) and Cue type (F = 2.10, p 
= .175) in RT. It is worth noting that RT was 517 ms in priming cues and 546 ms in non-
priming cues. Participants had a RT of 539 ms in CSI 650 ms condition, a RT of 524 ms in 
CSI 1100 ms condition, and a RT of 531 ms in CSI 1700 ms conditions. A planned post-
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hoc comparison showed that RT was equivalent across CSIs, with p > .100. There were no 
significant interactions in RT. A planned post-hoc comparison showed that the switch costs 
were marginally significant in non-priming cues (switch - repeat +15 ms, p = .059), but not 
significant in priming cues (+8 ms, p = .192).  
For ERs, there was a significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 11) = 11.84, p 
= .006, η2p = .52. Participants made more errors in task-switch trials (6.84%) than in task-
repeat trials (5.44%), indicating a switch cost of +1.40%. There was a significant main 
effect of CSI, F(2, 22) = 8.61, p = .002, η2p = .44. Participants made more errors in CSI 
650 ms condition (7.56%) than in CSI 1100 ms (5.72%) and CSI 1700 ms conditions 
(5.14%). A post-hoc analysis showed that the difference between CSI 650 ms and CSI 
1100 ms was significant, p = .020. The difference between CSI 650 ms and CSI 1700 ms 
was also significant, p < .001. There was no significant main effect of Cue type, F < 1. The 
ERs were 6.12% in priming cues and 6.17% in non-priming cues. There were no 
statistically significant interactions. A planned post-hoc analysis showed that switch costs 
were not significant for priming (switch - repeat = +1.15%, p = .280) and non-priming cues 
(+1.65%, p = .310). The switch costs were not different between cue types, p = .210. 
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Table 3.7 
Experiment 2C. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (ERs, as %). 
Trial 
transition 
and CSIs 
Priming  Non-priming 
     
RT ER  RT ER 
Repeat      
650 518 (24.28) 7.38 (1.37)  549 (24.33) 7.27 (1.48) 
1100 504 (26.62) 4.30 (1.22)  533 (16.83) 4.38 (1.20) 
1700 518 (22.54) 4.94 (1.34)  536 (17.07) 4.38 (1.47) 
      
Switch      
650 525 (26.92) 7.82 (1.39)  563 (29.66) 7.76 (1.84) 
1100 521 (28.81) 6.30 (1.25)  543 (16.55) 7.93 (1.44) 
1700 516 (22.20) 5.93 (1.23)  555 (18.05) 5.29 (.82) 
      
All_Repeat 513 (13.79) 5.54 (.76)  539 (11.11) 5.34 (.81) 
All_Switch 521 (14.65) 6.68 (.73)  554 (12.53) 7.00 (.83) 
Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 
Analyses of individual differences in target RTs 
As in Experiment 2A and 2B, I conducted GLMMs on RTs in order to investigate 
individual differences in task switching between two types of task cues. Models listed in 
Table 3.8 range from a simple GLMM 2C.1 with main fixed effects and random intercept 
to a complex GLMM 2C.3 with full factorial fixed effects and specific random effects. 
GLMM 2C.3 was the most parsimonious model giving the lowest AIC and BIC values. 
The factor “Trial transition”, “Cue type” and “CSI” outside the parentheses denote fixed 
effects and their interactions. The terms inside the parentheses denote the by-subject 
random intercept, the by-subject random effect of Cue type, CSI, and of the interaction 
between Trial transition and Cue type.  
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Table 3.8 
Experiment 2C GLMM comparisons based on target RT data (the best model is in bold; 
GLMM 2C.3). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma 
(link = “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-sq p-value 
(>Chisq
) 
GLMM 
2C.1 
RT~  
Trial.transition + 
CSI+ Cuetype +  
(1| subject) 
7 101495 101543 -50740 10148
1 
  
GLMM 
2C.2 
RT~  
Trial.transition*CSI* 
Cuetype + (1 + 
Trial.transition + 
Cuetype|subject) 
19 101133 101266 -50548 10109
5 
385.53 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
2C.3 
RT~  
Trial.transition*CSI
* Cuetype +  
(1 + CSI + Cuetype + 
Cuetype : 
Trial.transition| 
subject) 
34 100759 100996 -50345 10069
1 
404.43 < .001 
*** 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
Similar to the results of ANOVA in RTs, the fixed effects of GLMM 2C.3 indicate 
that responses were significantly faster in task-repeat trials (536 ms) than in task-switch 
trials (547 ms), t = 4.20, p < .001. Different from the results of ANOVA, the model 
indicates that responses were significantly faster in CSI 1100 ms (535 ms) than in CSI 650 
ms (551 ms), t = 3.39, p < .001. Responses were faster in priming cues (528) than in non-
priming cues (555 ms), t = 6.21, p < .001. In addition, switch costs were statistically 
smaller in priming cues (+6 ms) than in non-priming cues (+16 ms), t = 2.94, p = .003. The 
differences between switch costs for priming and non-priming cues were statistically 
significant in CSI 650 ms (SC priming = +7 ms, SC non-priming = +13 ms; t = 2.03, p 
= .042) and CSI 1700 ms (SC priming = -1 ms, SC non-priming = +21 ms; t = 6.70, p 
< .001).  
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Figure 3.9. Results of Experiment 2C. Illustration of by-subject random effects for target 
RT. Dotplots in top row illustrate individual deviation (dot) and 95% confidence intervals 
(horizontal error bar) from mean RT (Intercept = grand mean RT of 542 ms). Dotplots in 
the left and right of the middle row illustrate individual deviations and 95% confidence 
intervals from the fixed effect of Trial transition in non-priming cues (mean switch cost = 
switch - repeat = +16 ms) and in priming cues (mean switch cost = switch - repeat = +6 
ms). The dashed vertical lines indicate zero task-switch costs. Dotplots from the left to 
right panel of the bottom row illustrate individual deviations and 95% confidence intervals 
from the fixed effect of Cue type (mean difference = priming – non-priming = -27 ms), and 
from the difference between CSI 1700 ms and CSI 1100 ms (mean difference = 4 ms), and 
between CSI 650 ms and CSI 1100 ms (mean difference = 16 ms). The solid vertical lines 
centred on zero in each dotplot denote the group-level RT or fixed effects. Please note the 
different scales on the x-axes (in ms) in the plots.  
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Figure 3.9 illustrates that participants varied considerably in their mean RTs 
(Intercepts) from the overall average, similar to the pattern of individual differences in my 
previous experiments. Moreover, some participants varied significantly from the mean 
task-switch costs in priming and non-priming cues. However, Participant 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 did 
not deviate significantly from the mean switch costs in both types of cues. Participant 1, 5, 
10, 11, 12 did not deviate significantly from the zero switch costs in both cue types. 
Comparing switch costs in priming cues with switch costs in non-priming cues I found that 
participants with priming cues showed narrower confidence intervals representing more 
precise estimation in individual RTs. The individual differences in non-priming cues was 
positively related to the differences in priming cues (Pearson’s r = .76).  
Figure 3.9 also shows that the individual differences in RT difference between cue 
types showed a random pattern. Only three participants (i.e., Participant 3, 7, 8) showed no 
RT difference between two types of cues. Similarly, the individual differences in RT 
between CSIs also showed a random pattern, with participants varying considerably 
between CSI conditions.  
 
ERP Data 
Individual-averaged ERPs for task-repeat and task-switch trials were obtained in 
priming and non-priming cues at each of the three CSI conditions (650 ms, 1,100 ms and 
1,700 ms). Therefore, there were 12 cue-locked and 12 stimulus-locked ERP average 
waveforms for each participant at each of the 64-electrode site. All averages were based on 
a minimum of 40 trials (Maximum = 64 trials, Mean = 53 trials).  
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Cue-locked (Figure 3.10A) and stimulus-locked (Figure 3.11A) waveforms for 
switch and repeat trials are depicted at four midline sites across cue types (priming, non-
priming cues) for each of the 3 CSI conditions (650 ms, 1100 ms, 1700 ms). Figure 3.10B 
and Figure 3.11B illustrate cue- and stimulus-locked difference waveforms at electrode Pz, 
at which the largest difference between switch and repeat trials was reported in the 
previous studies (Jost et al., 2008; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006; Steinhauser et al., 2017; 
for a review see Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). As in these studies, difference waveforms 
in each CSI condition were derived by subtracting the average ERP waveforms for task-
repeat trials from the average ERP waveforms for task-switch trials. I conducted point-by-
point t-tests to establish time points of significant difference between switch and repeat 
trials at electrode Pz. Only significant differences at the significance level of .01 were 
summarised in Table 3.9 and highlighted in Figure 3.10B and Figure 3.11B. In addition, 
cue-locked scalp topographies of mean amplitude (400-600 ms time window) for each 
condition and the related significant difference sites (α = .01) across all 12 participants are 
displayed in the left panel of Figure 3.12. Stimulus-locked scalp topographies of mean 
amplitude (500-700 ms time window) for CSI 1100 ms condition and the related 
significant difference sites (α = .01) across all participants are displayed in the right panel 
of Figure 3.12. 
 
Cue-locked ERPs 
Figure 3.10 shows that cue-locked ERP waveforms were similar between two types 
of cues in different CSI conditions. For both priming and non-priming cues, parietal site 
showed that there was a switch-related positivity that emerged approximately 200 ms in 
CSI 650 ms and approximately 400 ms in CSI 1,000 ms and 1,700 ms after cue onset. The 
switch positivity peaked around 500-550 ms post cue for all CSI conditions (Figure 
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3.10B), and returned to the baseline around 700 ms for priming cues in the longer CSI 
conditions (1,100 ms, 1,700 ms) while for non-priming cues around 700 ms in CSI 1,100 
ms and around 900 ms in CSI 1,700 ms, suggesting different efficiency in task preparation 
between two types of cues. Participants were more efficient in priming cues in CSI 1700 
ms. Compared with long-CSI conditions, in trials with a short CSI (650 ms) switch 
positivity did not return to the baseline level before stimulus onset, for both priming and 
non-priming cues.  
The results of point-by-point analysis of parietally cue-locked difference 
waveforms are summarised in Table 3.9. Both types of cues elicited a similar pattern of 
switch positivity in CSI 650 ms and 1700 ms. However, when in trials with CSI 1100 ms, 
switch positivity was only significant in priming cues (482-537 ms), followed by a 
significant switch-related pre-stimulus negativity (921-941 ms). Correspondingly, scalp 
topographies in a time window of 400-600 ms after cue onset show that the switch-repeat 
contrast was most significant over central-parietal electrode sites in priming and non-
priming cues (the left panel of Figure 3.12). 
 
Stimulus-locked ERPs 
Figure 3.11A shows that priming and non-priming cues were similar in switch and 
repeat stimulus-locked ERPs in different CSIs at electrode Fz, Cz and Oz. In contrast, 
Figure 3.11B depicts stimulus-locked difference waveforms for the three CSI conditions at 
Pz where the effects were maximal. It was found that in CSI 650 ms and CSI 1700 ms, the 
stimulus elicited a switch negativity (non-significant) in both priming and non-priming 
cues. In CSI 1100 ms, Table 3.9 and Figure 3.11B demonstrate that the stimulus in 
priming-cue condition elicited a significant switch positivity, started from approximately 
500 ms and spread to approximately 700 ms post stimulus. The stimulus in non-priming 
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cue condition elicited a short-lasting switch positivity around 569 ms post stimulus. 
Correspondingly, scalp topographies in a time window from 500 to 700 ms after target 
stimulus onset show that switch versus repeat contrast was most significant in the parietal 
region for non-priming cues and in the frontal and parietal sites for priming cues (the right 
panel of Figure 3.12).  
 
Table 3.9 
Results of point-by-point analysis of cue- and stimulus-locked difference waveforms at Pz 
(switch minus repeat waveforms) 
 cue-locked  Stimulus-locked 
 650 ms 1100 ms 1700 ms  650 ms 1100 ms 1700 ms 
Priming 533-543 
578-590 
593-608 
 
482-537 
921-941 
 
524-543 
617-646 
  504-515 
538-553 
563-582 
627-693 
 
        
Non-Priming 465-479 
496-530 
557-559 
604-611 
 513-521 
536-595 
  569-571  
Note. The numbers in the table represent regions (in ms) where the switch waveform was 
significantly different from the repeat waveform, at the significance level of .01. 
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Figure 3.10. A: Cue-locked ERP waveforms for switch and repeat trials at four midline 
sites (Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz) for each condition. B: Cue-locked switch-repeat difference 
waveforms (black solid lines) and standard deviations (blue dotted lines) and time point 
with significant differences (grey bar) at electrode Pz for each condition.  
The x-axis indicates the timeline (in ms) of each trial. The ticks on the x-axis reflect 100-
ms increments, consistently for all CSIs. The y-axis indicates ERP potentials (μV), with 
differing scales for panel A and for panel B. The ticks on the y-axis reflect 5 μV increments 
in panel A and 2 μV in panel B. The origin of the x- and y-coordinates indicates cue onset 
in both panels.   
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Figure 3.11. A: Stimulus-locked ERP waveforms for switch and repeat trials at four 
midline sites (Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz) for each condition. B: Stimulus-locked switch-repeat 
difference waveforms (black solid lines) and standard deviations (blue dotted lines) and 
time point with significant differences (grey bar) at electrode Pz for each condition.  
The x-axis indicates the timeline (in ms) of a trial. The ticks on the x-axis reflect 100-ms 
increments, consistently for all CSIs. The y-axis indicates ERP potentials (μV), with 
differing scales for panel A and panel B. The ticks on the y-axis reflect 5 μV increments in 
panel A and 2 μV in panel B. The origin of the x- and y-coordinates indicates target-
stimulus onset in both panels.   
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Figure 3.12. Cue-locked scalp topographies (μV; left) and electrode sites of significant 
contrast (α = .01; red dots) between switch and repeat trials in different CSIs (650 ms, 
1100 ms, 1700 ms) averaged over a time window of 400-600 ms after cue onset. Stimulus-
locked scalp topographies (μV; right) and electrode sites of significant contrast (at α = .01; 
red dots) between switch and repeat trials in CSI 1100 ms averaged over a time window of 
500-700 ms after target stimulus onset. Please note different colour scales from different 
CSI conditions and different time windows. 
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3.4.3 Experiment 2C Discussion 
The behavioural data of the present experiment showed that although switch costs 
were relatively small for both types of cues, RT switch costs were reduced further by 
nearly a half for priming cues than for non-priming cues, collapsing across different CSIs. 
This is consistent with the results of Experiment 2A and 2B where participants showed on 
average smaller switch costs in trials with priming cues than non-priming cues. However, 
inconsistent with previous experiments, the participants in the present experiment showed 
much small switch costs for both types of cues. suggesting that participants might have 
been highly engaged in task preparation independent of the type of task cues. 
Cue-locked ERPs and topographical maps 
At electrode Pz, I found cue-locked ERP positivities that were larger for switch 
trials compared to repeat trials, consistent with previous ERP studies on task switching 
(e.g., Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). The differential switch 
positivity was significant for priming cues in each CSI condition. In contrast, in CSI 1100 
ms non-priming cues did not elicit a significant switch positivity. Previous studies reported 
that cue-locked switch positivity indicates advance preparation associated with small RT 
switch costs (e.g., Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). Participants with 
priming cues showed efficient preparation independent of CSIs. In addition, priming cues 
elicited a significantly stronger pre-stimulus negativity for switch trials than repeat trials in 
CSI 1100 ms, suggesting high task preparedness (e.g., Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis & 
Jamadar, 2014). These ERP results corresponds to their behaviour data showing that switch 
costs were on average relatively smaller in priming cues (+8 ms, +1.15%) than in non-
priming cues (+15 ms, +1.65%).  
Scalp topographies suggested that by averaging over 400-600 ms after cue onset 
there was a significant difference between task-repeat and task-switch trials over central-
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parietal sites for each cue type in each CSI condition, consistent with previous results that 
switch-repeat contrast was most significant at central-parietal electrodes around 400 ms 
after cue onset (Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Jost et al., 2008; Karayanidis et al., 2009; 
Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006; for reviews see Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis & Jamadar, 
2014). Studies have suggested that central and parietal regions are associated with switch-
specific preparation such as task-set updating. 
Stimulus-locked ERPs and topographical maps 
Inconsistent with previous ERP studies on task-switching that a greater stimulus-
locked negativity for switch compared to repeat trials over central-parietal sites (Jamadar et 
al., 2010a, 2010b; Jost et al., 2008; Karayanidis et al., 2009; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006), 
at electrode Pz I found a non-significant differential switch negativity in stimulus-locked 
ERPs for either cue type in any CSI condition. Previous studies suggested that switch-
induced negativity is related to attentional conflicts from task-irrelevant target dimension 
and response conflicts. However, studies also suggested that the differential negativity was 
smaller when following a univalent stimulus compared to bivalent stimulus, because 
univalent stimulus contains perceptual attributes associated with responses in only one of 
the tasks and therefore should lead to reduced conflicts from the competing task-set 
(Elchlepp et al., 2012). Based on previous results, the non-significant stimulus-locked 
negativity may imply that participants had small level of interference from irrelevant target 
feature and irrelevant response set in each trial. The post-stimulus EEG data supports the 
behavioural results showing on average a rather small RT switch costs in the present 
experiment.  
Interestingly, the present EEG data showed that in trials with both CSI 1100 ms and 
priming cues there was a significant differential positivity at parietal site between 500-700 
ms after target stimulus onset. Similarly, in trials of CSI 1100 ms and with non-priming 
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cues there was a transient parietally switch positivity emerging around 569 ms after the 
target stimulus was presented. These results are not predicted. However, according to a 
recent study by Barceló and Cooper (2018), the fronto-parietal ERP positivity that is 
elicited by the target stimulus is associated with cognitive control of task switching. In this 
case, the cognitive control process may have lasted longer in trials with priming cues, 
suggesting that participants with priming cues could also have facilitated goal-directed 
attention and information processing.  
 
3.5 General Discussion 
In this chapter, I studied the effect of cue type on task switching. By manipulating 
two types of cues between- and within-subjects in Experiment 2A and 2B, respectively, I 
found that priming cues reduced RT switch costs but not ER switch costs. Participants with 
priming cues showed smaller and non-significant switch cost across CSIs. Participants also 
showed smaller deviations in task-switching performance in the priming cues. This finding 
is consistent with studies reporting smaller switch costs with transparent cues than with 
non-transparent cues (e.g., Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002; Logan & Schneider, 2006; 
Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Miyake et al., 2004; Schneider, 2016), although in all of these 
studies residual switch costs were significant even with transparent cues. Arbuthnott and 
Woodward (2002) suggested that associations between transparent task cues and task goals 
were stronger than associations between non-transparent task cues and task goals (see also 
Miyake et al., 2004). It is possible that the priming cues associated stronger with the task 
goals, therefore, participants activated the relevant task set more quickly compared to the 
non-priming cues. In addition, according to the mediated retrieval hypothesis in other 
studies (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Logan & Schneider, 2006), priming cues directly linked to 
the task goal, in contrast, participants with non-priming cues may need an addition step of 
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translating the task cue to a “task-name mediator” (i.e., link circle to the colour task and 
link hexagon to the shape task) before retrieving specific task goals. Since the priming cues 
also provided target features and response mappings, in this condition participants showed 
facilitated task preparation.   
In order to study the differences in preparation between two types of cues, I 
measured cue-locked and stimulus-locked ERPs in Experiment 2C. Surprisingly, the 
behaviour results showed that participants had on average small switch costs of only +11 
ms, which was even much smaller in priming (+8 ms) than in non-priming cues (+15 ms). 
Five participants did not show switch costs in either cue type. Consistent with previous 
ERP results on task switching, cue-locked ERP positivity was larger for switch trials 
compared to repeat trials at the parietal electrode (e.g., Jamadar et al., 2015). The 
differential switch positivity was significant for priming cues in each of the CSI conditions, 
but was not significant in non-priming cues with CSI 1100 ms. As suggested by previous 
studies (Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Jost et al., 2008; Karayanidis et al., 2009; Nicholson 
et al., 2005, 2006), the large and significant cue-locked switch positivity may indicate 
efficient preparation associated with small RT switch costs in priming cues, independent of 
CSIs. In addition, priming cues elicited a pre-stimulus negativity that was larger for switch 
trials in CSI 1100 ms, suggesting high level of anticipatory attention and task preparedness 
before target stimulus onset (Jamadar et al., 2010a, 2010b; Jost et al., 2008; Karayanidis et 
al., 2009; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006).  
Stimulus-locked ERP activity was different between priming and non-priming cues. 
At electrode Pz, priming cues elicited a significant and long-lasting switch positivity after 
target stimulus onset in CSI 1100 ms, which may be associated with facilitated cognitive 
control during target processing (e.g., Barceló & Cooper, 2018). In both types of cues 
participants showed non-significant post-target switch negativity, which may be associated 
with reduced conflicts. This is inconsistent with previous studies indicating that proactive 
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control can reduce but not eliminate post-target interference for switch trials (e.g., Jost et 
al., 2008; Nicholson et al., 2005, 2006). One explanation could be that the participants in 
Experiment 2C may have consistently engaged in cue-based preparation despite cue types. 
Consequently, they were less affected by the interference arising from carryover 
activation/inhibition of task sets and/or triggered by conflicting target-response mappings 
after target stimulus onset. In addition, as suggested by Elchlepp et al. (2012), stimulus-
locked differential negativity at central-posterior sites was larger for bivalent stimuli than 
for univalent stimuli, because no conflicts from the competing task sets associated with a 
univalent stimulus. It is possible that participants might have maintained high level of 
attention across trials, they fast attending to the relevant feature as soon as target onset. 
Thus, they were less affected by the competing task dimension with less conflicts during 
response selection, similar to the processing of a univalent target (e.g., Elchlepp et al., 
2012; Mueller et al., 2007). Priming cues informed about the relevant task feature and task-
response mappings, which should have helped participants to less attend to the wrong task 
category in the upcoming trial. However, it is lack of evidence why there was no sign of 
post-target conflicts in trials with non-priming cues, even in trials with short preparation 
interval (i.e., CSI 650 ms).  
In sum, participants with priming cues on average showed faster responses and 
smaller RT switch costs. In addition, the GLMM results in three experiments consistently 
showed that participants with priming cues deviated smaller than with non-priming cues 
from the mean conditional task-switch costs. However, similar to previous studies on cue 
types (e.g., Logan & Schneider, 2006; Schneider, 2016), some participants showed 
significant task-switch costs in both cue types, although their switch costs were relatively 
smaller in priming cues. ERP analyses showed that trials with priming cues were 
associated significant cue-locked switch positivity, independent of cue-stimulus interval. 
There was no target stimulus-locked switch negativity for both types of cues. Participants 
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also varied considerably in ERP amplitudes, suggesting large individual variability in cue-
locked and stimulus-locked processing and the related cognitive control process. These 
results may point to the importance of studying individual differences in task switching 
with different types of cues. 
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CHAPTER 4 Gender Differences in Task Switching 
 4.1 Experiment 3 Introduction  
In this chapter, I studied gender differences in order to understand individual 
differences in task switching. Currently, there are only a few studies on gender differences 
and task-switching abilities, showing inconsistent results. Some studies have reported that 
males outperformed females in task switching (Beeri et al., 2006; Tun & Lachman, 2008). 
For example, Tun and Lachman (2008) asked 4,428 participants, aged between 32 and 85 
years, to perform in a cued Stop and Go task-switching paradigm via telephone. 
Participants were told to say stop when hearing Red and say go when hearing Green in one 
task (congruent response condition), and say go when Red and say stop when Green in 
another task (incongruent response condition). In a mixed-task block of 29 trials, 
participants switched between task rules based on the given cue. Tun and Lachman (2008) 
found that male participants were faster than female participants in the middle-age and 
older groups. Females showed larger congruency effect and switch costs than males.  
However, some studies found the opposite pattern, reporting that females were 
superior than males in switching abilities and interference control (Friedman et al., 2016; 
Stoet et al., 2013; Van der Elst, Van Boxtel, Van Breukelen, & Jolles, 2006; Weiss et al., 
2006). For example, Stoet and colleagues (2013) studied 240 participants in a shape/filling 
task-switching paradigm. They found that females outperformed males in blocks with 
randomly intermixed tasks, while both gender groups did not differ in the single-task 
blocks. They suggested that females had an advantage when performing tasks in a more 
complex situation.  
 There are other studies that did not find gender differences in task-switching 
activities (Christakou et al., 2009; Munro et al., 2012; Polunina et al., 2018; Reimers & 
Maylor, 2005). Reimers and Maylor (2005) reported advantages of female participants in 
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task switching until age 30, but they also reported that the difference disappeared and even 
reversed through adulthood. Recently, in a large study on about 31,000 participants from 
13 European countries conducted by the Rockefeller University it was suggested that with 
improved living conditions and educational opportunities, there was a tendency for 
increased gender differences, favouring females in general cognitive functions including 
memory retrieval (Weber, Skirbekk, Freund & Herlitz, 2014). However, Weber and 
colleagues (2014) suggested reduced gender differences in numeracy, and no gender 
differences in category fluency. More recently, a study by Polunina et al. (2018), using a 
sample of 258 participants, indicated no gender differences in at least two important 
cognitive functions, such as interference control and cognitive flexibility. 
Previous studies employed different experimental paradigms and manipulations, 
showing varying results creating a controversy whether females or males were better in 
task switching abilities. The main aim of Experiment 3 was to study 40 males and 40 
females in a critically manipulated task-switching paradigm. I was particularly interested 
whether the effect of gender on task switching performance is modulated by different 
preparation intervals. In order to test this, in Experiment 3 the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) 
was either short (CSI = 100 ms) or long (CSI = 900 ms), leading to short and long cue-
based preparation, respectively. According to previous research that has identified gender 
differences in task switching (Beeri et al., 2006; Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Stoet et al., 
2013; Tun & Lachman, 2008; Van der Elst et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 
2006), I expected that male and female participants would show differences in the effect of 
preparation interval (CSI) on task switching. This would inform which gender group is 
more efficient in task switching and task preparation, and refine the previous results. 
However, a more recent study found no detectable gender differences in many cognitive 
abilities (Polunina et al., 2018). Therefore, according to their results both genders may 
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have similar switching performance, showing similar task-switch costs and congruency 
effects independence of CSI. 
In addition, previous studies employed large sample sizes but researchers typically 
tested only mean performances across ages, neglecting individual variability (e.g., 
Polunina et al., 2018; Weber et al., 2014). The present experiment explored whether there 
are gender differences during the preparation phase of a colour/shape task-switching 
paradigm. I documented both group average and individual response time performance 
using a sample of young participants. I plotted Individual-specific intercepts and random 
effects based on GLMM model estimations. It is possible that the previously observed 
gender advantage could be due simply to the superior switching performance of a few 
individuals, while their superior performance may be hidden in a group-averaged 
performance analysis.  
 
4.2 Experiment 3 Method 
I planned to test task-switching effects and congruency effects in two groups (male, 
female) in an ANOVA with repeated measurements as within-between interactions. A 
statistical power analysis (Faul et al., 2007) indicated an optimal sample size of N = 54 for 
a medium effect size f = 0.25, alpha = 0.05, and power = 0.95 with 27 participants in each 
group.  
Participants 
A total of 80 participants, 40 males (Mean = 22.10 year, SD = 3.12) and 40 females 
(Mean = 21.63; SD = 3.53), from the University of Glasgow took part in the current 
experiment and received £6 each for participation. All participants reported normal or 
correct-to-normal vision and were naive about the purposes of the experiment. None of 
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them had previously participated in a task-switching experiments. I excluded 7 participants 
(4 males, 3 females) because their overall accuracy in either CSI 100 ms or CSI 900 ms 
was below a preset inclusion criterion of 80% correct responses. For the remaining 73 
participants, there were 36 males (Mean = 22.06 years, SD = 3.18) and 37 females (Mean = 
21.58 years, SD = 3.48). A two-sample t-test showed no significant age differences 
between groups, t (70.71) = .63, p = .534.  
Tasks, stimuli and apparatus 
The apparatus for stimulus presentation and response keys were identical to 
Experiment 1 and 2. The only difference was that in the present experiment I employed a 
colour/shape task with letter cues displayed in yellow (RGB = 255, 255, 0). The colour and 
the shape task were cued by the letter “C” and “S” (1 cm × 1 cm), respectively.  
Procedure 
Each trial began with the display of a task cue. Each task cue was presented for a 
CSI of either 100 ms or 900 ms, before it was replaced by a target stimulus. Participants 
had up to 2 seconds to respond. The response-stimulus interval was constant at 1,000 ms, 
to control for possible interference from the previous trial (Altmann, 2006; Meiran, 1996). 
Therefore, after a correct response, there was an ITI of 1,000 ms minus the CSI, resulting 
in a condition of CSI 900 ms and ITI 100 ms (900-100) and a condition of CSI 100 ms and 
ITI 900 ms (100-900). Incorrect responses or no responses within 2 seconds will be 
followed by an error message which stayed on for 3 seconds.  
Participants completed a block of 24 trials with randomly mixed tasks in each of 
the two CSI conditions before the actual experiment. In the actual experiment, participants 
completed two blocks of 96 trials with randomly mixed tasks in the 900-100 condition and 
another two blocks of 96 mixed trials in the 100-900 condition. The presentation of these 
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blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Participants took breaks between each 
block of trials. 
 
4.3 Experiment 3 Results 
Training trials, the first trial of each block and trials immediately following an error 
were excluded from all analyses. Error trials were also excluded from the RT analysis. 
After exclusion, I first conducted task-switching analyses on mean RTs and ERs using 
conventional ANOVAs. Then, I conducted GLMMs to investigate the gender-related 
individual differences in RT performance. For all data analyses, I used statistical software 
package R, version 3.4.2 (R Core Team, 2017).  
 
Task-switching analyses and gender differences 
Mean RTs and error rates (ERs) are summarised in Table 4.1. Five-way ANOVAs 
with mixed effects were conducted on averaged individual RTs and ERs. Gender (males, 
females) was a between-subject factor whereas Task (colour, shape), Trial transition (task-
repeat, task-switch), Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and CSI (900 ms, 100 ms) were 
within-subject factors. 
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Table 4.1 
Experiment 3. Mean RTs (in ms) and error rates (ER as %) for all conditions in males and 
females 
Paradigms Trial 
transition and 
Congruency 
Males (N = 36) Females (N = 37) 
 
RT 
 
ER 
 
RT 
 
ER 
  
CSI = 100 ms 
Colour RepCon 642 (20.06) 2.71 (.63) 609 (22.90) 1.61 (.39) 
RepInc 713 (22.01) 7.49 (1.12) 640 (23.31) 5.41 (.77) 
SwiCon 731 (23.87) 3.99 (.74) 706 (30.24) 2.36 (.78) 
SwiInc 776 (17.94) 14.17 (1.47) 768 (26.64) 14.82 (1.64) 
      
Shape RepCon 675 (21.87) 3.50 (.61) 649 (21.95) 1.66 (.43) 
 RepInc 728 (21.40) 6.40 (1.12) 676 (20.93) 6.69 (1.01) 
 SwiCon 790 (25.98) 3.85 (.91) 735 (26.34) 4.60 (.80) 
 SwiInc 858 (24.06) 12.66 (1.52) 811 (25.73) 12.08 (1.93) 
      
 Repeat 689 (10.93) 5.03 (.48) 642 (11.21) 3.84 (.39) 
 Switch 789 (12.07) 8.67 (.72) 755 (13.89) 8.46 (.81) 
 Congruent 709 (12.34) 3.51 (.36) 675 (13.28) 2.56 (.33) 
 Incongruent 769 (11.62) 10.18 (.71) 722 (13.33) 9.75 (.77) 
      
  CSI = 900 ms 
Colour RepCon 491 (18.49) 1.82 (.44) 497 (21.81) 2.13 (.62) 
RepInc 531 (20.53) 5.71 (1.10) 514 (22.57) 3.93 (.61) 
SwiCon 558 (24.22) 3.51 (.70) 528 (21.10) 2.25 (.53) 
SwiInc 603 (24.62) 9.80 (1.38) 568 (25.86) 9.16 (1.54) 
      
Shape RepCon 551 (17.88) 3.72 (.72) 554 (22.53) 2.80 (.81) 
RepInc 578 (22.37) 6.04 (.89) 570 (24.96) 3.93 (.82) 
SwiCon 603 (25.87) 4.93 (.86) 589 (23.16) 2.62 (.63) 
SwiInc 622 (24.11) 9.62 (1.42) 606 (28.27) 5.94 (1.43) 
     
 Repeat 538 (10.19) 4.32 (.43) 534 (11.64) 3.20 (.36) 
 Switch 596 (12.38) 6.96 (.61) 573 (12.48) 4.99 (.60) 
 Congruent 551 (11.33) 3.49 (.36) 542 (11.31) 2.45 (.32) 
 Incongruent 583 (11.71) 7.79 (.62) 564 (12.91) 5.74 (.61) 
Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses  
RepCon = Repeat Congruent; RepInc = Repeat Incongruent; SwiCon = Switch Congruent; 
SwiInc = Switch Incongruent 
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Main effects in RTs 
For mean RTs, there were four significant main effects. There was a significant 
main effect of Task, F(1, 71) = 75.57, p < .001, η2p = .52. Participants responded more 
slowly in the shape task (662 ms) compared to the colour task (617 ms). There was a 
significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 71) = 198.41, p < .001, η2p = .74. On 
average task-switch trials (678 ms) were 77 ms slower compared to task-repeat trials (601 
ms), indicating a significant switch cost of +77 ms. There was a significant main effect of 
Congruency, F(1, 71) = 107.72, p < .001, η2p = .60. On average incongruent trials (660 ms) 
were 41 ms slower compared to congruent trials (619 ms), showing a significant 
congruency effect of +41 ms. In addition, there was a significant main effect of CSI, F(1, 
71) = 240.65, p < .001, η2p = .77. The responses were 158 ms slower for CSI 100 ms (718 
ms) than for CSI 900 ms (560 ms). However, males and females did not significantly differ 
in their mean response times, F < 1. Females’ average response time was 626 ms and 
males’ average response time was 653 ms. 
 
Two-way interactions in RTs 
Trial transition significantly interacted with CSI, F(1, 71) = 57.59, p < .001, η2p 
= .45. Switch costs were significant in both CSI 100 ms (switch – repeat = +106 ms, p 
< .001) and CSI 900 ms (+49 ms, p < .001). A post-hoc comparison adjusted after Holm 
(1979) showed that switch costs were significantly smaller for CSI 900 ms than for CSI 
100 ms, p < .001. 
 Congruency significantly interacted with CSI, F(1, 71) = 14.23, p < .001, η2p 
= .17. Congruency effects were significant for both CSI 100 ms (incongruent - congruent = 
+53 ms, p < .001) and CSI 900 ms (incongruent - congruent = +27 ms, p < .001). A post-
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hoc comparison showed that congruency effects were significantly smaller in CSI 900 ms 
than in CSI 100 ms, p < .001. 
I performed three planned pair comparisons between males and females in order to 
study whether there were gender differences in switch costs, congruency effects and 
between CSIs. The results showed that switch costs were significant in both male (switch - 
repeat = +79 ms, p < .001) and female participants (+76 ms, p < .001). Switch costs were 
equivalent for both genders, p = .784. Congruency effects were marginally significant in 
females (incongruent - congruent = +35 ms, p = .046), and significant in males (+46 ms, p 
= .005). Congruency effects were equivalent for both gender groups, p = .164. Females 
(698 ms) were significantly faster than males (739 ms) in CSI 100 ms, p = .002. However, 
there was no difference between females (553 ms) and males (567 ms) in CSI 900 ms, p 
= .267. 
 
Three-way interactions in RTs 
There was a significant three-way interaction between Gender, Trial transition and 
CSI, F(1, 71) = 4.98, p = .029, η2p = .07. Post-hoc analyses showed that the switch costs in 
CSI 900 ms were statistically significant for male participants (switch - repeat = +59 ms, p 
= .004) but not for female participants (+39 ms, p = .097). Both male (+99 ms, p < .001) 
and female participants (+113 ms, p < .001) showed significant and equivalent switch costs 
in CSI 100 ms (Figure 4.1A). 
 Gender significantly interacted with Trial transition and Congruency, F(1, 71) = 
5.58, p = .021, η2p = .07. As shown in Figure 4.1B, Female participants had non-significant 
congruency effects (incongruent - congruent = +21 ms, p = .264) in task-repeat trials, while 
male participants had significant congruency effects (+48 ms, p = .013). Both groups 
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showed significant and equivalent congruency effects in task-switching trials: Females had 
a congruency effect of +49 ms (p = .011) and males had a congruency effect of +44 ms (p 
= .022). No other effects reached statistical significance. 
 
A.                                                               B. 
     
Figure 4.1. Results of Experiment 3. Mean RTs (in ms) of male and female participants in 
different trial conditions. A. The violin plots illustrate the RT distributions in repeat and 
switch conditions in male and female participants across CSIs (CSI 100 ms, 900 ms). B. 
The violin plots illustrate the RT distributions in congruent and incongruent conditions in 
male and female participants across Trial transition (repeat, switch). Bold horizontal bars 
and boxes denote medians and interquartile ranges, respectively. Black dots represent 
outliers whereas red diamonds and error bars denote means and standard errors, 
respectively. 
Note. *** p < . 001, ** p < . 01, * p < .05, ns = non-significant. 
 
Main effects in ERs 
For error rates, I found three significant main effects. There was a significant main 
effect of Trial transition, F(1, 71) = 126.22, p < .001, η2p = .64. Participants made more 
errors in task-switch trials (7.26%) than in task-repeat trials (4.09%), indicating a switch 
cost of +3.17%. There was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 71) = 139.71, p 
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< .001, η2p = .66. Participants made more errors in incongruent trials (8.36%) than in 
incongruent trials (3.00%), showing a congruency effect of +5.36%. There was a 
significant main effect of CSI, F(1, 71) = 22.30, p < .001, η2p = .24. Participants on 
average made 2.06% more errors in CSI 100 ms (6.15%) than in CSI 900 ms (4.09%). No 
statistically significant main effects of Task (F < 1) and Gender (F = 3.08, p = .084) were 
found. For interest, females had a mean ER of 5.12% and males had a mean ER of 6.24%. 
 
Two-way interactions in ERs 
There were four significant two-way interactions. Congruency interacted with 
Task, F(1, 71) = 5.19, p = .026, η2p = .07. Congruency effects were significant and 
equivalent in the colour task (+6.26%, p < .001) and in the shape task (+4.46%, p < .001).  
Congruency interacted with CSI, F(1, 71) = 23.00, p < .001, η2p = .24. Congruency 
effects were significant in CSI 100 ms (incongruent - congruent = +6.93%, p < .001) than 
in CSI 900 ms (+3.79%, p < .001). Congruency effects were significantly larger in CSI 100 
ms than in CSI 900 ms, with p < .001. 
Trial transition interacted with Congruency, F(1, 71) = 41.96, p < .001, η2p = .37. 
Switch costs were significant in congruent (switch - repeat = +1.02%, p = .001) and 
incongruent trials (+5.33%, p < .001). Switch costs were significantly larger in incongruent 
trials than in congruent trials, with p < .001. 
Trial transition interacted with CSI, F(1, 71) = 11.62, p = .001, η2p = .14. Switch 
costs were significant in CSI 100 ms (switch - repeat = +4.14%, p < .001) and in CSI 900 
ms (+2.21%, p < .001), and were significantly larger in CSI 100 ms than in CSI 900 ms, p 
= .001. No other two-way interactions reached statistical significance. 
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Three planned comparisons were performed between Gender and Trial transition, 
Gender and Congruency, and Gender and CSI. I found that both males (switch - repeat = 
+3.14%, p < .001) and females (+3.21%, p < .001) showed significant ER switch costs, and 
the costs were equivalent between genders. Both males (incongruent - congruent = 
+5.48%, p < .001) and females (+5.24%, p < .001) showed significant and statistically 
equivalent ER congruency effects. Females (4.09%) made significantly fewer errors than 
males (5.64%) in CSI 900 ms, p = .033.  However, females (6.15%) and males (6.85%) did 
not differ in their error rates in CSI 100 ms, p = .476. No other effects reached statistical 
significance. 
 
Analyses of individual differences 
In order to study individual differences in RTs, I analysed the RT measurements 
from each trial using GLMMs as in the previous experiments. Table 4.2 presents models 
from the simplest one to the most complex one that converged. I compared the most 
parsimonious model with full-factorial design including Gender (GLMM 3.3) with a 
corresponding model without Gender (GLMM 3.2) in order to determine whether factor 
Gender and its interactions improved the model fit. In other words, the model comparison 
tested whether the distinction between male and female participants was an important 
predictor of RTs. 
The GLMM 3.2 and GLMM 3.3 seem to be comparable although GLMM 3.2 was 
slightly more parsimonious with lower AIC and BIC (ΔAIC = 2, ΔBIC =132). However, 
the result of a model comparison suggests that the distinction between males and females 
explained additional variance in target RTs. In order to study gender effect and compare 
with the results of ANOVA, GLMM 3.3 with full-factorial design was selected. In GLMM 
3.3, Task, Trial transition, Congruency, CSI and Gender, and their interactions were treated 
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as fixed effects. The random effects captured individual deviations from the grand mean 
RT (Intercept), from the main effect of CSI and from the interaction between Trial 
transition and CSI.  
 
Table 4.2 
Experiment 3. GLMM model comparisons based on RT data (GLMM 3.3 was selected). 
Model 
names 
Models 
(family = Gamma (link 
= “identity”)) 
df AIC BIC Log lik dev Chi-Sq p-value 
(>Chisq) 
GLMM 
3.1 
RT~ 
Task+Trial.transition + 
Congruency+CSI+ 
Gender 
+ (1| subject) 
8 327700 327765 -163842 327684   
GLMM 
3.2 
RT~ 
Task*Trial.transition* 
Congruency*CSI 
+ (1 + CSI + 
CSI:Trial.transition| 
subject) 
27 326568 326787 -163257 326514 1169.76 < .001 
*** 
GLMM 
3.3 
RT~ 
Task*Trial.transition* 
Congruency*CSI* 
Gender 
+ (1 + CSI + 
CSI:Trial.transition| 
subject) 
43 326570 326919 -163242 326484 30.01 .018 * 
Note. The model formulas are stated in the syntax of the lme4 package in R.  
 
The fixed effects of GLMM 3.3 mirror the ANOVA results on RTs, except for the 
effect of gender. On average, responses were faster in the colour task (634 ms) than in the 
shape task (679 ms), t = 37.29, p < .001; responses were faster in task-repeat trials (616 
ms) than in task-switch trials (697 ms), t = 50.99, p < .001; responses were faster in 
congruent trials (637 ms) than in incongruent trials (676 ms), t = 33.45, p < .001; responses 
were faster for CSI 900 ms (580 ms) than for CSI 100 ms (733 ms), t = 86.58, p < .001. 
Different from the ANOVA results, females (642 ms) were significantly faster compared 
to males (671 ms), t = 17.54, p < .001 
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In line with the results of the ANOVA, CSI interacted significantly with Trial 
transition (t = 35.52, p < .001), and with Congruency (t = 26.88, p < .001). Switch costs 
were larger in CSI 100 ms (SC = +107 ms) than in CSI 900 ms (SC = +53 ms). 
Congruency effects were larger in CSI 100 ms (+55 ms) than in CSI 900 ms (+21 ms). 
Trial transition interacted with Congruency, t = 8.44, p < .001. Switch costs were larger in 
incongruent trials (+85 ms) than in congruent trials (+75 ms). Gender differences in CSI 
100 ms were more salient compared to CSI 900 ms, t = 17.95, p < .001. Females (712 ms) 
were faster than males (753 ms) in CSI 100 ms while females (572 ms) and males (588 ms) 
were similar in CSI 900 ms. 
Gender differences in task-switch costs were small. Congruency effects were 
reduced in females, but this was limited to repeat trials, t = 16.19, p < .001. Females had a 
congruency effect of +20 ms and males had a congruency effect of +46 ms in task-repeat 
trials; the congruency effect was +44 ms in females and +43 ms in males in task-switch 
trials. 
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Figure 4.2. Experiment 3. Illustration of by-subject random effects for GLMM 3.3 on 
target RTs. Male participants are labelled with white dots shown in the top panel and 
female participants are labelled with grey dots shown in the bottom panel. The dotplots 
from left and right shows individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence intervals 
(horizontal error bars) from conditional mean RTs (Intercept = grand mean RT of 671 ms 
for male participants and 642 ms for female participants, as indicated by the solid vertical 
red and black line centred on zero, respectively), conditional mean RT difference between 
CSI 900 ms and CSI 100 ms (-164 ms for males and -141 ms for females, as indicated by 
the vertical red and black line centred on zero, respectively), conditional mean switch costs 
in CSI 100 ms (+102 ms for males and +113 ms for females, as indicated by the solid 
vertical red and black line centred on zero, respectively) and in CSI 900 ms (+62 ms for 
males and +44 ms for females), respectively. The dashed vertical lines in the dotplots 
indicate zero differences between CSIs, and zero switch cost for each condition in each 
183 
 
gender. Please note that male and female participants have different intercept and fix 
effects. Please also note the different RT scales on the x-axis across plots. 
 
The by-subject random effects explained considerable RT variance. Figure 4.2 
shows individual differences in mean RTs, with both groups of participants showing 
significant deviations from the group mean RT. Sixteen males and 19 females responded 
faster than the grand average RT, while 12 males and 10 females showed slower responses 
than the grand average RT. Both groups showed large deviations between CSIs. 
Figure 4.2 also shows that across CSIs, both genders showed significant deviations 
from the mean switch costs and zero switch costs. All participants showed significant 
switch costs in CSI 100 ms. However, when in trials with CSI 900 ms, there were two 
more females (N = 20) than males (N = 18) showing switch costs close to zero. In addition, 
three female participants, Participant 37, 47 and 72, showed a reversed switch cost of -48 
ms, -25 ms and -43 ms, respectively, in CSI 900 ms. No male participants showed a clear 
reversed switch cost. 
 
4.4 Experiment 3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 studied gender differences in task-switching performance using two 
different CSIs. I found that in trials with CSI 100 ms female participants were on average 
faster compared to male participants whereas in this condition error rates were similar 
between males and females. For CSI 900 ms female participants made fewer errors and 
had smaller RT switch costs compared to males. In addition, males and females were 
different in the congruency effects in task-repeat trials. Congruency effects were more than 
halved and non-significant in female participants compared to male participants. These 
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results suggest that female participants were slightly better than males at task switching 
and interference control when in specific conditions.  
Gender differences in task-switch costs 
Comparing task-repeat with task-switch trials I found significant switch costs for 
RT and ER, consistent with previous task-switching results (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). The costs were reduced in the condition with a CSI of 900 
ms compared to the condition with a CSI of 100 ms, in line with previous studies showing 
reduced switch costs when increasing preparation times (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010).  
I found gender differences in switch costs with longer preparation intervals. 
Compared to male participants, females showed reduced RT residual switch costs in CSI 
900 ms, suggesting that females had a small advantage over males in task preparation. This 
result seems to support previous studies that showed that females were superior than males 
in task switching and cognitive performance using various tasks and paradigms (Friedman, 
2016; Stoet et al., 2013; Van der Elst et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 2006). Researchers 
concluded that females were better at coping with complex conditions and that females had 
more efficient information processing.  
I suggest that the advantage for females in task switching may be due to efficient 
task preparation. According to the FTE account of task-set reconfiguration (De Jong, 2000; 
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010), it is likely that females completed task-set reconfiguration 
within a cue-stimulus interval of 900 ms. Therefore, females had smaller switch costs 
compared to males in CSI 900 ms. This may be related to gender-specific memory network 
utilization. For example, Hill, Laird and Robinson (2014) conducted a meta-analysis using 
the BrainMap database which is based on 69 papers with a total of 901 participants. 
Studying the neural underpinning of working memory for males and females, Hill and 
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colleagues found that males and females employed different networks to solve complex 
problems. Males utilised more spatial processing related networks (i.e., parietal regions) 
than females, and females seemed to recruit more prefrontal regions. Research has shown 
that the prefrontal cortex plays a critical role in information maintenance (Prabhakaran, 
Narayanan, Zhao & Gabrieli, 2000) and top-down processing related to goal-directed 
behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001). In the present experiment, female participants might 
have used more top-down preparation strategies associated with more activated prefrontal 
networks compared to males.  
The reduced switch costs in females in the present experiment contradicted 
previous studies suggesting a male advantage in task switching (Beeri et al., 2006; Reimers 
& Maylor, 2005; Tun & Lachman, 2008). For example, Tun and Lachman (2008) 
conducted a Switch and Go switching task with unlimited target-response intervals in five 
age groups ranging between 32 and 85 years. Researchers reported smaller switch costs in 
male participants. Importantly, researchers also reported an interaction between gender and 
age. Male participants performed better than females in groups with age above 45 whereas 
there was no difference between male and female participants below age 45. Their study 
suggested that the effect of gender on task switching may vary across lifespan. Similarly, 
Reimers and Maylor (2005) used a cue-stimulus interval of 1,000 ms showing that female 
adolescents had smaller RT switch costs whereas the gender difference tended to disappear 
and was even reversed as the age of the participants increased. Therefore, an important 
factor can be age differences of samples across studies. The participants in the present 
sample were young university students (aged between 18-32 years), and showed a small 
female advantage. However, I did not find gender differences in task switching 
performance in CSI 100 ms. Future studies may employ a larger sample to investigate 
whether gender interacts with preparation time in different age groups. For example, 
whether females would be better at task switching only when preparation time is long, and 
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whether such gender differences would disappear with increased age. Importantly, it is 
unclear whether there are gender-related individual differences in task preparation over 
adolescence, adulthood, and old age. 
By analysing individual performance I found in CSI 900 ms that one female 
participant, Participant 37 showed significantly reversed switch costs, and that two other 
female participants, Participant 47 and 72, showed also reversed switch costs although not 
significantly different from zero. This is an unusual pattern as these participants responded 
more quickly in task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials. Dreisbach and Haider 
(2006) reported similar results. In their study, participants decided either whether the digit 
was odd or even, or whether the digit was smaller or bigger than 5 based on the colour of 
the target digit. Participants were encouraged to use a specific probability cue for task 
preparation in each trial. As a result, participants showed slightly faster responses in switch 
trials when they were told to perform a task switch with 75% probability before every trial. 
In this condition, Dreisbach and Haider found that participants were able to adjust their 
cognitive control dynamically based on task expectancy and showed pronounced switch 
preparation. It is possible that if Participant 37, 47 and 72 had highly expected a task 
switch in each upcoming trial, a different task set would always be prepared. Then, 
responses can be faster for switch trials in the paradigm with both cue and target stimulus 
presented simultaneously. However, this is not the case in the present experiment because 
participants were informed about equal probability of tasks and a cue that specified the 
upcoming task was presented 900 ms before target onset. Participants can take the time to 
prepare a relevant task resulting in at least similar performance across trials.  
Alternatively, a more plausible explanation would be that the participants with 
reversed switch costs had a different strategy in addition to high switch expectancy. In 
order to test this speculation, I conducted a post-hoc analysis for Participant 37. I found 
that in trials with congruent targets responses were significantly faster in task-switch trials 
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(351 ms) compared to task-repeat trials (426 ms) whereas no reliable differences were 
found in trials with incongruent targets (Mean switch RT = 397 ms; Mean repeat RT = 415 
ms). This participant might have performed tasks using stimulus-response associations 
when the target stimulus was congruent, while the retrieval of associations was sometimes 
delayed in task-repeat trials due to high switch expectancy.  
However, the post hoc analyses for the other two female participants, Participant 47 
and 72, indicate an opposite pattern of results. These two participants showed much 
reversed switch costs in trials with incongruent targets. Specifically, with incongruent 
targets Participant 47 responded more quickly in switch trials (294 ms) compared to repeat 
trials (335 ms), while with congruent targets this participant responded equally fast in 
switch (317 ms) and repeat trials (318 ms). Similarly, Participant 72 showed significantly 
faster responses in switch trials (548 ms) compared to repeat trials (740 ms) only when the 
target stimulus was incongruent. There was no significant difference between switch (573 
ms) and repeat trials (613 ms) when the target stimulus was congruent. It could be that 
when cue/task repeated these two female participants did not prepare until target onset. In 
addition, they might use stimulus-response associations in trials with a congruent target 
stimulus and apply task rules in trials with an incongruent target stimulus. The problem is 
that when in trials with an incongruent target participants need to prepare the relevant task 
rules before appropriate feature categorisation of the target stimulus. Unprepared repeat 
trials would then lead to delayed responses especially after incongruent target onset. In 
contrast, when cue/task changed these two female participants might always prepare so 
that they could apply the relevant task rule as soon as target onset, although they may still 
have associated a response with the congruent target directly.  
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Gender differences in congruency effects 
The present experiment indicated gender differences in congruency effects. The 
difference was observed in task-repeat trials, where female participants showed a non-
significant RT congruency effects whereas males showed significant congruency effects. 
The finding of reduced congruency effects in females is in line with previous results (Stoet 
et al., 2013; Van der Elst et al., 2006) that suggested that females were less affected by 
task-irrelevant information. For example, Van der Elst and colleagues (2006) asked 
participants to read words, name colours, and name the ink colour of printed words in a 
Stroop test. An interference measure was calculated by subtracting the average time 
needed to complete the first two tasks from the time needed to complete the third task. 
They found that female participants had lower (better) interference scores than male 
participants, suggesting better cognitive flexibility and executive control in females.  
The present experiment employed bivalent stimuli. As noted in previous studies, a 
bivalent stimulus is not only associated with a competing task, but also affords a response 
to the competing task (Allport et al., 1994; Bugg & Braver, 2016; Kiesel et al, 2007; 
Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Half of the bivalent stimuli in the present experiment were 
incongruent and associated with conflicting responses in the colour and shape tasks. Thus, 
participants typically responded more slowly in incongruent trials than in congruent trials, 
showing a significant congruency effect. Studies suggest that the congruency effects are 
more pronounced in task-switch trials because there are increased between-task 
interferences and response conflicts. Interferences or conflicts are likely to occur due to 
carryover of previou task set and response mappings when a switch in task between trials 
(Allport et al., 1994; Bugg & Braver, 2016; Kiesel et al, 2007; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). In 
the present experiment, both males and females, showed congruency effects in task-switch 
trials, suggesting that both genders were influenced by the previous relevant but currently 
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irrelevant task information. They spent longer time to activate the relevant response when 
the task was changed and when there were large response conflicts. 
In task-repeat trials, congruency effects were smaller because activation of the 
relevant task set persists from the previous trial (Allport et al., 1994; Bugg & Braver, 2016; 
Kiesel et al, 2007; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). I found that congruency effects were more 
than halved in female compared to male participants. It is possible that females were better 
at maintaining task information and therefore they re-activated the previous tasks-set in 
working memory more quickly. Consequently in task-repeat trials, females were less 
affected by distracting information from the other task and showed reduced congruency 
effects. This was supported by Guillem and Mograss (2005) that suggested that males and 
females may differ in their abilities to maintain information over interference: Males 
maintained less-specific information whereas females engaged in more detailed 
information leading to better performance in a memory task. Another explanation would be 
that female participants were more likely to employ a different strategy such as performing 
by cue-stimulus-response associations rather than applying task rules in task-repeat trials. 
Evidence for this strategy was provided by Li et al. (2019a), where participants showed 
reduced congruency effects in conditions that required to remember stimulus-response 
associations (+39 ms) compared to a condition where they applied task rules (+71 ms). 
In sum, Experiment 3 revealed that females had small advantages in task switching, 
and a GLMM model comparison suggested that the distinction of gender significantly 
improved the prediction of response times. Studying individual performance I found that 
two more female than male participants made efficient task preparation and indicated no 
significant switch costs in CSI 900 ms (Figure 4.2). Three out of 37 female participants 
showed reversed switch costs for CSI 900 ms, suggesting that these participants might 
have used different switching strategies. For example, two of them may not prepare until 
target onset in repeat trials, in which they showed impaired performance with incongruent 
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target stimulus. In addition, the smaller congruency effects in females suggest better 
interference control of irrelevant task and/or a different strategy in task-repeat trials. For 
example, they may have performed different tasks by recalling cue-stimulus-response 
associations rather than applying task rules when in trials with a task repetition.  
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CHAPTER 5 General Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Individual differences in task switching 
In the past few years, researchers have reported striking individual differences in 
the performance of cognitive tasks and other related conditions. They suggested that a 
number of participants were considerably better than others, showing minimal performance 
decrements in task-switching trials (Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 
2007; Stoet et al., 2013), dual-task situations (Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Watson & 
Strayer, 2010, 2012), Stroop incongruent trials (Haff & Rouder, 2017, 2018), and other 
difficult tasks such as recognising unfamiliar faces (Robertson et al., 2016; Russell et al., 
2009) and memorising long list of items (Mallow et al., 2015; Ramon et al., 2016). Other 
studies provided evidence for gender-related differences in task-switching, although the 
results were inconsistent in terms of task switching and interference control (Beeri et al., 
2006; Christakou et al., 2009; Friedman, 2016; Stoet et al., 2013; Tun & Lachman, 2008; 
Van der Elst et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 2006). Accordingly, participants had variable 
performances and showed different effects in previous experiments. In task-switching 
paradigms participants may vary considerably in task-switch costs and few participants 
may have eliminated switch costs. In the present thesis I investigated individual differences 
in task-switching performance across tasks, conditions and paradigms using Generalised 
Linear Mixed-effect Models. 
As predicted, I found that individuals differed significantly in both response times 
(RTs) and error rates (ERs) when performing in Experiment 1A and two follow-up studies. 
Using a novel method, in which participants were required to make no mistakes, I 
identified exceptionally performing participants who were able to switch between tasks 
without errors and switch costs. However, these participants varied in their task-switching 
performance and showed switch costs in the follow-up experiments when cue and target 
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stimulus were presented simultaneously. Their superior switching abilities were limited to 
conditions that allowed cue-based preparation. This is in line with the assumption made by 
Yehene and Meiran (2007) who suggested that switching costs in a short cue-stimulus 
interval do not indicate a general switching ability. Instead, the observation of residual 
switch costs for longer cue-stimulus intervals seems to represent a more general ability. De 
Jong and colleague’s failure-to-engage (FTE) account (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 
2010) suggests that residual switch costs with long cue-target intervals are due to a 
proportion of trials in which participants failed to prepare the task. According to the FTE 
account, the proportion of prepared trials may reflect a general ability of advance 
preparation.  
Similar to the FTE account (2000, 2010), where participants fail to prepare 
occasionally (see also Nieuwnhuis & Monsell, 2002; Poboka et al., 2014), other 
researchers have proposed the partial-mapping preparation (PMP) account. They suggested 
that task preparation is limited to a specific stimulus-response pair because focused 
attention is limited in capacity and it is therefore impossible to complete advance 
preparation in all trials (Lien et al., 2005; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Note that Lien and 
colleagues described the stimulus-response pairs in the order of response-key position: left, 
middle, and right. They assumed that participants would learn the stimulus-response pairs, 
consistent with reading in English, from left to right, so that participants would prepare and 
assign priority to the stimulus-response pairs from left to right as well. As expected, Lien 
and colleagues only found complete preparation and no switch costs for the left, or high-
priority stimulus-response pair. Participants consistently showed large and significant 
switch costs for the middle and right, or lower-priority stimulus-response pairs compared 
to the high-priority pairs on the left (Lien et al., 2005; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). 
However, Lindsen and De Jong (2010) questioned the PMP account and compared 
individual cumulative response time distributions for all three stimulus-response pairs. The 
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results suggested that for some participants the probability of successful advance 
preparation appeared to be highest for the first stimulus-response pair (i.e., the 
leftmost/high-priority pair), consistent with the PMP hypothesis. Some participants showed 
similar probability of advance preparation for all three stimulus-response pairs, consistent 
with the FTE account. Moreover, they also observed that 7 participants (39% of all 
participants) showed a high degree of overlap between switch- and repeat-trial RT 
distributions for all stimulus-response pairs, corresponding to faster responses and smaller 
RT switch costs. This study suggested that participants prepared task sets differently and 
that a few participants appeared to have completed preparations for all tasks showing 
reduced switch costs. Thus, the question arises why some participants are better at task 
preparation and show smaller or even no switch costs compared to other participants. 
 
5.2 Why some participants can eliminate switch costs 
Better motivation 
Based on the results of Experiment 1A I assumed that best performers might be 
more motivated by the zero-error policy. According to the FTE hypothesis (De Jong, 2000; 
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010), they may be engaged in the task preparation of each upcoming 
trial with a higher level of attention and motivation. Indeed, the results of post-
experimental self-reports suggest that best performers had higher scores than most other 
participants on an intrinsic motivation scale (Deci & Ryan, 2011). Specifically, they 
reported to be more interested and felt more competent in the task-switching experiment. 
This is consistent with previous results indicating that motivation can modulate 
cognitive/attention flexibility, improve working memory performance and facilitate 
effective problem-solving strategies (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Krawczyk & D' Esposito, 2011; 
Nadler, 2013; Pessoa, 2009; Struthers et al., 2000; Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2016). However, 
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the finding of higher levels of motivation in best performers needs to be interpreted with 
caution because the participants completed the motivation scales after the experiment. As a 
result, those who finished the experiment early without an error would evaluate themselves 
as being highly motivated and more competent in the just completed task-switching 
experiment.  
 
Superior executive control 
Since best performers consistently performed well showing no switch costs in the 
task-switching conditions with a cue-stimulus interval of 650 ms, best performers might 
have superior executive control abilities, in line with the multi-tasking studies that showed 
that “supertaskers” had more efficient neural activity in attentional control networks when 
performing in the dual-tasks with better executive control functioning (Medeiros-Ward et 
al., 2014; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010). This is also in line with 
previous studies on working memory showing that “superior memorisers” had more 
activation in executive-relevant brain areas (Mallow et al., 2015).  
According to studies on executive control and related cognitive performance, 
higher cognitive control abilities were linked to improved abilities of switching back and 
forth between multiple tasks (switching) while inhibiting interference and task-irrelevant 
information (inhibition), along with a greater efficiency in continuous updating of working 
memory representations (Miyake et al., 2000; Zeidan et al., 2010). Best performers might 
have more efficient executive control, corresponding to improved switching, inhibition and 
updating when performing in the colour/shape task-switching trials. It is possible that as 
soon as a task cue appeared, best performers were faster than other participants in cue 
encoding, goal updating and task-set reconfiguration. Karayanidis et al. (2009) suggested 
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that greater preparation can optimise the encoding process after target onset, so best 
performers might also be better in target encoding and target-driven interference control.  
 
Higher general intelligence 
From the results of a Raven intelligence test in Experiment 1C, best performers had 
on average higher IQ scores compared to controls. Previous results also showed that higher 
IQ scores were related to better executive control, particularly in working memory 
updating (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al, 2006). Task switching requires frequent 
updating of the task set in working memory, therefore a higher IQ score may correlate with 
a more efficient task-switching performance. However, it remains unclear whether superior 
intellectual abilities and better executive control are the result of learning or are genetic in 
origin. There are studies suggesting that the diversity of executive functions and 
intellectual abilities are primarily genetic in origin (Friedman et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 
2016). However, other studies argued that executive functions such as working memory 
capacity can be entrained, and that training gains can translate into gains in general 
intelligence (Klingberg, 2010; Light et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the intelligence results in 
Experiment 1C suggest that differences in task-switching abilities may be linked to 
differences in executive control, and general intelligence. 
 
Better self-control and lower impulsiveness 
By using different psychological scales, I found that best performers had higher 
scores in trait self-control and lower scores in attentional and non-planning impulsivity. In 
Leshem (2015), participants switched attention between ears in a dichotic listening to word 
task with 4 target words. The target words appeared randomly in the attended ear. Leshem 
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(2015) found that participants with high self-reported impulsivity were associated with 
greater difficulty in inhibiting incorrect responses and resolving cognitive conflicts 
compared to low-impulsive individuals. Similarly, Enticott and colleagues (2006) reported 
that all subscales of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), the same impulsivity scale as in 
the present thesis, were significantly correlated with Stroop conflicts. Enticott et al. (2006) 
used a spatial Stroop task and required participants to overcome interference if a target 
arrow pointed in the opposite direction to the visual field in which the target was presented. 
They found that participants, who needed more time to solve the interference, scored 
higher in non-planning impulsivity, attentional impulsivity and other subscales of BIS. The 
researchers suggested that general impulsive behaviour in normal participants may be 
partially attributable to some forms of inhibitory dyscontrol, specifically, the difficulty of 
ignoring task-irrelevant information and suppressing inappropriate motor responses 
(Enticott et al., 2006). Moreover, other researchers showed that high-impulsive individuals 
had lower working memory capacity than low-impulsive individuals (Whitney et al., 
2004). Participants need to retrieve or activate task-relevant information from their 
working memory while inhibiting interference in task switching (Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Accordingly, I suggest that best performers’ superior 
switching performance is related to better self-control and lower levels of impulsiveness. 
Participants with these traits may be better at task preparation. In addition, they may also 
be more efficient in switch-related cognitive processing after target onset. As soon as a 
target stimulus is presented, best performers may direct attention effectively to the goal- or 
task-relevant features with reduced conflicts in response selection.  
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Gender-related individual differences 
There are other possible factors that may account for why some participants can 
switch between tasks more efficiently than other participants. For example, some studies 
have found significant gender-related differences in task switching and switch-related 
cognitive abilities (Beeri et al., 2006; Friedman, 2011, 2016; Stoet et al., 2013; Tun & 
Lachman, 2008; Van der Elst et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 2006), while other researchers 
failed to find gender differences (Polunina et al., 2018; Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Weber et 
al., 2014). However, these studies neglected gender-related individual differences in task 
switching and in related cognitive tasks. In Experiment 3 I studied whether gender 
differences are present during the preparation phase of colour/shape task-switching by 
manipulating the cue-stimulus interval. I monitored group average and individual 
performance within each gender, using GLMMs. On average, I found that female 
participants were slightly better than males at task switching in trials with long preparation 
intervals. In addition, females had a small advantage in interference control when there 
was a task repetition. The individual analysis showed that for long preparation intervals 
two more female than male participants had switch costs close to zero while three more 
females had switch costs smaller than zero. However, the individual switch costs for 
female participants varied considerably as for male participants. These results were 
consistent with previous research reporting behavioural and neural-network advantages in 
female participants when performing in complex tasks and when solving complex 
problems (e.g., Hill et al., 2014; Stoet et al., 2013; Van der Elst et al., 2006; Weber et al., 
2014; Weiss et al., 2006).  
However, in Experiment 1 I found 6 females (13.6% of 44 female participants) and 
3 males (21.4% of 14 male participants) among the best performers. This seems to suggest 
that males were more efficient in task switching, consistent with large-sample studies that 
observed a male advantage (e.g., Beeri et al., 2006; Tun & Lachman, 2008). Nevertheless, 
198 
 
a recent meta-analysis reported no consistent gender differences using task switching and 
related cognitive tasks (e.g., Polunina et al., 2018). Gender may be not very predictive 
when explaining switching performances across best performers and other individuals in 
Experiment 1A, 1B and 1C.  
Accordingly, by exploring individual differences in task switching I found that a 
few exceptional individuals eliminated RT and ER switch costs in different conditions for 
a cue-stimulus interval of 650 ms. Although many factors seem to play a role in explaining 
their superior performance, future studies are needed in order to understand the nature of 
the differences between best performers and controls. For example, a future study may 
investigate best performers in task switching and the control participants using a variety of 
tasks, such as memory and perception tasks. Best performers may have advantage in 
sensory processing that allows them to capture the cue and target features more quickly, so 
that cue- and target-encoding can start earlier. Nevertheless, further evidence is needed to 
support this speculation. According to the current results in Experiment 1A, 1B and 1C, 
best performers consistently showed better advance preparation following a cue. Then, a 
follow-up question is whether I can encourage a typical participant to engage more 
efficiently in cue-based preparation to reduce switch costs. 
 
5.3 Varying effects of cue type across participants 
Participants can be encouraged to prepare the upcoming task if there is a cue-
stimulus interval of over half of second, and importantly, if the cue informs about the 
upcoming task. The effect of cue type on task switching has been investigated in previous 
studies. It was found that, compared to non-transparent/non-informative task cues, 
transparent/informative task cues reduced task-switch costs, although switch costs were 
significant in both cue types (e.g., Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002; Jamadar et al., 2010a, 
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2010b; Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Miyake et al., 2004; Nicholson et 
al., 2006; Schneider, 2016). From these studies it was concluded that transparent cues can 
help to retrieve relevant goal and task sets and therefore lead to faster task preparation.  
In line with previous results, I showed in Experiment 2A, 2B and 2C that when 
participants were instructed with priming cues (i.e., transparent cues), participants had on 
average reduced and non-significant residual task-switch costs independent of cue-stimulus 
intervals. The priming cues were more similar to the iconic cues used in Grange and 
Houghton (2010). In their study iconic cues provided target feature, so that in trials with 
iconic cues participants can easily search for and respond to the location of a relevant 
target. According to Grange and Houghton (2010), the iconic feature cues, unlike word 
cues, can facilitate exogenous attention or directly stimulate the relevant working memory 
representations required to perform the task. If the task situation involves non-semantic 
categorisation, a specifically designed cue that primes features in the upcoming target 
would help to activate control process of task-set reconfiguration. The relevant task 
representation can be formed quickly in working memory.  
Similarly, in Experiment 2A, 2B and 2C of the present thesis, when participants 
were presented with priming cues, a visual representation of the relevant task feature and 
the related target-response mappings were quickly activated, increasing the chances for 
making faster responses and fewer errors in task switching. In contrast, participants with 
non-priming cues need to activate or reconfigure the relevant task set, and this task-set 
reconfiguration requires high levels of cognitive control. In other words, the priming cues 
provide a shortcut for task-set reconfiguration and response retrieval from working 
memory, and thereby facilitate advance preparation. 
Since in other studies it was argued that the task-switching process involves cue 
processing (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2006), I also measured 
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response times to cues in Experiment 2A. I asked participants to respond to the cue by 
indicating which task needs to be performed before they respond to the target stimulus 
(c.f., Arrington et al. 2007). Only for priming cues participants showed no significant 
differences in response times between cue-repeat and cue-switch trials. This indicates that 
for priming cues the cue-encoding processes were equally fast for switch and repeat trials. 
A positive relationship between cue RT and target RT provides evidence that fast target 
encoding and fast response execution are related to fast cue processing and cue-based 
preparation. In line with the results in Grange and Houghton (2010), only for iconic feature 
cues participants performed the cue-switch trials as quickly as cue-repeat trials.  
I found individual differences in task switching for two types of cues. With priming 
cues participants showed smaller deviations from group-average switch costs and many 
participants showed switch costs close to zero. In contrast, participants with non-priming 
cues deviated more from the mean switch costs. This may be because following a non-
priming cue informing only the upcoming task participants can be rather different in their 
proportion of prepared trials due to different task-switching strategies and cognitive control 
abilities. However, priming cues activated relevant task representation and response 
mappings, leading to more efficient preparation in each trial.  
In order to better understand the nature of the task preparation process for priming 
and non-priming cues, in Experiment 2C I measured cue-locked and target stimulus-locked 
ERPs as well as their brain topographies. I showed their ERPs for repeat and switch trials 
at four midline electrodes, and conducted ERP analysis at electrode Pz only. I found that 
participants with priming cues showed cue-locked switch positivity across different CSIs at 
Pz, whereas non-priming cues did not trigger a significant switch positivity in CSI 1100 
ms. Previous studies indicated that switch positivity is associated with advance preparation 
(e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2009; for reviews see Jamadar et al., 2015; Karayanidis & 
Jamadar, 2014).  
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Karayanidis et al., (2009) suggested that advance preparation can optimise target 
encoding and decreases target-driven interference associated with reduced post-target 
negativity. In Experiment 2C post-target switch negativity was not significant for both cue 
types and in all CSI conditions. This may be the case because most participants in 
Experiment 2C were highly prepared, so that they had decreased target-driven interference 
associated with small RT switch costs. However, note that participants varied in their 
target-locked activity (Figure 3.11). At electrode Pz, some participants seemed to show 
larger than average switch negativity that peaked around 200 ms after target onset, 
consistent with previous results (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2009). Participants with large 
post-target negativity might have delayed task-set reconfiguration and increased target-
driven perceptual interference. Similarly, individual differences in target-locked activity 
were also found in trials with priming cues. It seems that even though priming cues should 
have facilitated task preparation and reduced ambiguity of feature categorisation when 
target onset, participants differed in their reactive control process. In other words, some 
participants seemed to have great difficulty to control target-driven interference, 
suggesting limited advantage of priming cues in these individuals. Indeed, there are many 
factors that may affect task-switching performance, such as how participants perceived the 
priming cues, whether each participant relied on the information provided by the cue, 
whether each individual had high motivation to engage in the cue-based preparation, and 
presumably other variables that were not controlled. In previous studies it has been 
suggested that individuals have different cognitive processing and task-switching 
performance because of context-based motivation, psychological development and 
population characteristics (e.g., Stoet & López, 2011; Tun & Lachman, 2008; Yee, Krug, 
Allen & Braver, 2016). In the next section, I will discuss other factors that may explain 
individual differences in task switching. 
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5.4 Other factors affecting individual differences in task switching 
Induced emotion and incentive/motivational influence 
It has been suggested that emotion and various incentives play a crucial role in 
directing human flexible behaviour (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Nadler, 2013; Yee et al., 
2016). For example, Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) studied how positive emotion affects 
goal maintenance and flexible switching of cognitive sets. In this study participants 
performed a letter/digit switching task. In each trial either two different digits or two 
different letters were presented simultaneously but in different colours. Participants were 
asked to respond to the target with the colour pre-specified by an instructional cue while 
ignoring the other target stimulus. Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) suggested that a positive 
mood enhanced performance and reduced switch costs when participants responded to the 
target with a new colour that was not previously presented while ignoring the non-target 
with a previously attended colour. However, the induced positive mood increased switch 
costs when participants had to respond to the target appearing in the previously ignored 
colour while ignoring the non-target that was presented in a new colour. They concluded 
that cognitive processing and behaviour control, are dynamic and context-dependent, and 
can be regulated by affective states (see also Nadler, 2013). Other researchers suggested 
similar effects of emotion on problem solving and decision making. As stated by Isen 
(2001, p75), “as long as the situation is one that is either interesting or important to the 
decision maker, positive affect facilitates systematic, careful, cognitive processing, tending 
to make it both more efficient and more thorough, as well as more flexible and 
innovative”.  
Yee et al. (2016) studied the effect of various incentives on cognitive processing. In 
their study, participants were asked to perform in a pre-cued letter/number task-switching 
paradigm in order to receive monetary rewards. First, participants performed in a task-
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switching baseline block without rewards, although dollar signs were presented in each 
trial. The purpose of the baseline block was to calculate individual reward criterion, i.e., 
37.5th percentile of the correct response times. In the incentive condition, participants 
earned the monetary rewards when their response was accurate and faster compared to the 
reward criterion. In addition, dollar signs were presented in the beginning of each trial 
indicating the relative worth of that trial as low ($), medium ($$), or high ($$$$). If 
participants earned the monetary rewards, they were served with appetitive, neutral or 
aversive liquid as secondary incentives. Each type of liquid appeared in one block. In total, 
there were three blocks in the incentive condition. Participants rated how much they liked 
the three types of liquids and reward trials after they completed the task-switching 
experiment.  
Yee et al. (2016) found that participants had increased motivation and task-
switching performance significantly improved when the amount of monetary reward was 
increased. Participants had the smallest switch costs when monetary reward was high. 
Using liquids as a second incentive, participants responded more quickly when they 
received an appetitive liquid, but more slowly when they received an aversive liquid, 
compared to a neutral liquid. However, switch costs were not affected by either appetitive 
or aversive liquid. Based on the self-report ratings after the experiment, Yee et al. (2016) 
found individual variability in the level of motivation. There was a wide spread of 
residuals of the motivation ratings in the aversive-liquid condition compared to conditions 
with neutral and appetitive incentives.  
In their Experiment 2 researchers considered individual differences in perception to 
each liquid, rather than on the basis of the intrinsic properties of the liquids themselves. 
The preference ranking of liquid was derived by asking a new sample of participants to 
compare three juices with neutral liquid, before participants started the experiment. 
Moreover, participants evaluated each liquid based on its’ pleasantness on a Likert scale. 
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This preference ranking procedure was important as researchers were able to control 
subjective motivational influence across liquid conditions. In addition, each participant can 
be truly motivated by appetitive liquids (i.e., juices). By doing so, Yee and colleagues 
found that while most participants preferred juices to neutral liquid, they showed different 
preferences to three types of juices. Surprisingly, two participants preferred the neutral 
liquid to all juices. Yee and colleagues found that juice did not produce any modulation of 
switch costs. Participants showed only reduced switch costs as the monetary rewards 
increased. Yee and colleagues (2016) explained the null effect of liquid incentives as 
satiation-related influences on motivational states and cognitive performance. The 
increased satiation may have reduced the value of appetitive liquid over the block of trials.  
 
Aging 
There is evidence suggesting that executive functions decline with age (Tun & 
Lachman, 2008; Reimers & Maylors, 2005; for a review see Kirova, Bays & Lagalwar, 
2015). In contrast, two studies reported no age-related decline in key measures of attention 
and executive functioning (Grange & Becker, 2017; Wasylyshyn, Verhaeghen & 
Sliwinski, 2011) and one other study found smaller decrements in cognitive performance 
for older bilinguals than older monolinguals (Bialystok, Poarch, Luo & Craik, 2014).  
For example, Reimers and Maylors (2005) recruited 5,271 participants between the 
age of 10 and 66 years to perform in an online task-switching experiment. They found U-
shaped RT effect of age in the mixed task block: Children and older adults were slower 
than young adult participants. However, RT switch costs increased gradually with age only 
in participants over 18 years. There was no significant effect of age in switch costs in 
adolescents below 18 years. Reimers and Maylors (2005) study was based on 8 sets of 4 
alternative-run trials. The null effect of age may be because the RT data was too small in 
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the group of adolescents. Additionally, a web-based experiment may result in a lot of 
random noise in young adolescents (e.g., distractions), so that it was difficult to detect an 
underlying age-related trend in cognitive control in this group of participants. The authors 
did acknowledge this limitation. In addition, Reimer and Maylor proposed that the switch 
costs measured within the mixed block may be less sensitive to neurologic changes across 
the lifespan.  
Similarly, Tun and Lachman (2008) asked 3,616 participants aged between 32 and 
85 years to perform in a Stop/Go Switch Task with a total of 29 trials. Saying “Go” for 
Green and “Stop” for Red were required in congruent trials whereas “Stop” for Green and 
“Go” for Red were required in incongruent trials. Participants alternated between 
congruent and incongruent trials based on the task cue. They found that participants 
responded more slowly in incongruent trials compared to congruent trials, indicating a 
significant congruency effect. Congruency effects were larger in older adults, participants 
with lower education, and female participants. Consistent with the results of Reimers and 
Maylors (2005), switch costs showed the same pattern as congruency effects, with larger 
switch costs as age increased, for lower education and female participants, even after 
controlling for differences in health status. In addition, Tun and Lachman (2008) found 
that after controlling for health status, there were no significant differences in response 
times between adults who received a college degree and less-educated participants who 
were 10 years younger in incongruent trials. Tun and Lachman (2008) concluded that 
formal education can moderate age differences in the more complex condition that 
involves executive control. This study provides a better understanding of age-related 
executive control processes in a multivariate design. 
More recently, Grange and Becker (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 task-
switching studies and focused on response-time congruency effects. Their results showed 
no age-related decline in response-congruency effect on response times. However, it was 
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unclear whether a true effect of aging was present in accuracy. Although it was also 
unclear whether there were age-related deficits in the process of target-response-compound 
selections (non-mediated route; see Schneider, 2015) and/or target-feature categorisations 
(mediated route; see Schneider, 2015), Grange and Becker’s (2017) results add to the 
evidence of a general lack of age-related deficits in task switching abilities. More 
generally, there may be no age-related decline in key measures of attention and executive 
functioning.  
 
Typical and atypical populations in task switching 
Since task-switching performance is often used as an important indicator of 
executive control functioning, in previous task-switching research typical and atypical 
populations were compared in order to understand how there are differences in cognitive 
behaviour and brain development (e.g., Belleville, Bherer, Lepage, Chertkow & Gauthier, 
2008; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana & Minshew, 2006; Stoet & López, 2011; for reviews 
see Keehn, Müller & Townsend, 2013; Kirova et al., 2015).  
For example, Stoet and López (2011) studied 19 children with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) and 19 typical-developing controls, matched in age and IQ level, using a 
colour/shape task-switching paradigm. They found that when the relationship between 
stimulus and response was not clearly instructed by the cue (high-memory condition), 
children with ASD made more errors and had higher switch costs in error rates compared 
to a control group. When the stimulus-response mapping was made explicit (low-memory 
condition), researchers found no reliable difference in response times, error rates, and 
switch costs. In addition, they found that ASD children were less affected by task 
interference, showing similar response time congruency effects as the control children. 
Stoet and López (2011) suggested that children with ASD may have impaired cognitive 
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flexibility, but only in conditions with higher memory demand. However, the superior 
performance of the ASD children in terms of interference control may be because these 
children developed cue-target-response associations that helped them to be less affected by 
task-irrelevant information. Therefore, the critical difference between ASD children and 
typical children in task switching may be related to how they establish task representations 
and how they apply task rules. According to Just and colleagues (2006), executive 
dysfunction in ASD may result from poor coordination between brain regions that are 
necessary to complete complex cognitive tasks (for a review see Keehn et al., 2013).  
Other atypical populations such as people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) showed 
poor selective and divided attention, failed inhibition of interference, and poor 
manipulation skills (Belleville et al., 2008; Kirova et al., 2015). Using a conceptual/spatial 
task-switching paradigm with pre-cueing, Belleville and colleagues (2008) compared the 
switching performance between AD patients and matched healthy controls. They found 
that AD patients had longer response times and made more errors, compared to controls. 
Moreover, AD patients showed larger switch costs in response times compared to healthy 
controls, suggesting that AD patients had difficulties in task-set reconfiguration. Practice 
failed to reduce the task-switching costs in AD patients. A further detailed task analysis 
showed that only when switching to the spatial task (i.e., identify the left-right location of a 
digit), AD patients needed at least two trials to recover to a pre-switch level, compared to 
one trial in the control participants, suggesting a specific deficit in spatial switching and 
attentional control in AD patients.  
To sum up, according to previous studies on individual differences in task 
switching performance and various factors (e.g., Stoet & López, 2011; Tun & Lachman, 
2008; Yee et al., 2016), it seems difficult to establish the nature of the different switching 
performance between induced emotions/motivations, typical and atypical participants, and 
across ages. In the present experiments it is therefore more difficult to reveal individual 
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differences in samples of typical university-student participants. For example, although in 
Experiment 1A I identified best performers and participants who performed relatively poor 
in task switching, they shared similar characteristics in their mean response times. They 
were also similar in response time switch costs in the cue-stimulus composite conditions. It 
is therefore unclear what specific factors contributed to their performances and whether 
they had different task-switching abilities, strategies, or just showed random variability. 
 
5.5 Limitations and future directions 
Studying individual differences in task switching is a complex topic because there 
are many factors that can affect individual differences, such as gender, age, educational 
background, personality, trait/state motivation, intelligence, and so on, that need to be 
considered when making comparisons between individuals. Participants showed 
considerably different task-switching performance, and when the same participants were 
studied in follow-ups and other conditions they also varied significantly in task-switching 
strategies and performance. Therefore, studying averaged-group performance in task-
switching and the related cognitive tasks ignores individual variability. For example, it 
seems unlikely that every participant had the same task-switching effects and used the 
same strategy in an experiment.  
This points to a limitation in the present thesis because in all experiments I did not 
try to control the strategy of participants but assumed that they have been motivated to 
engage in every cue-based preparation. Nevertheless, I demonstrated in Experiment 1A 
that when using a demanding experimental task a few participants did fully engage in 
advance preparation following task-cueing. I speculate that best performers, who showed 
no errors and no switch costs, efficiently prepared each upcoming task consistent with FTE 
account. The other participants, who made frequent errors, showed switch costs or both 
209 
 
occasionally fail to prepare. Alternatively, these participants might have used other 
strategies such as two-stage of reconfiguration which means they activated task rules after 
target onset leading to impaired switching performance. When employing more 
conventional task-switching paradigms and with different conditions in Experiment 1B and 
1C, I also identified large individual differences in the mean response times and RT task-
switch costs. Variations in task-switching performance may be due to different strategies 
across individuals.  
A recent study indicated that participants can perform by associations, apply task 
rules, or both (Li et al., 2019a). In addition, participants may develop their own 
conjunctive rules, such as a “target-first” strategy as proposed by Li, Li, Liu, Lages and 
Stoet (2019b). In this study, non-Chinese participants were able to eliminate switch costs 
when they responded to Chinese characters. This is because they applied a target-first 
strategy which means that they processed the target stimulus before the cue in order to 
decide whether to apply task rules or use target-response associations. Participants can 
have even more complicated strategies when task switching. For example, three female 
participants in my Experiment 3 responded more quickly than the group average and 
showed switch costs that were smaller than zero. However, they may still have used 
different strategies between conditions because one of them showed reversed switch costs 
only in congruent trials while the other two showed reversed switch costs only in 
incongruent trials. Future research on cognitive tasks, such as task-switching studies 
should take individual variability into consideration in order to improve model fits and 
hypothesis testing and to make results more replicable.  
Previous studies have identified supertaskers who demonstrated no decrements in 
dual task performance (Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & 
Strayer, 2010), “super-recognisers” who showed higher scores in facial recognition tests 
(Robertson et al., 2016; Russell et al., 2009), and “superior memorisers” who were 
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extraordinary when memorising long lists of items (Mallow et al., 2015; Ramon et al., 
2016). Similarly, in the experiments of Chapter 2 I identified 9 best performers, to some 
extent conditional-based “super-switchers”, who showed high accuracy and consistently 
eliminated switch costs in conditions with preparation intervals across experiments. Based 
on Yehene and Meiran (2007) who argued that people may have a general switching 
ability, it is unclear whether people may also have a general cognitive ability that can be 
generalised to various cognitive and other related tasks. This is possible because 
performing in task switching, multitasking, and memory tasks require high level of 
executive functioning and some of cognitive or perceptual processes are shared between 
these tasks, such as interference control, task-set maintaining and task planning (for an 
editorial review see Strobach, Wendt & Janczyk, 2018). Future studies may investigate 
whether individuals would perform exceptionally in different complex task situation, and 
their distinct neural mechanisms.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
The present thesis studied individual differences using different task-switching 
paradigms. By employing Generalised Linear Mixed-effects Models on single-trial 
response times, I found in all experiments that participants varied considerably in their 
mean response times and switch costs. A few participants were consistently better at task 
switching than others showing high accuracy and no switch costs across experiments and 
conditions. However, switch costs emerged when both cue and target stimulus were 
presented simultaneously. Therefore, I suggest that the superior switching performance 
may be due to efficient preparation following a task cue, associated with better cognitive 
control. In addition, better switching may be linked to higher general intelligence, intrinsic 
motivation, self-control, and lower levels of impulsivity. Although gender may play a less 
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important role when explaining superior performances, using a larger sample in 
Experiment 3 I found that female participants were slightly better than males at task 
switching in trials with longer preparation intervals. Females also showed a small 
advantage in interference control when the task was repeated in successive trials. 
I also studied individual difference in trials with different cue types. In order to 
encourage typical participants to prepare efficiently, in Experiment 2A, 2B and 2C I 
designed priming cues that help to activate the relevant target features and response 
mappings in an upcoming trial. I found that compared to non-priming cues, RT switch 
costs were reduced in trials with a priming cue. Moreover, GLMM analyses suggest that 
with priming cues participants showed smaller deviations from the mean switch costs. ERP 
analyses suggest that in trials with priming cues efficient preparation was associated with 
cue-locked switch positivity at electrode Pz, independent of cue-stimulus intervals. I 
propose that priming cues may facilitate advance preparation but this may not be the case 
for all participants because individual differences in task-switching performance were 
observed for priming and non-priming cues. Participants may have different task-switching 
abilities in terms of cognitive control and motivation to engage in each upcoming trial but 
the variability in performance may also suggest the presence of idiosyncratic strategies to 
cope with task-switching demands.  
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Appendix A. Experiment 2A target RTs and ERs following cue responses 
and without following cue responses 
 
Mean target RTs and ERs following cue responses (yes; cue-response condition) 
and without following cue responses (no; standard condition) were analysed using an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with between-subjects factor Cue type (priming, non-
priming) and within-subject factors Cue response (yes, no), Task (colour, shape), Trial 
transition (repeat, switch), and CSI (1100 ms, 1700 ms).  
 
RTs 
Task-switch trials (544 ms) were more slowly compared to task-repeat trials (507 
ms), as indicated by a significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 40) = 134.15, p 
< .001, η2p = .77. Shape-task trials were more slowly (530 ms) compared to colour-task 
trials (521 ms), as indicated by a significant main effect of Task, F(1, 40) = 5.25, p = .027, 
η2p = .12. However, the main effects of Cue response (F < 1), CSI, F(1, 40) = 2.79, p 
= .103, η2p = .01, and Cue type, F(1, 40) = 3.06, p = .088, η2p = .07, were not statistically 
significant. 
 
Trial transition significantly interacted with CSI, F(1, 40) = 7.86, p = .008, η2p 
= .16, suggesting that task-switch costs were larger in conditions with a CSI of 1100 ms 
(+43 ms) compared to conditions with a CSI of 1700 ms (+31 ms). Trial transition 
significantly interacted with Cue type, F(1, 40) = 29.52, p < .001, η2p = .42, suggesting that 
task-switch costs were larger in non-priming cues (+54 ms) than in priming cues (+19 ms). 
Moreover, Cue response significantly interacted with CSI, F(1, 40) = 6.02, p = .019, η2p 
= .13. A post hoc analysis suggested that target RTs were significantly longer in standard 
condition compared to cue-response condition in CSI 1700 ms (standard - cue-response = 
233 
 
22 ms, p = .002), whereas the difference was not significant in CSI 1100 ms (standard - 
cue-response = -9 ms, p = .243). There were no other significant effects for target RT. 
 
ERs 
For ERs, there were three significant main effects: Trial transition, F(1, 40) = 
49.09, p < .001, η2p = .55, CSI, F(1, 40) = 7.88, p = .008, η2p = .16, and Cue response, F(1, 
40) = 90.92, p < .001, η2p = .69, while there was no significant main effect of Cue type, 
F(1, 40) = 1.03, p = .315, η2p = .03, and Task, F(1, 40) = 2.09, p = .156, η2p = .05. I found 
that ERs were higher in task-switch trials (9.84%) compared to task-repeat trials (7.17%); 
and were higher in CSI 1100 ms (9.23%) compared to CSI 1700 ms (7.77%); finally, ERs 
were higher in cue-response condition (11.26%) compared to standard condition (5.74%). 
 
In addition, Cue response significantly interacted with CSI, F(1, 40) = 4.72, p 
= .036, η2p = .11. ERs were higher in cue-response condition compared to standard 
condition in CSI 1100 ms (6.30%), relative to in CSI 1700 ms (4.75%). There were also 
significant three-way interactions between CSI, Cue response and Trial transition, F(1, 40) 
= 5.40, p = .025, η2p = .12, and between Task, Cue type and Cue response, F(1, 40) = 7.27, 
p = .010, η2p = .15. Moreover, there were significant four-way interactions between CSI, 
Task, Trial transition and Cue type, F(1, 40) = 7.84, p = .009, η2p = .16, and between CSI, 
Task, Cue type and Cue response, F(1, 40) = 6.29, p = .016, η2p = .14. No other 
interactions reached statistical significance. 
 
 
